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ABSTRACT
This thesis is about environmental conflict in democratic 
societies. It is argued that a better understanding of the conditions 
that produce this sort of conflict can be achieved only by focusing on 
the complex decision-making process associated with the use of natural 
resources. Such an emphasis allows for a clearer exposition of the 
roles and relationships of the main participants in that process. The 
chosen theoretical perspective requires that a framework be established 
which allows links to be made between the phenomena of decision-making, 
conflict and power relations in society. It is also maintained that 
because the state is responsible for the management of resources, as 
well as for the resolution of conflicts arising from their ownership 
and use, it is necessary to lay stress on understanding the nature of 
the state in capitalist societies and the bases of its support. The 
analytical framework is therefore derived from certain theories of the 
state.
The case of the Moomba-Sydney natural gas pipeline is examined 
for whatever support it lends to the theoretical arguments. The 
analysis is carried out in terms of the actions and reactions of the 
state, the firm and the individuals affected by the pipeline. Each of 
these agencies and actors was intimately involved in the controversy 
over the location of the pipeline within national parks in general and 
the Blue Mountains National Park in particular. The analysis corroborates 
the general arguments of the thesis. However, it also underlines the 
limitations of overarching and general theories that attempt to explain 
the relationships between the state, the firm and the community. The 
context of specific historical events is also a crucial variable which
no theory can take completely into account.
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PREFACE
This thesis can be seen as a contribution to political geography 
in that it examines the decision-making process associated with the use 
of a particular locale. However, it is also an attempt to expand the 
boundaries of the environmental perspective within the discipline of 
geography.
In 1972 controversy erupted over the location of the 1,300 km 
underground natural gas pipeline which links the gas fields at Moomba, 
South Australia with the Sydney market (Figure P.l). The nature of 
this controversy allows for the environmental emphasis of the thesis. 
Several other issues associated with the case intersected the 
environmental concerns: indeed, the interrelatedness of the issues
emerged as one of the threads running through the analysis and discussion.
Most of the evidence for the analysis has been drawn from the 
transcripts and submissions of two public Inquiries which focused on the 
potential environmental impacts of the pipeline development, as well as 
on official documents, contemporary newspaper reports and the records 
kept by various groups and individuals. Interviews were also conducted 
with several politicians, environmentalists and other people who became 
directly involved through submissions and/or testimony to the Inquiries, 
or who were simply interested observers.
The Moomba-Sydney pipeline episode contains several precedents 
relating to the allocation of natural resources. The precedents provide 
valuable lessons for environmentalists, governments and business 
enterprises and as such is an appropriate subject for geographical study.
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The overall perspective taken in the thesis is to understand 
and interpret the range of actions in the pipeline case as the product 
of the structure of the social system of which the actors are part, and 
of the positions they occupy within that structure. As such the framework 
of analysis is explicitly structural having been influenced by the still 
developing but invigorating literature in geography which is cast in the 
historical materialist mould. Chapter 1 provides a justification for 
the choice of this framework and for its usefulness in understanding 
the causes of environmental conflicts.
In Chapter 2 a more specific framework for analysing environmental 
conflicts is developed. The discussion emphasizes the relationship of 
the state to the private sector and the community in recognition of 
the critical role which the state plays in the resolution of conflicts of 
interest within society.
Chapter 3 presents a broad survey of the evolution of 
environmentalism in Australia by attempting to relate the changes in the 
economy and the general society to the growth in awareness of, and 
appreciation for, the natural environment. This chapter is also intended 
to identify some important antecedents which form the background of the 
environmental conflicts of the 1970s of which the pipeline case is one 
example.
An overview of the pipeline case is presented in Chapter 4. This 
chapter introduces the main actors in the case, their relationship to the 
pipeline project and the interrelationships between them. This overview 
is also intended to provide the reader with full knowledge of the story 
so as to obviate any possible conclusion that only those parts of the 
story were selected which demonstrated the argument of the thesis. A more
(xiii)
detailed account of the actors involved, how they became involved and 
their actions is presented in the next three chapters. The goal of the 
analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 is to seek empirical substantiation for 
the theoretical arguments contained in Chapters 1 and 2.
The analysis in Chapter 5 highlights the contradictory position of 
the state in democratic capitalist societies: because the state is
dependent on the capital accumulation process it must provide conditions 
suitable for the accumulation of capital but it must also respond to 
community demands for conservation and preservation of natural resources. 
Chapter 6 deals with the firm responsible for the pipeline development and 
shows how the firm's actions are influenced by changing inputs to 
production, market conditions and social pressures for environmentally 
responsible behaviour. The general atmosphere of uncertainty created by 
these factors causes the firm to be dependent on the cooperation of the 
state. Chapter 7 serves as a comment on the potential of protest as well 
as on the boundedness of this kind of action.
The general conclusions drawn from the empirical evidence are 
contained in Chapter 8. While underscoring the constraints on individual 
action imposed by the social structure, the analysis also reaffirms the 
role of human agency in transforming these same structures. It is suggested 
that one task which remains for geographical theory is to articulate the 
forces of social structure and human agency in a meaningful way.
1CHAPTER 1
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT AND GEOGRAPHY: 
TOWARDS A STRUCTURAL APPROACH
An important feature of democratic capitalist societies since 
the 1960s has been the growing incidence and scale of conflicts about 
decisions involving the use of environmental resources —  air, water, 
land and the mineral energy resources of the subsoil. The phenomenon 
of conflict appears to be one among many responses accompanying the 
rising awareness of the impacts of ongoing social processes on the 
quality of human life. As such, environmental conflict can be seen as 
a reaction by the affected population to the 'menace of entrenched 
power' (Rapoport, 1974:192). The reaction usually takes the form of 
overt public controversy arising, perhaps, out of a sense of injustice 
over the 'illegitimate transfer' (Cox and Dear, 1975:63) of a resource 
from a less powerful to a more powerful group. Simply put, environmental 
conflict represents the struggle by individuals to gain some or greater 
control over decisions which directly or indirectly affect their lives. 
This view of conflict denies that the organizational principles of 
society allow all individuals and groups equal access to resources and 
equal influence over the outcome of resource use decisions. Rather, it 
is based on a conception of society which is inequitable in these 
respects.
Few thoughtful individuals would disagree with Gladwin's 
(1980:243) argument that environmental conflict is 'one of the most 
complex, difficult, pervasive, and consequential challenges ever faced
by modern industrial society'. It therefore behoves social scientists,
2including geographers, to contribute towards an understanding of the 
causal processes involved. From the knowledge derived efforts can be 
directed either at finding ways to cope better with the condition or, 
preferably, at identifying means of reducing the incidence and the 
intensity of conflicts.
A fundamental tenet of this thesis is that an understanding of 
the power relationship between participants in the locational decision­
making process is an important beginning towards this end. Such a 
focus on the decision-making sphere has the advantage of identifying 
the proponents of competing demands for the use of a specific resource, 
the base and nature of their support, the mechanism through which a 
particular demand becomes accepted for consideration by the ultimate 
decision-making authority and, inductively, the conditions under which 
certain demands are met. However, to properly investigate and explain 
how decisions are made in an atmosphere of conflict it is necessary to 
consider the more general factors in society which give rise to 
differing needs and the means of accommodating them. In this way it 
can be seen how macro forces not only cause but also impinge on the 
outcome of conflicting demands for environmental resources.
A prerequisite for explanation in the approach being advocated 
is careful understanding of the circumstances surrounding actions on 
the part of individuals and groups. This necessitates heavy reliance 
on contextual 'real world'(Massey, 1974) information from the 
historical period in which a conflict event takes place. But, if 
studies of decision-making are to have any usefulness beyond providing 
a historical record, they must be set within a conceptual framework 
that allows generalizations to be made about the determinate conditions
3underlying conflicts and the prospects for minimizing (eliminating?) 
them within a particular social structure or mode of production. 
Further, the search for underlying forces operating in society as a 
whole would have the advantage of extending research in the 
environmental perspective in geography beyond exploration of the 
intrinsic worth of resources such as open space and scenic vistas 
towards an understanding of the processes which bring about undesirable 
levels of environmental transformation.
Since resource use is based on production and exchange of 
material goods, the focus of research must be on the economic 
organization of society. Engels (1951:125) provides justification 
for such an orientation:
The materialist conception of history starts from the 
proposition that the production of the means to support 
human life and, next to production, the exchange of 
things produced, is the basis of all social structure; 
that in every society that has appeared in history, 
the manner in which wealth is distributed and society 
divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what 
is produced, how it is produced, and how the products 
are exchanged. From this point of view the final 
causes of all social changes and political revolutions 
are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in man's 
better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in 
the changes in the modes of production and exchange. 
They are to be sought, not in the philosophy, but in 
the economics of each particular epoch.
This type of approach, which recognizes the links between 
social problems like environmental conflict and the relations of 
production, broadly fits what is now generally referred to as the 
structural framework. The potential which it offers for uncovering 
causal relationships in society has led to what might be termed the 
structural revolution in human geography. By having embraced this 
approach the various disciplinary perspectives of industrial location
4(Massey and Meegan, 1979), housing (Hooper, 1978), welfare (Herbert, 
1979), urbanization and urban planning (Dear and Scott, 1981), 
cultural/humanistic (Gregory, 1981; Ley, 1981) and time (Thrift and 
Pred, 1981) , geography are bound to benefit. The impact of this 
trend is also evident in studies of environmental conflict over 
location of industrial facilities (Storper, Walker and Widess, 1981) 
and urban land use in general (Cox, 1978).
However, the structural framework has been discussed and/or
applied at the macro scale — the level of society — and a demonstration
of its suitability for explanation of relationships and reasons for
actions at the level of organizations and individuals has not been
fully articulated in any systematic way. Likewise an appropriate
methodology for the collection of relevant evidence and for the
analysis and evaluation of information has not been identified. Much
of this gap in knowledge may be attributed to the recency of. interest
in the structural approach by human geographers. Another reason most
certainly relates to the sheer difficulty of empirically demonstrating
causal relationships (Wright, 1978:14). In this regard Lukes' (1977:29)
observation is most encouraging. He argues that:
to investigate the structural constraints upon the 
power of agents is, at the same time, in part to 
inquire into the nature of those agents; such an 
investigation is of its nature an inquiry into 
counterfactuals, for which evidence must always be 
indirect and ultimately inconclusive. It would, 
however, be fallacious to conclude from the inbuilt 
difficulties of such research that there is in 
principle no correct answer to the question of what 
is within and what beyond the power of agents, or 
indeed that there are no practical ways of 
ascertaining whether some proposed answers were 
better than others.
Simmie (1974:63) also offers that in testing the validity of
5conflict theory evidence and empathy are both required. Empathy is 
required, says Simmie,
because most of what is to be analysed will be 
beyond the personal experience of the investigator.
At the same time, without a sympathetic feel of 
the irrational and emotional elements of social 
interaction, it is not possible to comprehend the 
real significance of evidence.
It is hoped, therefore, that despite the obvious difficulties, 
this structural analysis of decision-making in the pipeline case 
will make a contribution, however small, towards an understanding of 
the cause of environmental conflict in democratic capitalist societies. 
It is also hoped that the method used, though largely descriptive, 
will, through its good points as well as its bad ones, provide 
guidelines for future empirical research within this chosen theoretical 
framework.
Before elaborating on the theoretical factors considered to 
be important in a structural orientation it is necessary to briefly 
examine existing studies for the contributions they make towards an 
understanding of the general problem of environmental conflict. 
Consequently, the remainder of the discussion in this chapter is 
divided into two parts: the first considers the existing literature
and the second identifies the elements of importance in a structual 
analysis of environmental conflict.
Existing studies of environmental conflict: contribution towards
understanding
Existing studies of environmental conflict fall essentially 
into three main groupings. First, the most common approach is that of
the detailed individual case history of which many are listed by 
Gladwin (1980:244). A major problem with these sources is that each
6
study is usually presented as a unique event independent of any 
contextual information. Consequently, it is usually not possible to 
make generalizations about causal processes based upon them. But they 
allow for the sort of deduction made by Kimber and Richardson (1974), 
for example, about the factors influencing the success or failure of 
environmental pressure groups.
The second approach is an aggregative one in which incidents 
of environmental conflict are compiled from secondary sources — usually 
local newspaper reports — and information is extracted from them through 
content analysis. The method is demonstrated in the work of Janelle 
and Millward (1976), Janelle (1977, 1979), Ley and Mercer (1980),
Gladwin (1980) and Sant (1981). The benefit of these studies is the 
possibility that the results can lead to the formulation of. 
propositions about spatial patterns and trends of environmental 
conflicts. Nevertheless, because the focus is still at the level of 
effects of social processes, the problem of causation remains to be 
tackled. It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance of 
establishing the relationship between patterns and trends (surface 
manifestations), such as is revealed by an assembly of cases, and 
processes (underlying forces) which are their cause. This is because 
only through knowledge of causal connections will ideas emerge for 
coping with the increasingly discordant conditions in society. Only 
in this sense can human geographical research become relevant to 
social policy.
Despite their serious shortcoming, the aggregative empirical
7studies are important for identifying what issues are raised in 
conflicts, where they occur and who are involved. As an example, in 
the only such study of environmental conflict on a global scale 
Gladwin (1980) discovered patterns and trends from which he was able 
to formulate a number of general empirical propositions. Gladwin's 
results are a valuable first step which greatly aid in the 
establishing of future research priorities. For this reason a 
summary of his findings is outlined below.
From 1970 to 1979 Gladwin and a team of researchers scanned 
a range of United States and foreign newspapers, journals and magazines 
and collected data on 3,000 environmental disputes over industrial 
facilities in forty nations around the world. The analysis of 366 
disputes associated with the United States chemical process industry 
(petrochemical, nuclear power, transport and storage, mineral mining 
and so on) led to the following propositions about conflicts in the 
United States:
(1) Environmental conflict is focusing on change — from 
existing sources of pollution problems to the potential 
impacts of new facilities.
(2) Environmental conflict is spreading —  occurring in all 
regions of the United States and is directed at all phases 
of the production process.
(3) Environmental conflict is continuing —  the number of 
reported conflicts over industrial facilities has not 
diminished since 1972, despite energy crises and recessionary
conditions.
(4)
8
Environmental conflicts vary tremendously —  no two
environmental battles are totally alike.
(5) Environmental conflict is broadening —  land use, social 
impact and human health concerns are rapidly assuming 
central importance.
(6) Environmental conflict is characterized by a division of 
labour among opponents —  different types of opponents tend 
to protest against different types of industrial facilities.
(7) Environmental conflict is decentralizing —  battles 
increasingly involve local and non-governmental actors.
(8) Environmental conflict is quite litigious —  compared with 
overseas, but the trend is shifting towards a focus on 
government administrative solutions.
(9) Environmental conflict is growing in size —  the average 
number of issues, opponents and resolution mechanisms 
involved per confrontation is increasing largely as a 
consequence of the changing focus on new facilities.
(10) Environmental conflict is becoming more costly —  costs 
consist of fines/compensation and shutdowns for existing 
facilities and postponements, delays and cancellation of 
new projects.
(11) Environmental conflict is shifting from 1 regulatory' to
’social' in general character —  such that the 'environmental 
movement' is assuming a more central role in the process.
These propositions can be collapsed into three main themes.
The first is that environmental protest is shifting from a focus on
9narrow, technically soluble problems (like air and water pollution 
control) to broader more intractable problems (such as health and 
safety, or economic and social impacts) affecting society in general. 
The second theme, that of the emphasis on new facilities control, 
underscores the growing importance of the spatial or locational 
dimension of this sort of social movement. In view of this trend, 
the study of environmental conflicts is a proper subject for 
geographical inquiry.
The third theme, an outcome of the first two, is that the 
shift towards a wider breadth in both the scale of citizen activism 
and the issues raised in these controversies necessitates new 
mechanisms for their resolution (Sandbach, 1980:10-20). The shift 
from a dependence on litigation to the reliance on government 
administrative solutions emphasizes the crucial role which the state 
has come to play in and on society (Johnston, 1980). A consequence 
of this is that the various actors or participants in a public 
controversy can be expected to be less autonomous and more politicized 
(Roweis, 1981:166) than in earlier times. This centrality of the 
state in resolving conflicts in contemporary society points to the 
need for an explicitly political perspective in conflict studies. 
Nevertheless,only by recognizing that political as well as cultural 
and economic factors determine resource use decisions will the 
dynamics which produce conflict be uncovered.
It is on the basis of this understanding that a third approach 
to the study of environmental/locational conflict is now appearing in 
the geographical literature. The approach is well reflected in a 
collection of papers on urbanization and conflict in market societies
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edited by Cox (1978). In these studies urban conflict is seen to 
arise from specific economic, political and cultural circumstances 
in society. As Cox (1978:1) explains, the dissatisfaction with the 
relevance of questions generated by pre-existing approaches led to a 
probing towards a new paradigm predicated on 'images of a world of 
antagonistic relations in which the fundamental questions concern who 
gets what and why'. This paradigmatic shift, as Cox terms it, has 
been spawned by the belief that social interaction is based on conflict, 
not consensus. But dissension, though essential, is an insufficient 
foundation on which to base explanation. Therefore a further and 
necessary premise of this paradigm is one strongly influenced by 
Marxist theory. It holds that 'the inner logic and dynamics of 
price-fixing markets [in which prices are determined competitively by 
supply and demand], and the private property rights on which they are 
based are assumed as absolutely central for an understanding of urban 
development and the conflicts which it generates' (Cox, 1978:1-2). 
Implicit in this position is the notion that conflict is a conscious 
reaction to problems accompanying the growth and development of 
society (e.g. see Roweis and Scott, 1978).
However, while the contributors to Cox's 1978 volume generally 
provide valuable theoretical discussions and illustrations of urban 
conflict, they do not offer many guidelines for the empirical 
application of the new paradigm to the sort of locational conflict 
found in the pipeline case examined in this thesis. The paper by Dear 
and Long (1978), though not explicitly cast in the Marxist mould, 
contains several concepts which provide a useful contribution towards 
the construction of a theoretical framework for the analysis of
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locational conflict. Some of their observations can be summarized 
as follows:
(1) Locational conflicts arise from decisions over the use 
of a limited geographical area. But more particularly, 
controversy is generated when the access of one group to 
a location is blocked by the actions of another group.
(2) State intervention in locational conflict has a profound 
impact on the decision situation through the addition of 
'political market' considerations to the pre-existing 
economic market concerns.
(3) A crucial variable in locational decision-making is power.
The basis of power of the interacting groups in a 
controversy essentially defines the strategies employed
in confrontations.
(4) The major groups of participants in the urban development 
process are the government, business groups (the private 
sector) and members of the community outside these sectors. 
The basis of government power is the fact that it possesses 
the ultimate authority for decision-making. This authority 
is backed by law. Business groups have financial power. 
Community power is not overt in the way the others are but 
instead is manifest as a set of strategic options available 
in response to proposals of a group in authority.
To build on these concepts requires an understanding of the 
reasons why limits are set to the access of some groups to resources. 
It is also necessary to comprehend how it is that such limits come to
be imposed and how they are maintained. In effect, there needs to be
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an understanding of the underlying logic of society — an explanation 
of the conclusion Rapoport (1974:173) draws from a wide range of 
'systemic' theories of society that 'the "psychology" of the system 
may be entirely independent of its human components'.
Outline of a structural framework for locational conflict analysis
The foregoing discussion argued that locational conflict 
typically represents the reaction to a decision to use the resources 
of a limited geographical area. This type of conflict necessarily 
involves a resource developer and an aggrieved and active population. 
Furthermore, as shown by Gladwin (1980), these conflicting interests 
depend increasingly upon the state government (politicians and 
administrative agencies) to resolve their differences. Most important, 
however, is the argument that conflict must be explained, at a general 
level, in terms of the logical operation of the mode of production in 
which it occurs. At a more specific level, the precise meaning of a 
conflict event can be more fully appreciated when seen as the 
materiality of historical circumstances. The historical circumstances 
therefore provide the context within which a set of actions produce 
conflict. Further, as Massey and Meegan (1979:159) point out, it is 
'a way of dealing with variety in behaviour; but a way which leaves 
the basic explanatory form untouched, by merely adding on some 
"structural considerations'".
A structural framework for locational conflict analysis should: 
first, identify what factors motivate action and reaction on the part 
of the main participants in a controversy; second, explain the 
significance of the role played by each participant; and, third,
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relate the motivations and roles of active agents to the dynamics of 
the society as a whole. Clearly, the first of these objectives is 
the requirement for a historical perspective. The second is for an 
understanding of the limitations on the freedom of interacting groups 
within society — i.e. an understanding of power relations. The third 
objective requires reasonable knowledge of the 'psychology' (to use 
Rapoport's terminology) of the capitalist socio-economic system which 
will be discussed in a later section.
In their conceptualization of a structural approach to 
industrial locational behaviour, Massey and Meegan (1979:159) contend 
that it is analysis
in which locational behaviour is explained as the 
result of the combination of the forces operating 
at the level of the national and international 
economy with the specific characteristics of the 
firm in question, characteristics which should 
include both the firm's place within that overall 
economic structure, and its internal form.
While this procedure is most appropriate for explaining the locational
decisions of any firm, including the one involved in the pipeline case,
the analysis of behaviours in locational conflict is much more complex.
In addition to the firm there are community and state participants
whose motivations for action may differ markedly from each other and
from the private enterprise interests. These differences must be
ascertained, and this can be accomplished along the lines suggested
by Massey and Meegan (1979). Also, it would appear that both community
and state government responses are greatly influenced by local and/or
regional social and political conditions as well as by economic
factors. This is simply because locational conflicts, and indeed the
majority of environmental conflicts, are site specific. When considering
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the locations of major battles over environmental impact, local and 
regional place names, not nations, spring to mind — Alaska, Cublington, 
Fraser Island, Gorleben, Minamata Bay, Rotterdam, Three Mile Island 
and Windscale are cases in point. Similarly, environmental/locational 
issues appear to be more influential in political fortunes at the 
local level than at the national level in most countries. Enloe 
(1975:33) observes that it 'has been mayors, state and provincial 
officials, and national representatives of local districts that have 
risen and fallen on the waves of politicized environmental concerns'. 
Finally, the impacts of an industrial facility or other land use 
decision are usually perceived to require greatest adjustment on the 
part of the population in the immediate vicinity of the activity.
Thus, in the analysis and explanation of locational conflict attention 
needs to be given to the interplay of local, national and international 
spatial and a-spatial forces in terms of the role they play in 
motivating state politicians, business interests and community groups 
to take action.
Elements of conflict and contradiction in capitalist society
There are many forms of capitalist society: to distinguish
between them is not the concern here. Rather, the intention is to 
identify the common characteristics which are reproduced in different 
places wherever the capitalist mode of production predominates.
The activity which distinguishes capitalist society from others 
is the production of commodities (goods and services) for the 
accumulation of profit by private property owners. But most important
to the problem of environmental/locational conflict is, as Cox (1978)
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points out, that the exchange of' commodities takes place on price­
fixing markets. The significance of this means of exchange is that 
competition to sell goods and services and to make a profit creates 
tendencies towards overproduction, wastefulness, and the creation of 
needs (Hirsch, 1977; Leiss, 1978). Competition also gives rise to 
market failures and monopolization (Dear and Scott, 1981). Of 
necessity, the threats to profit-making posed by these 'self-disorganizing 
tendencies' (Dear and Scott, 1981:8) must be controlled.
Inefficient and uneconomic commodity production methods are 
obvious targets for control. The drive towards eliminating these 
hindrances leads to land and other resource use practices which are 
considered efficient for capital accumulation. The profit motive 
also often causes the alienation of resources from public to private 
use (the push to utilize public park lands for the location of 
industrial facilities or for the mining of minerals and fossil fuels) 
and the transference of responsibility for certain production costs from 
the firm to the society as a whole (included here are a suite of safety 
costs occurring in the workplace, the home and the surroundings in 
general). Dissonance arises when these actions clash with the beliefs 
and interests of other members in society. And, to quote Habermas 
(1976:27), as soon 'as incompatibility becomes conscious, conflict 
becomes manifest, and irreconcilable interests are recognized as 
antagonistic interests'. Habermas (1976:27) further argues that 
conflicts are only the appearance of a fundamentally logical contra­
diction, adding:
We can speak of the "fundamental contradiction" of a 
social formation when, and only when, its organizational 
principle necessitates that individuals and groups 
repeatedly confront one another with claims and 
intentions that are, in the long run, incompatible.
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The incompatibility of interests, which is central to 
Habermas’ argument, is related to the social distribution of power 
and influence over resource use decisions. It is one of the aims of 
this thesis to empirically verify this theoretical position.
So far, it has been advanced here that the profit motive in 
capitalism creates a drive towards efficiency and economy on the part 
of commodity producers, and that this motive leads to the alienation 
of resources from public use, and to production related health and 
safety hazards. From time to time these actions cause conflict in 
society. It is also suggested that dissonance and conflict are 
inevitable concomitants of social growth and development. But it is 
left to be theorized how these 'dysfunctional effects' (Habermas, 
1979:75) are kept from causing irreparable disruption of social 
cohesion and transformation of the capitalist mode of production.
The state (comprised of politicians, administrative agencies, legal 
and other ideological bodies) has primary responsibility for conflict- 
accommodation. Because of the dynamic nature of society, however, 
new problems constantly arise for state management and hence the 
state's form and function are ever changing. Accordingly, its 
approaches to conflict-accommodation will be seen to vary from place 
to place over time. Despite these variations, Sandbach (1980:35-6) 
suggests that there is a 'model' which generally describes how 
controversies are dealt with by the state. Such a model, he maintains, 
'would emphasize the importance of the economic and social base for 
concern, and how conflicting interests are accommodated through 
debate, institutional change and legislation'.
It is possible to speak of a 'model' when referring to the
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state's behaviour because the state has an identifiable role and 
there exists a more or less definite relationship between it and the 
various interests in society. The nature of the state's role and 
relationships can greatly constrain its action in conflict situations.
The role of the state in society and its relationships to 
various interest groups is by no means straightforward or easily 
comprehensible. In fact, they are the subject of a very interesting 
yet difficult literature from a wide range of academic disciplines.
The following chapter reviews the main contributions to this debate 
to sift out those arguments considered useful for the development of 
a more specific framework which should provide greater knowledge of the 
constraints on the freedom of those interests involved in the 
locational conflict in the pipeline case. It is also hoped that the 
discussion will shed some light on the social relations which produce 
these sorts of conflicts and that a greater understanding of the 
resource use decision-making process will therefore be achieved.
Summary and conclusions
This chapter has tried to advance a logical argument in 
support of a structural approach to the study of environmental conflict 
The benefits of this approach are seen to lie mainly in its philosophy 
it seeks to understand causality as a basis for arriving at solutions 
to social problems.
Existing approaches to the study of environmental conflict 
(apart from a small group of studies influenced by Marxist theories), 
while serving to identify patterns, trends and the agents involved,
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fail to point to the levers most likely to bring about change in the 
conditions that produce dissonance in society.
It is also argued that a structural orientation would necessitate 
the adoption of an explicitly political perspective in these studies in 
recognition of the important part which the state plays in accommodating 
competing demands for environmental resources. There are, as well, 
benefits for the discipline of human geography. The study of locational 
conflict could be seen as a: core concern for political geography, 
thereby providing a new emphasis for this perspective which, as 
Johnston (1980:439) observes, 'is weakly developed within the current 
corpus of human geographical work'.
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CHAPTER 2
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
This chapter develops a framework that establishes propositions 
about the roles, relationships and interrelationships of the main 
participants and the extent of their influence on the outcome of the 
pipeline controversy. The focus is, however, on the state because of 
the pivotal role it plays in resolving conflicts between the private 
sector and the community.
An appropriate framework, one which takes into account arguments 
in Chapter 1, must reflect an understanding of the decision-making 
behaviour of the capitalist socio-economic system. It must also be 
applicable in the historical study of capitalist societies in general 
by outlining the way in which continuity and change in the actions of 
the main interacting 'elements' in the society can be understood. Most 
importantly, such a framework should allow due regard for the crucial 
role of the state in contemporary society by recognizing the increasingly 
important role it plays in resolving conflicts about the use of 
environmental resources, and in intervening in the material production 
process itself. Consequently, emphasis is placed on theories of the 
state to elucidate the roles and relationships of participants in the 
decision-making system.
The word 'system' is used here only to suggest some interaction 
and relationship between the parts or elements which constitute the 
society. 'System' is also used to convey the notion of control which
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is necessary to maintain desired levels of cohesion and to avoid 
disorder and collapse of a particular socio-economic arrangement. In 
social systems the idea of control is crucial to any understanding of 
the processes which produce desired goals and which reproduce ongoing 
functions, but this is not to suggest that social systems are static 
or that social processes are reproduced without undergoing change, 
however small.
It is useful to distinguish three elements or subsystems of the 
social whole: the state, the community and the private sector. The
following review of the theoretical literature on the state identifies 
the nature of each element and the constraints each exerts on the 
behaviour of the others and on the functioning of the whole.
A preliminary clarification of terms is necessary. The state is 
that element responsible for the integration of the subsystems. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, the state is more than the government although 
in democratic societies the government is usually represented as the 
state (Paris, 1981). The state is a hierarchical subsystem comprised 
of the national state (i.e. the Commonwealth government in the 
Australian context) within which are regional states (or State 
governments in Australia). The latter are further divided into local 
(council governments) states. At each level of the hierarchy there are 
administrative agencies which form the bureaucracy, legal and other 
ideological bodies which together comprise the entire state apparatus.
The private sector includes business firms (such as the Australian Gas 
Light Company which is responsible for this pipeline development) and 
other economic enterprises. The term community is used pragmatically: 
consisting of members of society outside the state and the private sector,
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it is a residual sector that in its political actions and relationships 
with the other subsystems reflects the interests of fractions or 
coalitions within it.
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THEORIES OF THE STATE
Theories of the state generally fall within two traditions 
which are usually counterpoised as liberal and Marxist. They represent 
polar views based on differing conceptions of the distribution of 
power within society and offer divergent explanations of the relationship 
of the state to the other parts making up the social whole. Within each 
tradition the theoretical literature is wide-ranging, often conflicting 
and generally confusing, and this lack of coherence has given rise to a 
vigorous debate (Jessop, 1977; Frankel, 1978; Holloway and Picciotto, 
1978; Gough, 1979; Saunders, 1979). This present discussion does 
not address the debate but simply outlines the main arguments advanced 
within each theoretical perspective, and isolates those aspects 
considered relevant to an understanding of the social processes which 
cause environmental conflicts and which provide for their accommodation.
Both liberals and Marxists view the state as an organization 
comprised of instrumentalities which carry out specific functions in 
accordance with the demands of particular classes or interest groups 
within society. But there is disagreement, both within and between them, 
on the basic question of the power relationship that defines the autonomy 
of the state. Further, the theories within each tradition focus on 
specific aspects of state-community-private sector relations at the 
cost of neglecting others (Alford, 1975). Liberal theories, however, 
focus on individuals, groups and powerful organizations as the forces
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which, motivated by their particular situational or bureaucratic 
needs, shape and legitimize state actions. In so doing they generally 
ignore the relationship of individuals, groups and organizations to 
society as a whole. Marxist explanations, in contrast, consider 
that conflicts within the social context give rise to institutions 
and laws perpetuating the domination of powerful interests over the rest 
of society. This fundamental difference in the level of abstraction 
limits the analytical usefulness of both liberal or Marxist theories to 
specific scales of investigation.
The liberal perspective
The liberal perspective includes pluralist or consensus, elitist 
and managerialist theories. They represent a progressive sequence based 
on an increasing influence of the state over policy decisions.
The pluralist position is well represented by Dahl (1956, 1961) 
and Polsby (1963). In this view the state is a geopolitical unit made 
up of the residents and the government of that territorial area. The 
government — the political element in society — is not independent of 
the economic and other interests since its policies are the equilibrium 
reached by group preferences. Hence, the outcome of policy decisions 
will be determined by the relative intensity of preferences among the 
members of a group. The government therefore performs a regulatory 
role. It is, necessarily, neutral in its relations with the various 
groups and derives this stance from the democratic electoral process 
through which individual politicians become the instruments of political 
majorities in society (Dahl, 1961:90).
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Although the theory recognizes the existence of an unequal
distribution of power and influence over decisions (Polsby, 1963),
it argues that, in general, the countervailing centres of power check
the influence of any single group to protect the individual from
exploitation. Polsby (1963:116) explains that pluralists reject the
idea that some group necessarily dominates every community because
The presumption that communities are likely to be 
less rather than more permanent in their patterns of 
decision-making is no doubt part of the answer, but 
another part is an even more fundamental presumption 
that human behaviour is governed in large part by 
inertia. This notion leads pluralists to look upon 
overt activity as a more valid indication of 
involvement in issues than mere reputations for 
leadership.
Herein lies a critical problem with the theory: it identifies the
unequal distribution of power within society and yet attempts to negate 
the implications by pointing to the electoral process as a sufficient 
mechanism for equalizing input of preferences into decision-making.
But the weakness of the theory is due to more than that. It fails 
to link overt activity to other actions in the society as a whole and 
so is unable to explain why particular preferences predominate. 
Certainly, any social system must promote specific kinds of actions 
and discourage or suppress others which can advantage those groups whose 
subjective interests are served by preserving the status quo. Because 
pluralist theory emphasizes harmony or order (Pettman, 1979) in society 
it is unsuited to an explanation of conflict between competing social 
groups within a geopolitical area.
Elitist theory attempts to overcome some of the shortcomings 
of the pluralist view by acknowledging that public policy reflects the 
preferences and values of a governing elite at the top of a pyramidal 
power structure, above both politicians and administrators (Dye, 1975).
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Elites possess information, human, technical and material resources 
which give them power to direct public policy (Almond and Verba, 1963).
The role of policy implementation falls to politicians and administrators 
governing the masses who are seen as a largely apolitical group within 
the society having minimal influence over policy decisions. None 
the less their interests are served because Elites share the same 
culture as non-elites since they are exposed to many of the same 
political socialization processes.
While it may be that there is considerable acquiescence by 
non-elites to the domination by elites — and Bachrach and Baratz (1970), 
Gramsci (1971) and Lukes (1974) provide useful explanations of this 
condition — dlite theory is unable to explain why there is protest for 
social change or how activism from among the non-elite gives rise 
to changes in state structure to accommodate changing functions.
The managerialist position is based on Weberian thought on 
bureaucracy and the state (Saunders, 1979). Wright (1978:183-94) has 
summarized Weber's argument into three propositions.
(1) With the development of capitalism and the increasing complexity 
of society, the need for rational administration expands both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. As a result, both public and 
private organizations tend to become more and more bureaucratized.
(2) As bureaucratization intensifies, the power of bureaucrats tends 
to increase, with respect to both non-bureaucratic organizations 
and the non-bureaucratic elements of bureaucracies.
(3) If the top administration of the state bureaucracy is in the 
hands of bureaucrats, there will be a strong tendency for
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(a) the political direction of the bureaucracy to be 
irresponsible and ineffective, especially in times 
of crisis; and
(b) the behind-the-scenes influence of big capitalists in 
the running of the state bureaucracy to be maximized.
Wright (1978:210) concludes that Weber's concept of the state 'centres 
on the ways in which elites control a particular kind of organization'.
Researchers who subscribe to this viewpoint see the state 
bureaucracy as a reservoir of power capable of overriding that of 
politicians and even that of the private sector. Pahl (1977:161) 
suggests that
it could certainly be argued until fairly recently 
that the state was subordinating its intervention to 
the interests of private capital. However, there 
comes a point when the continuing and expanding 
role of the state reaches a level where its power 
to control investment, knowledge and the allocation 
of services and facilities gives it an autonomy 
which enables it to pass beyond its previous 
subservient and facilitative role. The state manages 
everyday life less for the support of private capital 
and more for the independent purposes of the state.
Pahl's conclusion is that the state is a 'corporatist' management system
which enjoys independence from the other sectors in society with respect
to allocative and distributive decisions. Such a conception, however,
denies the fact of state interaction with a wider socio-economic system
— national and international, which gives its managers their apparent
autonomy. Certainly, the state that functions 'more for the independent
purposes of the state' would cease to be a capitalist one since a state
bureaucracy with so much autonomy from the private sector activities is
not a capitalist state (a point elaborated by Dupuy and Truchil, 1979).
Pahl's conclusion also deviates strongly from the Weberian postulate
that increased bureaucratization will strengthen the influence of big
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capitalists in the running of the society.
By focusing on the relationship within the state bureaucracy 
and on the interaction of bureaucrats with state politicians, 
managerialists ignore the interaction of the state with the private 
sector and community interest groups and so fail to provide a framework 
for understanding conflicts involving the three broad groups. However, 
Williams (1978:237) points out that researchers (e.g. Davies (1972), 
Lambert, Paris and Blackaby (1975), Norman (1975) and Williams (1976)) 
have been concerned with the roles played by a variety of 'mediating 
institutions' and are aware that 'many of these studies do not in any 
way explain the behaviour of managers except in terms of internally 
derived priorities'.
In response to criticism, Pahl (1979:43) appears to have modified 
his position on the extent of the autonomy of urban managers, but 
he insists that he
would have a personal bias towards theories which 
start from a basic assumption that there will always 
be scarce urban resources and facilities and that how 
these are controlled and distributed will always be a 
contentious political issue.
This is a reasonable posture to adopt if the concern is merely to expose 
patterns of allocation by state institutions. At this level of enquiry 
managerialism provides a useful framework for research. It does not, 
however, penetrate the logic of the socio-economic system to identify 
how it constrains the actions of the managers.
The Marxist perspective
Marxist theories of the state may be broadly divided into 
orthodox Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives. The orthodox view has
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been dichotomized around the works of Miliband (1969, 1977) and 
Poulantzas (1969, 1973, 1975, 1976) whose ideas have been labelled 
instrumentalist and structuralist, respectively. Contributions to 
the neo-Marxist perspective have been provided by O'Connor (1973),
Offe (1972, 1975a, 1975b), Habermas (1976) and Holloway and Picciotto 
(1978) who have tried to move away from the strait-jacket of ideal 
types of the capitalist state which Frankel (1967:3) has dismissed as 
'synthetic reconstructions of Marx's and Engels' incomplete discussions 
of the state that tell us more about the Lenins, the Milibands or the 
Althussers, than they do about Marx and Engels'. The new perspectives 
therefore acknowledge the inadequacy of existing constructs as a guide 
to understanding contemporary capitalist societies in which political 
developments, especially the considerable state intervention in the 
economy since the 1960s (e.g. through the nationalization and 
subsidization of industries and political action to resolve social 
conflicts), have made the state a more complex and intrusive element 
than is acknowledged in Marxian orthodoxy. The apparent success of 
state intervention, as well as the obvious limitations on state actions, 
have stimulated the search for a more comprehensive theory of the state 
which takes into account the limitations which internal structure, 
state-economy relations and economic structure impose on state autonomy, 
the power of the economically dominant class, and conflicts between 
classes or groups within society. What unites all Marxist theories of 
the state is their concern to explain the way in which classes rule in 
a particular kind of social structure.
Orthodox Marxist views on the state
Instrumentalist theories perceive the state as a set of political
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institutions dominated by the capitalist (ruling) class. This 
situation arises through its links with individuals who, because of 
their class background, occupy or hold influence over those in 
powerful positions in the state apparatus. In this tradition Miliband 
(1969) , for example, sees the state as an instrument in the hands of 
the economically dominant class and he supports the superstructural view 
that 'the executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing 
the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie' (Marx and Engels, 1969: 
110-111) .
The instrumentalist state cannot be autonomous from the ruling 
class since the bourgeoisie has exclusive sway. But to be manipulated 
the state must be seen as set apart, rather than derived from the 
competing forces in society. Such a conception presents a view of 
society in which 'the exercise of power and the formation of state 
policy seem to be reduced to a kind of volunteerism on the part of 
powerful people' (Gold, Lo and Wright, 1975, Part 1:35) in which case 
the theory is not greatly different from the elitist posture. Since 
the theory does not address the role of class struggles or protest 
politics in constraining the actions of the state or the ruling class, 
it cannot explain the ability of the state to perform legitimizing 
functions which, for example, meet the demands for environmental 
protection. It is certainly 'not true that the bourgeoisie hold 
absolute power over the state apparatus' (Frankel, 1978:60) for, even 
though they may dominate input into policy formulation, state decisions 
can reflect the demands of community interest groups. This is a fact 
with which the structuralist theory of the state tries to come to terms.
Adherents to the structuralist view believe that the state
29
structure is determined by the constraints of the capitalist socio­
economic system. Esping-Andersen, Friedland and Wright (1976) have 
identified two variants of structuralist theories, one political and 
the other economic. The latter, recognized by Baran and Sweezy (1966) , 
Mandel (1975) and Altvater (1978) , focuses on the functions that the 
state must perform to temporarily resolve economically determined 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. Conseqently, the 
state is residually defined by the functions which capital cannot 
perform (Esping-Andersen et at., 1976:189). But this view omits the 
important role of political activity which is necessary if the state is 
to maintain harmony between unequal classes.
The political structuralist viewpoint has been developed by
Althusser (1971) and Poulantzas (1969, 1973, 1975, 1976). Poulantzas
(1969:73) is critical of the instrumentalist as well as the economic
structuralist positions.
because the direct participation of members of 
the capitalist class in the State apparatus and 
in the government, even where it exists, is not 
the important side of the matter. The relation 
between the bourgeois class and the State is an 
objective relation. This means that if the function 
of the State in a determinate social formation and 
the interests of the dominant class in this formation 
coincide, it is by reason of the system itself: the
direct participation of members of the ruling class in 
the State apparatus is not the cause but the effect, 
and moreover a chance and contingent one, of this 
objective coincidence.
The economic functions of the state are regarded by Poulantzas 
(1975:81) as 'expressions of its overall political role in exploitation 
and class domination' and he does not believe that the state possesses 
any power of its own but that it is a relation, 'more exactly the 
condensation of a balance of forces'(1975:161). Such a state must be
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relatively autonomous from the competing forces in society. According 
to Poulantzas (1975:161-4)
The relative autonomy of the state must be understood 
here as a relationship between the state on the one 
hand, monopoly capital and the bourgeoisie as a whole 
on the other, a relationship which is always posed in 
terms of class representation and political organization 
... the relative autonomy of the state does not imply a 
coherent and rational will on the part of the agents of 
the state, as an intrinsic entity; it exists concretely 
as the contradictory 'play' within the state apparatuses, 
or even as the resultant of the balance of forces which 
is condensed in the state.
Although 'relative autonomy' and 'balance of forces' are important 
concepts for explaining the state's power and its relationship to the 
rest of society Poulantzas' definitions do not illuminate them. This 
lack of clarity is perhaps due to the failure to link the theoretical 
argument about structural constraints with specific situations in which 
the state's decision-making behaviour can be more easily grasped. In 
line with this criticism Esping-Andersen et at., (1975:189) comment 
that
The structuralist view of the state stresses the 
political output of state activity by which capitalist 
domination is.reproduced and the cohesion of the social 
formation assured.
Neither [it nor the instrumentalist] approach contains 
a theory of the mechanisms that link political inputs 
and systemic constraints to the outputs of state activity. 
Neither approach can analytically distinguish the extent 
to which class action mediates between constraints and 
state structures, generates those constraints and 
structures, or at times is irrelevant to the relationships 
of economic constraints to the state.
Thus while it can be admitted that the social structure constrains
state actions it is essential to be able to explain why its actions can
be more or less capitalist depending on the situation (Jessop, 1977:357).
The resolution of this problem is an essential thrust of the neo-Marxist
perspective and these theories are now examined to see what clarification
they provide.
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Neo-Marxist contributions to an understanding of the state
O'Connor (1973), Offe (1972, 1975a, 1975b) and Habermas (1976) 
have made significant contributions towards an understanding of the 
relationship of the state to the private sector and community interest 
groups in contemporary capitalist society. Their discussions go beyond 
a consideration of the relative autonomy of the state to address the 
fact of state intervention in the capital accumulation process and in 
social conflict. For this reason they offer the best guidelines towards 
developing a structural framework for the analysis of the pipeline case.
In his theory of the internal structure of the capitalist 
state Offe (1975a, 1975b) rejects as inadequate explanations that rely 
merely on external class manipulation or external constraints by 
competing classes. He argues that because social problems result from 
the inability of the state to follow policies necessary to concurrently 
support the accumulation of capital and meet the changing requirements 
of an increasingly complex socio-economic system, an adequate theory 
must identify the mechanisms within the state structure from which 
problems arise. Because the state has always intervened in the capital 
accumulation process, he suggests that the main theoretical problem is 
to explain the processes that allow the state to remain a capitalist 
state, that is, those which preserve its class character. Offe outlines 
his task as the formulation of a theory which focuses on the mechanisms 
which cause the capitalist state because, unlike Poulantzas, he does not 
see the state itself as capitalist.
In Offe's view the class character of the advanced capitalist 
state is revealed only through the selective mechanisms by which the 
state maintains its 'mandate to create and sustain conditions of
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accumulation' (1975a:126). Accumulation is that crucial process upon 
which the state's decision-making power depends: it therefore acts as
'the most powerful constraint criterion, but not necessarily as the 
determinant of content, of the policy-making process'.
The selective mechanisms, that have been labelled 'exclusion, 
maintenance and dependency', provide useful concepts to help evaluate 
the actions of state politicians and administrators. Gold et at.
(1975, Part 2:37) provide an explanation of them, noting that these 
constitute a wide range of institutional mechanisms within the state 
apparatus which (under ideal conditions) carry out negative selection 
(exclusion), positive selection (maintenance) and disguising selection 
(dependency).
Negative selection is the process by which anti-capitalist 
interests are systematically excluded from state activity by means of 
a filter system comprised of structure, ideology, process and 
repression. Structural filters are provided by the political 
institutions (cf. Poulantzas' (1969:76-8) ideological apparatus). 
Ideological filters determine relevant issues for discussion and 
policies for implementation; process or decision-making filters lead 
to conditions that favour some interests and work against others. (It 
is this last mechanism which provides certain interests with an 
advantage of access to scarce resources.) Finally, repressive 
mechanisms involve the use of coercion, especially in periods of 
political crisis when the other selective mechanisms begin to fail.
Positive selection may be viewed as a set of steering processes 
which determine specific outcomes among alternatives and define the 
economic function of the state in the process of capital accumulation.
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Offe (1975b:259) warns, however, that it is wrong to see this function
in terms of the type of rationality that governs the operation of
private organizations since
The goal that inspires the capitalist state and its 
detailed operation is not a substantive one and cannot 
be justified as a substantive one. That is to say, 
the capitalist state is not oriented towards doing 
anything efficiently or effectively (because there is 
no way to determine whether efficiency or effectiveness 
has actually been advanced through any measure or 
program) but it is oriented towards putting private 
actors in a position to increase their efficiency and 
effectiveness according to the criteria of private 
exchange and accumulation.
Digitising selection, as interpreted by Gold et al. (1975, Part 2:38) ,
operates to give the appearance of class neutrality to state activities
so that it is often difficult to identify biases when the other
selection mechanisms are functioning effectively. Or, in Offe's
(1975a:127) words, 'dependency means that this protective device [the
state] itself would be threatened if it engaged in policies inconsistent
with its protective functions'. Disguising selection is poorly explained
by Offe but it seems to coincide with the Gramscian notion of hegemony
by which, according to Williams (1960:587),
Gramsci seems to mean a socio-political situation, 
in his terminology a 'moment', in which the 
philosophy and practice of a society fuse or are in 
equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of 
life and thought is dominant, in which one concept 
of reality is diffused throughout society in all its 
institutional and private manifestations, informing 
with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, 
religions and political principles, and all social 
relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral 
connotation. An element of direction and control,
not necessarily conscious, is implied. This hegemony 
corresponds to a state power conceived in stock 
Marxist terms as the dictatorship of a class.
Offe asks how it is that the state can maintain the accumulation
of capital by private interests while retaining public political support.
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His answer helps explain why the state makes concessions to community-
based pressure groups whose demands actually reduce the efficiency of
private capital accumulation. He argues that the state performs a
legitimizing (political) function, saying (1975a:127)
The idea is that only if (and only as long as) the 
capitalist state manages, through a variety of 
institutional mechanisms, to convey the image of 
an organization of power and pursues common and 
general interests of society as a whole, allows 
equal access to power and is responsive to 
justified demands, the state can function in its 
specific relationship to accumulation.
Thus, while Offe clearly identifies economic and political 
functions for the state, he does not stop there. He integrates them 
to explain the overall power relationship of the state to the private 
sector interests and to community-based demands by examining the ways in 
which the capital accumulation process is maintained by institutions 
within the state apparatus. In narrowing his focus from the level of 
the relationship between broad social groups to institutions, Offe 
has provided a more detailed framework for understanding the role of 
the state. He reasons that the capital accumulation function has 
two components: allocation and production. Offe (1975a:128) defines
allocation as 'a mode of activity of the capitalist state that creates 
and maintains the conditions of accumulation in a purely authoritative 
way', while production involves state addition of physical inputs 
(labour power, raw materials or investment) into the production process 
itself. These functions differ mainly in terms of the policy decisions 
to which they give rise. Allocative policies are 'congruent with 
politics'; that is, distribution of state resources — land, taxes, 
tariff concessions and law enforcement services — is determined through 
power struggles for them. Production policies are based on state-generated
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decision rules that govern when and how it intervenes to alleviate 
specific disincentives, externalities or uncertainties due to failures 
in the private sector. It can be seen how these policies can give rise 
to conflicts between different groups or classes in society.
Offe then examines three types of 'institutionalized decision 
rules' — bureaucracy, purposive action and consensus — to determine 
their suitability for structuring the state apparatus to perform 
adequately the key tasks of allocation and production. He finds that 
whereas the bureaucratic rules may be well suited to the implementation 
of allocative policies it, or any of the others, cannot properly 
perform production functions because the state, not needing to adopt 
allocation optimal policies from the viewpoint of capital as a whole, 
can carry them out by rule (or law). State involvement in production, 
however, requires that policies be rational from the standpoint of 
capital as a whole but this requires knowledge of the external 
environment which the state cannot acquire given the complexity of 
contemporary society. Because the state cannot possibly plan to meet 
shifting contextual conditions it must therefore adopt a technocratic 
approach to the management of production.
Purposive action and consensus rules also have limitations as 
strategies for carrying out state functions. Offe's comments on these 
forms of administrating state affairs go far to dispel false hopes for 
effective state planning or for the outcome of citizen participation 
programmes. Offe (1975a:143) considers that, whereas purposive action 
(planning) can be applied to the design and implementation of state 
productive activities, it cannot be applied to private sector activities
since
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such an instrumental-rational mode of operation 
presupposes, as we have seen before, a degree of 
control over relevant variables that is atypical 
for the capitalist state. The typical case, rather, 
is that the amount of state power required for 
comprehensive planning of the production process is 
denied to the state by the accumulating units 
themselves. Planning thus seems to be inherently 
impossible to the capitalist state as an internal 
mode of operation — impossible not in itself, but 
because of the acts of retaliation that planning 
provokes on the part of capital as a whole or 
individual accumulating units. Such acts of 
relatiation (the major forms of which are absolute 
disinvestment, or investment strikes, and relative 
disinvestment, or displacement of investment in time 
and space) tend to make the cure worse than the 
disease under capitalism, and are thus self paralysing 
in regard to state activity.
Offe correctly points out that the contradictions inherent in the 
consensus approach create more problems than solutions because 
attempts to raise the state's administrative responsiveness would tend 
to crystallize conflict and protest thereby subverting the balance 
between the state and the capital accumulation process.
It can be concluded that many of the problems which are now 
occurring in advanced capitalist societies will be difficult for the 
state to solve. Institutional adjustments for which environmentalists 
in particular have clamoured, such as greater state control of planning 
and citizen participation in resource use decision-making, are in 
themselves inadequate to bring about changes in the processes which 
have caused excessive environmental degradation and wasteful consumption 
of natural resources. Thus, two major criticisms of institutionalized 
citizen participation are, first, that the victories won by the 
community are seldom consummated (Burch, 1976:49) and that, second, it 
has failed as a potentially effective means of redistributing political 
power, since it has not eradicated the biases that exclude certain
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fractions of the community from taking part in decisions nor has it 
combated social injustice (Kasperson and Breitbart (1974), O'Riordan 
(1976) , Sandercock (1978), Coit (1978)) . The reasons are many. They 
include the fact that there are no clear policy guidelines for 
participation (Wengert, 1976) in the making and implementation of 
public policy and that the process is, in itself, incapable of over­
coming basic social and economic inequalities. Cockburn (1977:97-131) 
in her study of management at the level of the 'local state' found that 
the institutionalization of what she terms the 'community approach' was 
no more than a corporate management strategy used, as in business 
organizations, 'to bend the customer to ... the needs of Government' 
in order to minimize future uncertainties, and secure greater efficiency 
in the management of society.
These criticisms mean that citizen participation programmes too 
often fit Edelman's (1975:309) description of them as 'symbolic 
processes' which 'more easily maintain confidence in the status quo 
than they promote disaffection and change, for the most powerful and 
most subtle cues come from established authorities'. O'Connor's and 
Habermas' arguments point to some reasons for the failure of participation.
O'Connor (1973) focuses on the relationship between the state 
and private capital accumulation in the United States to explain present 
economic and social problems. His theory of the 'fiscal crisis' is an 
explanation of the observed tendency for state expenditures to grow 
faster than revenues, a condition he believes to be comprehensible only 
in terms of the power relationships within the private sector. Such 
relationships affect a wide range of social problems which find their 
reflection and cause in the government budget: as a result the state
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administration rather than private enterprise becomes the locus of 
community conflict (a view also held by Offe and Habermas). To 
demonstrate this, O'Connor examines the internal structure of the 
state, its relationship and interrelationship to the development of 
contradictions in the capital accumulation process and to social 
conflicts. And although O'Connor's budgetary approach is different 
from that used by Offe they come to similar conclusions.
O'Connor's explanation of the functions of the state hinges on 
two premises. First, that the capitalist state must try to fulfil two 
basic and often mutually exclusive functions — accumulation and 
legitimization. The dilemma is that a state which ignores the need to 
assist the process of capital accumulation to meet legitimization 
demands runs the risk of diminishing its own power because the economic 
surplus production and taxes drawn from that surplus are necessary to 
assist the accumulation process. This presents a fiscal problem or 
'structural gap' as a result of the imbalance between expenditure and 
revenue. Second, that the fiscal crisis can be understood only by 
examining the budgetary relationship between the two basic functions 
which the state performs — the provision of social capital costs 
(costs of supporting private capital accumulation) and of social 
expenses (legitimization costs).
Social capital, comprised of social investment and social 
consumption, is expenditure required for profitable capital accumulation. 
The former, or 'constant capital' provides for projects and services 
which do not directly produce a profit but which tend to aid private 
investment (e.g. industrial development parks, roads and utilities); 
the latter, or 'variable capital', provides services like state
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educational facilities and technological research and development.
Soc'ia.Z expenses, not even being indirectly productive, drain the 
production system and reduce profits. But these non-productive 
expenses are increasingly important in maintaining social cohesion and 
in aiding the legitimization of the social system. Good examples of 
such social outlays are those supporting environmental protection 
regulatory agencies, the preservation of natural areas and relief to 
industries affected by environmental legislation.
O'Connor argues that the functions of the state are part of 
the contradictory process which creates tendencies toward economic, 
social and political crises thus demonstrating considerable accord with 
Habermas (1976, 1979) who views many current social problems as being 
related to the crisis 'tendencies' of late capitalism. O'Connor 
demonstrates this by dividing the economy into broad segments according 
to whether activities are supported by private or public capital.
Private capital is further divided into a monopoly sector run by large 
scale capital and a competitive sector consisting of small businesses.
He maintains that the growth of the monopoly sector leads directly and 
indirectly to the growth of the state and competitive sectors: hence,
as more and more of the cost of accumulation is socialized he argues 
that the necessary expansion of the state leads to even further growth 
of the monopoly sector. (Ridgeway (1970) has demonstrated this by 
relating the increase of governmental activities to control environmental 
pollution with the growth of the pollution control industry. He found 
that these new industries are owned by monopolistic enterprises like 
Dow Chemical, W.R. Grace, Dupont, Alcoa and Universal Oil Products, 
which are themselves major polluters of the environment.) The
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accumulation of social capital and social expenses becomes a very 
irrational process from the perspective of administrative coherence, 
fiscal stability and capital accumulation. The overall consequence 
of direct state involvement in the economy, therefore, creates the 
need for rationalizing involvement in the economy from the standpoint 
of capitalist interests, and the need to maintain credibility and 
support from within the community at large. In this way the state 
becomes the object of social conflicts as it tries to solve problems 
arising directly from the production process.
O'Connor, Offe and Habermas, then, see the state in advanced 
capitalism as being pressured to perform the disparate functions of 
accumulation and legitimization for which it is not organizationally 
adept. This lack of correspondence between structure and function 
causes conflicts in society.
Further comments and elaboration on theories of the state
It must be acknowledged that neither liberal nor Marxist 
theories adequately explain the nature of the state and its relationship 
to the rest of society. However, in general, Marxist theories achieve 
a greater degree of success. The arguments advanced by Poulantzas,
Offe, O'Connor and Habermas provide the best general guide towards 
developing a framework for analyzing the relationships between the 
state, the community and the private sector. This is because they 
emphasize class or group conflict as a force for change, a focus 
which requires, as a prerequisite for explanation, that the social and 
economic context within which conflicts take place be understood.
Amongst these theorists, however, only Offe (whose discussion is often
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so eclectic as to be confusing) allows for a narrowing of the focus of 
actions of broad groups to those of institutions.
Offe's theory is outstanding as a basis on which to build a 
framework for investigating the role of the state and its relationship 
to the other main actors in the gas pipeline episode. Unlike Poulantzas, 
he does not see the state in capitalist society as specifically 
capitalist, but as an organization comprised of instrumentalities which 
respond to the need to perform economic, political and ideological 
functions (cf. O'Connor). This perspective points to the importance of 
specific historical detail in the study of the role of the state since, 
to a degree, these needs change over time. The selection of a particular 
event, such as a natural gas pipeline development, allows the 
specification of an historical context which prescribes a certain range 
of state actions that define the state's role in the particular instance. 
The actions of the different institutions to which the state assigns 
various responsibilities may also be analyzed in relation to the 
functions of the state.
None of the theories of the state confronts the problem of 
the relationship between the levels in the hierarchy (e.g. Commonwealth, 
State and local government) and so this relationship remains to be 
theorized. Intra-state relationships are a most important aspect of the 
pipeline case since all three levels of the hierarchy are involved.
If Offe's and O'Connor's argument that the state is functionally 
related to, and dependent upon, the capital accumulation process is 
accepted, then all parts within it should be seen, at the broadest level 
of generalization, to have a unifying role despite the appearance of 
sectional or even anti-capitalist interests from time to time at one
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level to another. It can then be argued that because the responsibility 
for overall cohesion and coherence within society is the responsibility 
of the national government, over the long run power becomes increasingly 
concentrated at the centre and diminishes towards the periphery as 
illustrated in Figure 2.1. (As depicted there, interaction takes place 
up and down the hierarchy and between and within bureaucracies at each 
level.)
In the increasingly centralist states of advanced capitalism, 
the intra-governmental links have tightened, with the consequence that 
the power of regional and local governments to act independently of 
the centre has been reduced (Kasperson and Breitbart (1974), Broadbent 
(1977), Cockburn (1977)). Efforts by local governments to resist or 
reverse this process of incorporation, as in the push for decentralization 
to bring about territorial devolution of power, have met with very 
limited success in the United States (Kasperson and Breitbart, 1974) or 
in Australia (Scott, 1978). This raises the fundamental question about 
the extent to which the different levels of the state hierarchy are 
autonomous from constraints generated endogenously or exogenously.
Saunders (1979:189) has separated these constraints into three categories 
according to whether they are related to ecological, political or economic 
forces, and he argues that each constraint limits but does not determine 
policy outcomes since each level of government can exercise its own 
constitutional powers where desired. It is here postulated, however, 
that rarely can constitutional powers overcome these constraints. 
Furthermore, the ability of a central government to wield its authority 
can rarely be counteracted by lower levels of government. This is only 
the general relationship: in specifichistorical situations there is
some latitude.
PERIPHERY
High degree of interaction 
^  Low degree of interaction
Diminishing power
Figure 2.1: The levels of state government differentiated 
according to their power relationships.
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Ecological limiting factors refer to attributes of site and 
situation which render a particular governmental jurisdiction attractive 
or unattractive to capitalist interests. This suggests that the 
governments of capitalist nations would largely be unable to direct the 
location of economic enterprises to areas which, though most in need of 
them, are unprofitable for capital — a conclusion supported by Harvey 
(1975), Harloe (1977), Massey (1980). This is due, in part, to the 
world scale of operation of many large companies and to the power of 
capital which as Offe points out limits the ability of the state to 
undertake rational planning.
Political constraints are endogenous to the state system and as 
Saunders (1979:192) observes, take two forms: 'first the limitations
imposed on action by the internal organization of the ... state 
apparatus, and secondly the limits imposed through vertical integration 
into central government'. The first of these forms refers to the 
relationship between elected politicians and the state bureaucracy 
since tensions between them could serve to suppress certain demands.
The second, integration into either central or regional government, 
leads to economic dependency and loss of authority over some functions 
traditionally carried out by regional or local governments and 
consequently reduces the ability of these state units to make decisions 
without resort to consultation or broader considerations of conflict 
with national or regional objectives.
Economic forces are directed by the market and are related to 
factors that affect the profitability of capital investment. The ability 
of local government to provide infrastructural requirements and economic 
and other incentives, or produce demand will be weighed in locational
decisions by the private sector.
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However, it is the task of empirical research to show how 
these forces bring about specific spatial patterns and specific impacts 
on environmental quality.
Another important deficiency in Marxist theories of the state 
is that they do not include guidelines for analyzing community-based 
actions which seek to alter the relationship of the state to capital.
Yet Offe, O'Connor and Habermas stress legitimization as a key function 
of the state. Theoretical eleboration at this level of specificity 
would seek to answer such questions as: who pressure politicians into
taking legitimizing actions? What demands are made? What strategies 
are used to gain acceptance of demands for consideration by state 
decision-makers? Offe (1975a:139-40) makes it clear that legitimization 
does not take place through any organized or decentralized decision­
making process such as conflict or consensus since
such a model of decision making, at least in its pure 
form, would mean that not only the logical and 
institutional distinction between politics and 
administration, but also the basic distinction between 
state and society, becomes negated: the authority to
organize and decide upon productive state activity 
would reside in its clientele. The difficulties that 
such a loss of differentiation would entail for the 
ability of the state to function as a capitalist 
state are rather obvious.
A logical outcome of this kind of reasoning is to see the focus on the 
analysis of incidents of conflict (as exemplified in the studies by, 
for instance, Janelle and Millward (1976), Janelle (1977) and Ley and 
Mercer (1980)) as being inadequate to the explanation of the relationship 
between the state and the rest of society or between instruments within 
the state apparatus. This inadequacy stems from the fact that the 
starting point of analysis is the phenomenon of conflict over a scarce 
commodity, (e.g. urban open space). The analyses then tend to dwell on
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effects rather than the underlying causes. Nevertheless, as asserted 
in Chapter 1, these studies are, in fact, useful for pinpointing the 
spatial location of conflicts, and the associated effects. In addition 
to such studies there is a large body of literature on citizen 
participation which can provide useful concepts for carrying out 
detailed empirical work. It is here maintained that the use of such 
concepts and methods is not, in itself, antithetical to the aims of 
Marxist analysis. Johnston (1980:445) likewise argues that the 
integration of the various levels of analysis may require the use of 
even phenomenological/idealist methods.
Conclusion and a note on method
State theory emphasizes the nature of the state and the 
relationship it has with the other subsystems in society. The nature 
of the community or the private sector is not a vital part of the 
undertaking. But this is a logical bias since the focus is on 
understanding the crucial decision-making behaviour of the state in 
conflict situations.
A simple heuristic model is derived from the foregoing discussion 
and which is suitable for the analysis of the gas pipeline case is 
presented in a simplified form in Figure 2.2. The fundamental processes 
through which the state is related to the community and the private 
sector are indicated by the arrows.
In the analysis of the pipeline case it will be necessary to 
identify the ways in which the state interacts with the firm to support 
or reproduce capitalist relations of production. It must also be shown
how the cooperation which this relationship engenders sets limitations
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CONFLICT
lim itation
change/transform ation (?)
STATE
Community
interests
Private
(economic)
sector
Figure 2.2: Modes of interaction between the state, the community 
and the private sector.
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on the actions of the state in meeting demands from within the community 
which would reduce the efficiency of the capital accumulation process.
The process of selection of community or private sector demands for 
consideration may be analyzed in terms of their effects on the economic, 
political and ideological functions of the state. The role of the state 
bureaucracy can also be analyzed in terms of the actions taken in 
support of the functions of the state.
Community interest groups are seen to exert pressure for change 
in the actions of the state and the private sector. When community-based 
demands for resources (open space in the pipeline case) compete with 
those of the private sector conflicts arise and their resolution 
depends on state intervention. The policies that then emerge often 
help to bring about the changes demanded by community interests and in 
this way the community can be seen to mediate (go between in the sense 
of Marx (1973:331-3)) the fundamental relationship of cooperation 
between the state and business enterprises within the private sector.
According to Wright (1978:23-4) intervention requires that 
the state selects policies that pacify the dissatisfied elements within 
the community. By such intervention is meant that the state (A) is 
situated between the private sector (B) and the community (C) to 
resolve controversies between B anc C as shown in Figure 2.3(a).
C
(a) B--- >-A--- >-C (b)
B----------- >-A
A as an intervening variable C as a mediating variable
Figure 2.3: Illustration of an intervening and a mediating variable.
Source: Wright (1978).
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Wright also explains that mediation is a causal relationship in which 
a given social process shapes the consequences of other social processes 
such that C causes the way in which B affects A as illustrated in 
Figure 2.3(b). Hence, environmentalists' demands, for example, would 
serve to mediate the basic relationship of cooperation between the 
state and the private sector to render less predictable the outcome of 
state intervention in individual incidents of conflict.
The specific ways in which each of the sub-systems expressed 
its demands and/or demonstrated its power will be analyzed through 
detailed examination of the evidence available over the decade during 
which the gas pipeline project was planned and implemented.
A general discussion of the roles and relationships of the 
state, the community and the private sector within the context of 
environmentalism is undertaken in Chapter 3. That discussion is 
intended to highlight those features of Australian society which have 
conditioned the actions and reactions of individuals and groups towards 
environmental degradation. The periodization of actions and responses 
is seen to be an important part of the approach being advocated in this
thesis.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EVOLUTION OF AN AUSTRALIAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS
During the past 200 years Australia has been transformed from 
a small traditional hunter-gatherer society into one of the most 
highly industrialized, urbanized and affluent countries in the world.
In the process Australia has been incorporated into the dominating 
global economic system, with resulting international linkages that have 
allowed external forces to shape resource use and ownership patterns.
The growing exploitation of natural resources and the increasing scale 
of impacts on the landscape and on society have contributed to dramatic 
shifts in attitudes towards the environment which, in turn, have led to 
a changing evaluation of the environment and to new approaches for 
resource management. The evolving environmental consciousness arising 
from these developments is described in this chapter. The overall 
perspective is an explanation of how shifting environmental attitudes 
arose out of changing needs for resources within Australia and the 
world at large. The main argument is that the evolution of attitudes 
must be linked to historical stages in the economic development of 
Australian society.
Leo Marx (1964) demonstrated this interplay between the products 
of human consciousness and actions that take place in the external 
environment through the identification of cultural symbols found in 
literature. In his explanation of the American view of the pastoral 
landscape as an ideal, he argued that it was part of the romantic 
movement which arose in response to the mechanization of the industrial
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revolution and the general need in society for a reconciliation 
between the natural and the civilized. Likewise, the changing visions 
of the Australian environment identified by Heathcote (1972, 1976) 
reflect the need generated over time to redefine an ideal amidst 
ever-changing social and physical conditions rather than just the 
interplay of 'the nature of the continental environment itself ... 
the nature of the various men who made the assessments; and ... the 
means by which the assessments were made — the media of description 
and communication' as Heathcote (1972:78) concluded. Yet Heathcote's 
work does provide useful concepts with which to describe the 
manifestations of the processes responsible for transformation of the 
physical environment.
Heathcote (1972) appropriately distinguishes between scientific, 
romantic, colonial, national and ecological visions of the Australian 
environment. He also emphasizes (1972:96) that there has not been an 
'absolute and continued dominance of any one vision, but a complex 
interplay of the facets of many visions'. It will be shown here how 
these views arose out of- the problems and potentials of ongoing social 
processes.
The evolution of an Australian environmental consciousness may 
be conveniently divided into three phases, the first of which 
extended from the start of European settlement in 1788 to the early 
1890s. The actions of individuals and groups within all sections of 
early Australian society reflected the needs of a pioneering 
population and its imperial rulers to explore, exploit and adjust to 
the conditions encountered in a foreign and hostile setting. These 
factors combined to shape actions which produced decidedly destructive
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impacts on the natural environment. They also established a framework 
which, to a large extent, determined the nature of future attitudes 
towards the environment.
The second phase, from the 1890s to the early 1960s, was 
marked by a rise of interest in bushwalking and nature study spawned by 
the loss of natural areas and open spaces in built-up urban areas.
The legacy of this period is a number of national parks and scenic 
reserves.
The third phase of environmental consciousness began in the 
1960s and extends to the present. Its hallmark has been the direct 
conflict of environmental interest groups with land (resource) 
developers and the government. Moreover, a much wider variety of 
community groups — from trade unions to members of the intelligentsia — 
have been involved than in the previous period. Further, their concerns 
have sometimes reflected a search for alternatives to materialism and 
a way of life in which the potential for social conflict and ecological 
disaster are not ever-present. This phase may also be seen as a time 
in which environmental interests projected a vision of what may be 
termed idhe good s o c v e ty.
This discussion tries to identify some of the main features 
of Australian culture, politics and economy which contributed to
changing environmental attitudes during each of these phases. A 
brief preliminary discussion of the time prior to European occupancy 
of the continent highlights the traditional beliefs and practices of 
the Aboriginal society which enabled use of the environment while 
allowing for preservation of the landscape in a relatively pristine
condition.
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PRIOR TO 1788 — THE FIRST 30,000 YEARS
Prior to 1788 the Australian environment had accommodated a 
small Aboriginal population for an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 years 
(Jones, 1968; Bowler et at., 1970). Although the present Aboriginal 
population of 160,000 is only about one per cent of the Australian 
total, the tenacity of their culture since European colonization of 
the continent suggests that, with adequate political support, their 
traditional ways of evaluating the physical environment may become a 
more important influence on environmental resource use decision-making 
in the future.
Various researchers (Smith, 1960; Rapoport, 1972; Tonkinson, 
1978), have commented on the striking differences in attitude and 
environmental perceptions between the Australian Aborigines and the 
early European settlers. Rapoport (1972), for instance, observes that 
what to Europeans were uniform featureless landscapes with resources to 
be exploited were to Aborigines environments rich in history, cultural 
meaning, sacredness, and subtle ecological variability that only the 
intimacy of long harmonious association could have permitted.
The Aborigines transformed the natural environment to the 
limits of the available technology and within the prescription of 
their social organization. Their society was structured around an 
economy that dictated consumption, distribution and exchange 
relationships compatible with a hunter-gatherer mode of production. 
Their culture also incorporated practices that ensured production and 
reproduction of material needs within that mode of living (Strehlow,
1965; Bride, 1969; Jones, 1969).
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Anthropological and archaeological research has indicated that 
the landscape described by eighteenth century explorers and naturalists 
was the result of millennia of exploitation and moulding during which 
dramatic changes took place (Jones, 1973). The ecological types 
encountered by the British settlers may therefore be seen as equilibrium 
states in which human beings and nature were well adapted (Jones, 1973).
From the advent of European habitation of the continent there 
has been domination of the Aboriginal people and disregard for their 
culture with a consequent failure to incorporate any of the traditional 
Australian evaluations of the natural environment into the European 
culture. The resulting general lack of knowledge of, and appreciation 
for, the beliefs of the indigenous people has results in conflict 
between the two cultures. And as the growing appetite for resources in 
the world pushes Westerners further into territory long held sacred by 
the Aborigines, conflicts over the use of land — such as was experienced 
in the Aboriginal opposition to the drilling for oil at Noonkanbah in 
Western Australia and in the growing land rights or outstation movement 
(Coombs, 1978; Meehan arid Jones, 1978) — are bound to increase.
1788 TO THE 1890s: ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS
IN AN EMERGING CAPITALIST ECONOMY
From 1788 to the 1890s dramatic changes occurred in Australian 
society and in the natural environment. Attitudes towards nature were, 
in the main, exploitative and actions were destructive of the landscape. 
However, towards the end of the nineteenth century there were signs of 
a growing awareness of the need to conserve resources such as forests, 
soil and water — if only to ensure their availability in the future.
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The incipient capitalist economy based on agricultural 
production developed, and mature capitalist relations of production 
emerged. The period of incipient capitalism can be said to have 
lasted from 1788 to the late 1850s. The reaction to the discoveries 
of gold in the 1850s caused rapid growth in urbanization and 
industrialization and established the mechanisms for the development 
of a more mature capitalism in the next century. The main changes 
taking place in the society during each of these periods are examined 
in this section.
1788 to 1856: environmental transformation from forests to farmland
In 1788 when European settlement began in Australia the 
population in Great Britain was mainly agrarian (East, 1969), but 
the process of industrialization had already created semi-industrial 
cities (Leo Marx, 1964). Britain was a powerful imperial and maritime 
state which, through the political and economic centre of London, had 
gained control over the major economies of the world (Spate, 1969).
Britain's powerful political and economic position at this 
time was made possible by the industrial revolution which had been underway 
for some time. The process was spurred by science and technology 
(skills and tools) which were viewed in some quarters as great 
civilizing forces capable of liberating people from primitive 
relationships with nature and offering the potential for them to 
dominate it (Leiss, 1972).
The ideology or ideologies that governed the process of 
development of Australia were transported from the British cultural
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context and the particular form assumed in Australia depended on 
Britain's policy towards development and governance of the country, 
the visions of the settlers themselves and the limitations set on 
government and the rest of society by the physical environment.
The penal and military nature of the early settlements, and 
perhaps the time they were established, were also important antecedents 
to the development of an Australian culture, economy and government. 
They affected patterns of ownership, use and allocation of resources, 
evaluation of the natural landscape and, to some extent, spatial 
concentration of population. Although most of the first settlers were 
deprived people pushed out of British society, they nevertheless hoped 
to obtain a share of the necessities of life promised but never 
delivered in the mother country, and they reproduced British relations 
of production and attitudes to nature in the new environment.
Environmental attitudes of the early settlers
In the first few years after settlement was established at 
Botany Bay in New South Wales the small population of convicts, free 
settlers and government officials was mainly concerned to experiment 
with methods of growing food crops and raising livestock to supplement 
the infrequent supplies from Britain. Linge (1979b) chronicles the 
many failures experienced as the settlers became familiar with the new 
land. However, it was not until the late 1820s that there were major 
successes with sheep and cattle raising and wheat farming. These 
permitted the reorientiation of the economy from a subsistence to a
market economy.
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One of the main reasons for the difficulties encountered in 
establishing these staples of agricultural production was the fact 
that the physical environment encountered in Australia was as remote 
from the European experience as the continent itself was from Britain. 
Field's (1825:425) comment on the ubiquitous eucalyptus foliage,
'there is no flesh and blood in it: it is not of us, and is nothing
to us', may well have been representative of the sentiments of the 
early settlers towards the entire setting. This lack of intimacy 
meant that knowledge had to be gleaned by trial and error. Furthermore, 
the settlers had to contend with their own antipathy towards Australia 
since many, being convicts and poor people, had little choice as to 
where they were sent.
Smith (1960), reviewing the descriptions of the climate, 
artistic renditions of species and their habitats and the impressionistic 
reports of scientists and naturalists, concluded (p.184) that the 
reports led to 'the belief that the natural productions of Australia 
were novel creations and that ... Australian scenery was visually 
monotonous and induced feelings of melancholy'. Wace (1980:43), 
after examining the diaries and letters of settlers in transit between 
1825 and 1875 remarked that they would have been 'less than human if they 
had not imagined a more beautiful, productive and attractive place than 
the new land was likely to afford' and 'not surprisingly many recorded 
disappointment among their first impressions, usually vented on the 
unkempt raw aspect of the new settlements, or the harsh scrubs'.
Likewise, Powell (1975:24) was moved to declare, 'Australia was by no 
means easily loved'.
In Australia settlers were not presented with a situation
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conducive to the creation or nurturing of a myth of superabundance or 
of romantic visions of nature. The harsh environment had to be 
confronted and transformed to ensure the realization of dreams (or 
visions). To understand the role of the government and the rest of the 
society in the process attention must be focused on the social 
decision-making process, in particular the dominating influence of the 
imperial government in the institutionalization of the relations of 
production (i.e. social and property relations) as the embryonic 
society emerged.
The establishment of British relations of production in Australia
In 1821 settlement on the Australian mainland was confined to 
the Cumberland Plain within New South Wales. Of the population of 
31,635 (Linge, 1979b:55) in New South Wales at the time, over half of 
the adults were bonded convicts with the remainder ex-convicts and 
free settlers and their children. The first Governors were therefore 
concerned to maintain law and order as well as to settle the continent 
as a British colonial possession.
Despite disagreement over Britain's motives for establishing 
settlement in Australia eight years after it declared sovereignty over 
the continent in 1770 (see for example the arguments presented in 
Shaw, 1966; Blainey, 1966; Dallas, 1969; Goodwin, 1974; Cloher, 1975), 
it would erroneous to conclude, as did Carron (1979:64) , that 'there 
was no land use policy other than that the Colony should become self 
sufficient as soon as possible'. Indeed, all the evidence points to a 
deliberate exercise of state control over ownership of land. The land 
which was owned communally in the hunter-gatherer economy of the
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Aboriginal society became the property of the Crown and the early 
Governors exercised their power over its distribution according to 
general guidelines set out in London. Under the new system land was 
easily available in fee simple (but without rights to ownership of 
mineral resources) to freed convicts and their local rulers and to 
those pioneering free settlers who wished to experiment with farming 
in a water deficient environment. The parliamentary debates cited by 
Ghosh (1954), Shaw (1966) and Goodwin (1974), over an appropriate land 
tenure system for Australia refute the claim that land tenure began 
with the simple assumption that all land was the property of the Crown.
Shaw (1966:65) stated that British land policies instructed the 
first Governors to grant thirty acres to freed convicts, with an extra 
twenty acres for their wife and ten for each child. Later, provisions 
were made for more land to be allocated to those individuals who, 
because of their good conduct, merited larger parcels. Military and 
administrative personnel were also given larger pieces of land, but 
still in blocks too small for self-sufficient food production under 
Australian conditions. Thus, few of those eligible for land had 
taken up farming by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a situation 
that led to a general failure to achieve self sufficiency in the Colony 
(then only New South Wales).
In Britain the critics complained of the high cost of maintaining 
the antipodean dependency and spoke of the need to entrust honest men 
with the development of the continent (Shaw, 1966:77-118; Goodwin, 
1974:11-15) hence after 1820 the British government assisted immigrants 
to Australia. Shaw found that in the early 1800s the British government
insisted that settlers should possess capital and it was these owners of
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capital who pioneered the successful grazing industry and stimulated 
further private capital investment in the Colony. But their success 
would hardly have been possible without changes in government policy 
towards the occupancy of land. By permitting free settlers to squat 
on extensive areas of land the government allowed the growth of the 
'squattocracy' — a small group of pastoralists with large land holdings 
who by the 1840s had gained power and control over the economy and the 
government.
The rise of the squattocracy. Free settlers were charged a 
nominal rent for occupying extensive land holdings in what has been 
described as an 'independent, individualistic, mobile and 
opportunistic mode of settlement' (Powell, 1976:28). The production 
of agricultural commodities, especially wool and wheat, was encouraged 
by the growing demand in Great Britain. This new role stimulated a 
re-evaluation of Australia, and the prospect of expanding capital 
assets gave an incentive both to individual entrepreneurs and also 
economic theorists. One such was a civil servant, Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield, who argued for a policy to effect closer settlement through 
a process of systematic colonization and influenced land policy in 
Australia (Ghosh, 1964; Mills, 1968; Philipp, 1971; Williams, 1975). 
Williams (1975:73) has drawn attention to Karl Marx's comment that 
'Wakefield had unwittingly put his finger on the true nature of the 
capitalist economy, for systematic colonization was the artificial 
means of reproducing the class structure and the capitalists' means 
of production in a new setting'. However, even though Wakefield's 
concepts were put into effect only in South Australia, the fact that the 
ideas governing the development of the society were transferred from
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Britain was sufficient guarantee that Australia would be a capitalist 
society.
The 1830s, 1840s and 1850s witnessed a rapid expansion of 
farming activities. And as individual entrepreneurs exercised their 
freedom in the Australian commons (cf. Hardin, 1968) their actions 
caused large-scale changes in the natural environment as forests and 
scrub were cleared for paddocks, pastures and fields. By 1850 most 
of the better farmland was occupied (Butlin, 1959:29) and widespread 
forest clearance was causing soil and watershed damage and would create 
the need in later years for afforestation and forest conservation 
schemes (Powell, 1976; Carron, 1979). However, these destructive 
actions should not necessarily be attributed to a disregard for the 
environment, but to the dearth of knowledge about the Australian 
ecosystem and a lack of expertise among the settlers.
Another aspect of environmental change was the effort to 
Europeanize the landscape with imported plants, animals and models 
(chiefly British) of architectural and garden design (Heathcote, 1972). 
These imports, along with squatting and pastoralism, occupy an 
important place in the Australian ethos.
The effects of the squattocracy on social relations were 
beginning to be felt by the late 1840s. There was general resentment 
against the control that squatters exerted over vast areas of land.
Two of the most influential opponents of this mode of land tenure were 
the Governor of New South Wales, Sir George Gipps, and the Bishop of 
Australia. They shared the view that the land was 'the rightful 
patrimony of all the people of the United Kingdom' (Historical Records
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of Australia, Series 1, vol. 24:782). In April 1844 Gipps proposed 
regulations to limit the size of each cattle and sheep station, 
generally to twenty square miles (52 km2); to reduce demand for land 
by imposing a limit on the number of stock carried on each station; 
and to abolish the practice of applying the leasing fee of £10 per annum 
to more than one station.
In expressing support for these initiatives, the Bishop of
Australia observed (Historical Records of Australia, Series 1,
vol. 24:781-6) that the regulations would 'have been opposed by few,
if any, who had not a direct personal interest in frustrating them'.
He saw emerging out of the existing system a 'close corporation of
1,000 or 1,500 persons' who once allowed temporary occupancy of the
land would effectively prevent the majority of the population from
gaining any access to it. Therefore, to allow the squatters the right
to use large tracts of land was not 'reconcileable with the rules
either of justice or sound policy'. The Bishop eloquently asked:
Considering the numbers, station, and influence 
of those who compose the Squatting interest, and 
that they have already a predominant influence in 
the Legislative Council, do you not clearly perceive 
that the effect of such measures, as we have been 
considering, must be to throw the whole power of the 
country into the hands of those few persons, in whom the 
bulk of real property will be vested? And what will 
this be but to create a democratic oligarchy, which will 
not long be denied the control and disposal of what are 
now the revenues of the Crown, in trust for the whole 
people of the United Kingdom? What can the Crown oppose 
to such a power? And what can the people do when they 
require land, and find that the whole is monopolized by a 
few, so that the many cannot obtain a single acre without 
coming to them, and agreeing to take it upon their own terms? 
{Historical Records of Australia, Series 1, vol. 24:786).
Despite the objection of these influential individuals and 
the more widespread opposition to the land rights gained by squatters, 
by 1849 the squatters were able to purchase free-hold rights to their
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properties under an Order in Council. Thus they assumed the highest
social, economic and political status (Butlin, 1959; Williams, 1975;
Powell, 1976). Along with this security arose a conservatism which
was expressed in actions to subvert legislation for more equitable
land distribution through various evasions as well as massive legal
purchases (Williams, 1975:80). In Williams' view (p.65) this
monopolistic land ownership pattern gave rise to a class struggle
over the resource. This trend towards disparate ownership of natural
resources was only exacerbated by a series of events beginning with
the discovery of gold in the middle of the nineteenth century. Like
other problems, conflicts over the ownership of land persisted.
Howitt's (1855, vol. 1:242) observations of Victorian society during
the mid-1850s provide some affirmation that the allocation of land
continued to be 'a great question'. The following comment points not
only to the role of the state in deciding the land question, and its
relationship to the landed interests, but may also partly explain the
high concentrated spatial pattern of settlement which has remained
essentially unaltered over time.
[The Government] will not throw a good quantity 
[of land] into the market, so that people could get 
little farms and enclosures, for that would reduce the 
price; but they only sell little bits at such 
intervals of time as ensures a monstrous price for it; 
for people must have houses of some sort and somewhere.
But where? It can be nowhere but in Melbourne or 
Geelong, for they will not sell land up the country: 
that would interfere with the squatter; and the squatter 
and the Government, however they may differ on other 
points, are perfectly agreed on this. The squatter 
insists that he ought to have all the land — that there 
is nothing like wool; and the Government officers don't 
want to take any of the squatter's land, for it would 
reduce the pressure on Melbourne, and, of course, on 
the value of town allotments, in which, as they know 
beforehand where and what is to be offered for sale, 
they have great advantage for speculation. (Howitt, 1855, 
vol. 1:275).
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Gold: providing for a re-evaluation of the Australian environment
The 1850s began with gold-rushes in Victoria and New South 
Wales. Discoveries, particularly in Victoria, changed the British 
assessment of the wealth to be derived from Australia more than any 
other prior event, and over time contributed to an increasingly 
favourable view of the continent throughout the world (Goodwin, 1974; 
Heathcote, 1976). More fundamentally, however, the discovery of gold 
attracted a flood of British capital and labour with demanas which set 
off a sequence of actions leading to the development of an industrial 
capitalist economy after the 1860s.
Through its role in transforming the economy, gold intensified
the destructive human impacts on the natural environment. There were
dramatic alterations in the landscape of gold-mining areas. Howitt
(1855, vol. 2:47-8), described the 'most wonderful metamorphosis of the
country where gold is'. In one example he said:
Little more than a year ago, the whole of this valley 
on the Bendigo Creek, seven miles long by one and a 
half wide, was an unbroken wood! It is now perfectly 
bare of trees, and the whole of it is riddled with 
holes of from ten to eighty feet deep — all one huge 
chaos of clay, gravel, stones, and pipe-clay, thrown 
up out of the bowels of the earth!
Powell's (1976:37) comments on the environmental impact of gold-mining
are an appropriate assessment of the effects of the range of economic
activities from the 1820s to the 1850s.
It may be that the worst feature of this period — 
and it is no better for being inevitable — was that 
the mining interests, great and small, were permitted 
so much control over the Colony's forest and water 
resources at a time when there was general ignorance 
at every level of the full extent of those resources 
and their future significance.
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By the late 1850s, with the exception of Western Australia, 
each of the colonies into which Australia had been divided (New South 
Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Western 
Australia) was granted political independence from Britain.
Undoubtedly, their visions of nationhood were strengthened by the 
economic benefits of gold. But these events only intensified the 
destructive impacts on the natural environment as inter-colony 
competition for economic development activities became institutionalized 
within the framework of independence.
1856 to the 1890s: a shift in focus from the rural to the urban
The late 1850s began a period of rapid capital formation and 
intense economic development based on the exploitation of natural 
resources, high internal demand for goods and services, high earnings 
from export of gold, wool and agricultural products and the use of 
overseas capital for development activities. From that time until the 
close of the nineteenth century was a period of maturing capitalist 
relations of production in which the society continued to convert 
environmental resources into wealth through the intensification and 
concentration of economic activities. The major depression of the 1890s, 
which drastically affected the lives of many in the industrial cities of 
Sydney and Melbourne in particular, was only a temporary setback in the 
overall process of environmental transformation that, after the turn of 
the century, intensified within a new framework of federation and 
diversified trade linkages around the world.
Butlin (1959, 1962, 1964) and Linge (1979b) make important 
contributions to an understanding of the profound changes occurring as
the colonial economies added commercial and industrial activities to a
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still dominant agricultural base. Butlin's work emphasizes the process 
of capital formation while Linge focuses on the rise and expansion of 
manufacturing industries and their spatial distribution. The 
environmentally important aspect of these developments was the shift in 
the focus of attention from the extensive iterative form of land use 
involved in pastoralism and crop production to the deliberate and 
spatially concentrated urban form suited to the growth and expansion 
of commercial and industrial activities. As these activities tended to 
become concentrated around the ports where the earliest European 
settlements began, these same areas became the locale of environmental 
conflicts as urban congestion lowered levels of sanitation and 
diminished recreational open space.
During this gold age Australia attracted a sustained flood of
immigrants. From 1861 to the beginning of the economic depression in
1891, the population increased at a compounded rate of over 3 per cent
per annum (Butlin, 1964:12) and produced a remarkably concentrated
spatial pattern of urban settlement which, despite the problems it
created, has persisted to the present (Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1). The
interplay of forces that contributed to this distribution of population
has been conveyed by Butlin (1964:6):
The outstanding characteristic of Australian economic 
history was ... the exceptional rate of urbanisation of 
the local population ... By 1891, two-thirds of the 
Australian population lived in cities and towns, a 
fraction matched by the United States only by 1920 and 
by Canada not until 1950. Most of Australian capital 
equipment went into growing towns, most of the 
expanding workforce was employed in urban occupations 
and the greater part of gross product came from urban 
activity ... The process of urbanisation is the central 
feature of Australian history, overshadowing rural 
economic development and creating a fundamental contrast 
with the economic development of other 'new' countries.
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The changes in the economic base and the increasing concentration 
of people and activities required a shift in the role of government from 
the earlier emphasis on land settlement and penal control to a concern 
with facilitating economic development. This required the government 
to assume a share of the responsibility for economic development equal 
to that of the private sector (Butlin, 1959). However, government 
involvement was mainly in the provision of transport and communications 
infrastructure and the procurement of capital and labour through 
European markets — primarily Britain.
Australia's dependence on Britain created what Butlin (1959:31) 
referred to as a 'formal satellitic relationship ... in that the scale 
of Australian activity and the rate of growth were limited, in the 
aggregate, by the supply of British capital and migrants'. The 
dependence on overseas sources of capital and labour had two important 
impacts on Australian society. First, it created a strong nexus between 
Australia and Britain; second, it caused intense competition between 
colonies as each tried to secure these factors of production in a 
common market-place. This latter effect had major significance for 
resource management and environmental conservation.
Inter-colony competition: the significance for environmental resource
management
The consequences of competition between the colonies were 
political conflicts, waste of resources and a reluctance on the part of 
governments to adopt policies which would preclude the establishment of 
industries within their colony.
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The institutionalization of these competitive relationships in 
the form of tariff policies which emerged after the mid-1860s was both 
a response to the need to safeguard investments and an attempt to 
overcome the relatively low levels of internal demand for commodities 
within each colony. Tariffs were used by all governments to stem the 
flow of manufactured goods between the colonies and from overseas while, 
at the same time, providing a major source of revenue. Internal tariff 
barriers were not removed until after Federation in 1901. (A 
Commonwealth Tariff Board was set up in 1922 to handle all external 
tariffs (Crawford, 1968:463).)
Linge (1979a:193) observes that successive governments
first in the separate colonies and then in Australia 
as a whole, found various reasons for maintaining and 
gradually increasing the level of tariff protection: 
among the arguments were economic growth, full 
employment, national self-sufficiency, improving the 
balance of payments, increased customs revenue, unfair 
competition from low-wage countries and so on.
The resulting high tariff structures, Linge argues, when combined with
high transport costs have caused many firms to focus on regional
markets, thereby fragmenting the productive capacity of industry.
Thus, enterprises less able to achieve economies of scale, largely
rely on government to maintain domestic markets for their products and
to support the externalization of such non-productive outlays as
pollution expenses. Since urban pollution, sanitation and open space
provision became major issues influencing the growth of the Australian
environmental movement in the early years they are briefly discussed in
the next section.
Because large urban populations generate demands for consumer
goods, housing and other services, colonies with big cities became
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powerful. These, in turn, attracted industrial production, especially 
at a time of limited technological development. The ability of the 
rapidly developing economies to absorb labour sparked off widespread 
internal migration of people between and within the colonies (Butlin, 
1959:65; Linge, 1979b:12). This mobility had its own problems and 
potentials. One obvious problem was the resentment of governments 
over the loss of immigrants whom they had sponsored. Another was the 
discontent engendered in small towns where people perceived government 
policies as favouring the capital cities. Linge (1979b:18) found that 
it was this reaction to metropolitan dominance which led to the 
formation of Decentralisation Leagues, 'a movement that in various 
guises has become ingrained in the Australian political and economic 
environment'.
One of the potentials of high mobility was to present labour 
with a choice of locations in which to work. Another was the opportunity 
to evaluate the importance of the rural against the urban environments. 
Hence, the 'bush ethos' is said to have been created by people who moved 
freely between city and country environments (R. Brissenden, pers. comm.) 
Broadly speaking, the bush ethos is an expression of appreciation for 
the aesthetic and spiritual worth of the Australian natural landscape 
and the rural way of life. Much has been written about the bush ethos 
(e.g. Ward, 1958; Turner, 1964; Elliot, 1967; Powell, 1972; Serie, 
1973) which forms a major component of the Australian environmental 
consciousness.
Problems and potentials in the nineteenth century Australian city
The main environmental problems of cities of the late nineteenth
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century were poor sanitation and the absence of open space for park 
land. Both problems were to persist, substantially unresolved, well 
into the twentieth century. Sanitation and the associated public 
health dangers, largely overcome through medical and technological 
advances by the 1950s, gave way to concern about air, water and noise 
pollution in the late 1960s. But this was not the case with the problem 
of open space. The continued growth of cities after 1900 served not 
only to expand the need for recreational open space within or near 
urban areas but also to diminish the areas of open space set aside in 
earlier times.
Sanitation. Until nearly the end of the nineteenth century, 
residential and industrial wastes were discharged untreated onto land 
or into waterways within urban areas. The proximity of residences to 
factories, waste disposal drains and dumps created public nuisance and 
hazards to public health. Coward (1976:6-7) describes the frightening 
state of public santiation in Sydney where, during the second half of 
the nineteenth century, open and overflowing sewage drains and cesspools 
gave rise to disease epidemics and led to public agitation for improved 
conditions. Protest also arose from the juxtaposition of incompatible 
land uses like noxious manufacturing activities and residential 
communities. Linge (1979b) identifies attempts by various State 
governments to regulate the location of offending industries. His 
example from South Australia in the 1870s demonstrates the long history 
of pollution-public health problems in Australian urban environments 
but, more importantly, it depicts the position persistently taken by 
governments and some other members of society when conflict-resolution 
is presented as a choice between national and individual prosperity or
73
the lack thereof. The usual stance of government then, as now, is
nicely conveyed by the South Australian Attorney-General (Downer),
quoted in Linge (1979b:630):
It would be very hard if any person who had spent 
his money in the colony with the view to establishing 
manufactures should suddenly find his trade stopped, 
his business put an end to, and his capital wasted, 
and everyone would therefore agree with him that it 
was best to settle the rights of these manufactures 
on a satisfactory basis.
Coward (1976) suggests that it was 'political agitation' which 
caused the New South Wales government to embark on measures to rid the 
City of Sydney of disease-causing unsanitary conditions during the late 
nineteenth century. Even then, he suggests, it required epidemics to 
appear before administrative agencies were established to help devise 
appropriate ways of controlling diseases. Coward (1976:6-7) notes 
that both the Board of Health (which was formed in 1881) and its 
forerunner (the Sydney City and Suburban Sewage and Health Board) were 
only established after epidemics of smallpox and typhoid. Government 
inaction then could perhaps be attributed to a lack of understanding in 
medical science about the relationship between sanitation and disease. 
Nevertheless, the example of Sydney does point out the role of protest, 
and indeed of catastrophe, in bringing about government action in the 
area of environmental health management.
Recreational open space. By the 1870s the natural landscape had 
been transformed by pastoral and agricultural crop production; mining 
for gold, coal and non-ferrous metals; and deforestation for urban 
development and for transport and communication purposes. The cumulative 
impacts of all of these changes were felt by city dwellers, many of whom were
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confined to filthy, disease-infested locations. Social conditions 
had given rise to bushranger 'folk heroes' who Ward (1965:75) suggested 
'commonly ranged at will for months or years, robbing for the most part 
from the rich who were most worth the trouble, and giving to the poor'. 
Bushranging, he suggested, was 'in part a symbolic and only half-conscious 
expression of lower class and nationalist resentment at the de facto 
exclusion of these elements from any considerable political and social 
influence on events during the period'. As congestion increased the 
need for recreational open space in the urban areas began to be 
recognized (Ovington, 1980:45).
The creation of large urban parks in most cities and townships 
of Australia probably began in the 1870s. Prior to this there had been 
some isolated instances of action leading to scenic areas of one sort 
or another being established. The reservation of 2024 ha in the 
Jenolan Caves district in the Blue Mountains in October 1866 is one 
such example (Mosley, 1972:147; Powell, 1976:114). Another is the 
preservation of a shoreline recreational area, approximately 30m in 
width, along the Derwent Estuary (Tasmania) and Port Phillip (Victoria) 
(Mosley, 1972:147).
The reactions to the condition of the cities may also have 
produced what Heathcote (1972:87) termed a romantic vision of the 
Australian landscape: he suggested that this 'expressed itself as a
sympathetic response to the Aborigines, and a delight in the 
"uncivilized" nature of the landscape leading to an almost Arcadian 
attitude to the countryside or "bush"'. This view is reflected by 
one Victorian pioneer (Bride, 1969:365):
It has often been a source of regret to me that all
the charms attending the traversing of a new country
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must give way to the march of civilization; the 
camp on the grassy sward is now superseded by the 
noisy road-side inn; the quart-pot of tea by the 
bottle of ale. All the quiet serenity of an 
Australian bush, as we have known it, has yielded 
to the demands of population; and this, though a 
necessary change, is not the less to be regretted.
This is an interesting assessment because of what it reveals about the
essence of the romantic view of the countryside, why this vision
developed and the kinds of people who would have supported it.
The proclamation of open spaces as national parks (meaning 
large tracts of bushland) began in 1879. In that year the 1470 ha 
Royal National Park south of Sydney was designated. Like other national 
parks formed prior to World War II, it was the outcome of intensive 
lobbying by special interest (professional or other influential) elitist 
groups. Australian poet Judith Wright (1980:30) correctly suggests 
that 'the concept of a national park came with the concept of gentry 
and almost, you might say, noblesse oblige'. Although the reasons 
vary, the overriding motivation for establishing the first national 
parks was still probably utilitarian: they provided wildlife hunting
grounds, froze natural resources for future exploitation, and created 
opportunities for scientific research (Bardwell, 1974; Powell, 1976; 
Ovington, 1980).
1900 TO 1960: ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSFORMATION UNDER
FEDERATION AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION
After 1900 there was an intensification of the industrialization 
process already under way. However, agriculture continued to be the 
mainstay of the economy while manufacturing grew rapidly. Important 
developments relating to the management of the physical environment and
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its resources were the endorsement of interstate competition under 
the new Commonwealth Constitution and rapid rate of population growth 
especially in the inter-war years.
Intergovernmental relations after federation
Crisp's (1967) discussion of the Commonwealth government 
emphasizes the way in which the financial crisis of the 1890s provided 
the impetus for agreement among the colonies about the benefits of 
federation. (Goodwin (1974:99-104) shows that British politicians and 
economists had argued the virtues of a national economy since the 
1860s.) Crisp explained that while labour and the Labor Party (a 
leftist political party formed in 1891) played a noticeable role in the 
drive towards federation, they played 'a negligible direct part in the 
shaping and achievement of federation'. Instead, he suggests (p.14) ,
It was for the most part the big men of the established 
political and economic order, the men of property or 
their trusted allies, who moulded the federal 
Constitution Bill. The pastoralists, merchants and 
lawyers-turned-politicians, tough-minded men of affairs, 
made solid and often decisive contributions to the new, 
practical framework of national government. They 
intended it to accommodate further development of 
Australian economic and social life along essentially 
established and accepted lines. Although at that time 
Australia was to countries of the Old World in some 
respects a symbol of social experiment, a substantial 
majority of her leaders at the Conventions saw 
federation as an expedient provision of extended 
governmental machinery and in no sense as a 
facilitation of major social change, much less of social 
revolution. Time and the interpretations of the Courts 
have vindicated the shrewder conservatives: the
Commonwealth Constitution has been made a splendid 
bastion of property.
Crisp also argues that the men of property found ready support among 
those States which advocated 'States' Rights' as a means of limiting the 
power of the Commonwealth government as far as possible. These forces
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combined to draft a Constitution in which no level of government is 
entrusted with all the constitutional authority necessary for systematic 
and effective macro-economic management (Crommelin and Evans, 1977:26).
If this is so, it may be futile to perceive of, and plan for, the 
country as a single economic unit.
Most important for the management of natural resources is the 
fact that each State was able to retain autonomy over the ownership and 
use of all natural resources within its boundaries. As specified in 
the Constitution, each State has primary responsibility for mineral 
resource policy and the control of all land uses (except on federally- 
owned lands) within its boundaries. The legal sovereignty over land use 
is, in itself, sufficient to frustrate large-scale or even minor federal 
actions which the States oppose, such as legislation relating to 
Aboriginal land rights or environmental protection. In view of this 
unequal distribution of powers and varying resource endowments (in a 
recent federation of competitive nation states) only an optimist could 
find potential for cooperation. It is therefore clear that federation 
was not able to constrain the spirit of rivalry that existed between the 
separate colonies. Indeed, in some ways, it accentuated it.
The power that the States retained in federation was greatly 
assisted by the large concentrations of people within the capital cities 
at the time the Constitution was promulgated, plus the economic strength 
the colonies had amassed for over a century. The more populous States, 
in particular New South Wales and Victoria, were able to exercise a 
powerful influence over major aspects of national resource development 
policy. But they did this in the same competitive atmosphere which had 
thwarted federation over the years and which had made it necessary for
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the 'States' Rights' provision to be an important part of the 
constitutional agreement.
Just as the autonomy of the States relative to the Commonwealth 
government remained largely unimpaired under federation, the relationship 
between the States and their local governments stayed unchanged. As 
Neutze (1977:208) has observed, local governments were established to 
rid the colonial governments of detailed local administration. The 
real power of local governments is limited to the provision of local 
roads, drains, solid waste disposal and some other services, but their 
ability to carry out even these functions depends to a large extent 
upon the size of their populations and their budgets.
Population-environment relationships after 1900
In 1901 the Australian population stood at 3.8 million (de 
Lepervanche, 1975:91). This relatively small number of people in a 
continent equivalent in size to the coterminus United States (although 
physiographically Australia is more like northern Africa) raised 
concerns about the limitations that such a small population would 
impose on the achievement of national greatness. To add to these 
worries there was a major decline in the natural growth rate of the 
population from 3.51 per cent between 1871 and 1880 to 1.63 per cent 
at the end of the 1890s. In addition, there was a collapse in the 
level of immigration over the period. These factors gave rise to the 
'populate or perish' and 'White Australia' syndromes which later became 
incorporated into public policy (Linge, 1980). New South Wales 
statistician Coghlan (1903:69) expressed his concern:
Large as is the area of the Australian continent, it
is impossible that the people will ever become truly
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great under the conditions affecting the increase of 
population which [we] now obtain. Immigration has 
practially ceased to be an important factor, the 
maintenance of an increase of population depending 
upon the birth-rate alone, a rate seriously diminished 
and still diminishing. No people has ever become great 
under such conditions, or, having attained greatness, 
has remained great for any lengthened period. The 
problem of the fall in the birth-rate is, therefore, 
a national one of overwhelming importance to the 
Australian people, perhaps more than to any other 
people, and on its satisfactory solution will depend 
whether this country is ever to take a place amongst 
the great nations of the world.
Such feelings undoubtedly influenced the continuation of government 
immigration assistance schemes, and the main stimulus for assistance 
after federation was derived from the endemic problem of a shortage of 
labour necessary to achieve desired levels of economic growth.
Between 1901 and 1940 there was a net intake of 626,800 of 
whom 381,645 were assisted and nearly all were Britons (de Lepervanche, 
1975). The dependence on British labour did not change until after the 
1940s when Australia started to look to other European countries for 
immigrants. This move was symptomatic of changes which would occur in 
the source areas of capital and in export markets after World War II when 
the United States became the largest supplier of Australian development 
capital and Japan took more of the country's exports than any other 
country (Wheelwright, 1971).
The First Report of the Rational Population Inquiry (the Borrie 
Report, 1975) identified the years 1909 to 1913, 1920 to 1930 and 1947 
to 1970 as peaks in the inflow of settlers to Australia. Each coincided 
with periods when the Australian economy underwent reconstruction after 
economic depressions or world wars.
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While the inflow of immigrants created optimism among planners 
and entrepreneurs, according to the Borrie Report (p.180) it also 
generated criticism of government planning policies which were said to 
be directed by 'men-money-markets1 approaches. Concern over the impact 
of such policies on the population carrying capacity of the continent 
was expressed by members of the intelligentsia who were influenced by 
the environmental deterministic philosophy which dominated geographic 
thought in the early twentieth century. These individuals were 
particularly concerned over the stresses which a rapidly increasing 
population would impose on the availability of natural resources in 
Australia. The Australian geographer Griffith Taylor subscribed to 
the view that an optimum population based on the carrying capacity of 
the continent should be identified: he 'saw the pattern of Australia's 
population as it was then distributed as moulded essentially by 
climatic, topographical and economic determinants and projected little 
change in the future' (Borrie Report, p.135). Ironically, the estimates 
of optimum population made by intellectuals in Australia and 
overseas ranged from 10-15 to 480 million and the exercise is useful 
to demonstrate the strong relationship between the scientific methods 
used and the estimates obtained (Table 3.2).
Concern over population numbers dissipated after World War II 
but surfaced again in the 1970s and, as before, the controversies were 
influenced by ideas transferred from the United States. However, as 
emphasis of the population-environment debates in the 1970s changed to 
the need for zero population growth, an idea propounded by several 
population prophets, among whom the Ehrlichs (Ehrlich, 1970, Ehrlich
and Ehrlich, 1972) stand out as leaders.
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TABLE 3.2: ESTIMATES OF AUSTRALIA'S OPTIMUM POPULATION
AND CARRYING CAPACITY (millions)
Method of approach
Estimator Year Estimation
of optimum
population
using
economic
theory
Estimation 
of carrying 
capacity in 
terms of 
potential 
food
production
Estimation
of carrying
capacity
using the
comparable
densities
method
Knibbs 1917
-
132
Thomas 1921 50
Griffith
Taylor
1921&
1937
20 - 65
Penck 1924 480
Huntington 1925 15 - 20
East 1926 less than 40
Barkley 1928 30
Benham 1928 10 - 15
Belz 1929
Mullet & 
Wadham
1933 40 - 50
Trumble 1937 25
Source: Borrie Report (1975:191).
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Under the steady growth of the manufacturing industry from 
1901 to the mid-1970s (Linge, 1977) population increased rapidly, 
especially in the cities. Once again, as in the 1870s, the need for 
urban recreational open space emerged. It was in the immigration boom 
years of the 1940s that politicians in Sydney, for example, established 
the Cumberland City Council (1945) , with the responsibility for land 
use planning within Sydney. The fate of the Council and the failure of 
its plan for urban open space has been described by Harrison (1972) and 
Sandercock (1977) (see Chapter 7). (Sandercock (1977) also outlines 
the land use planning history for Australia's major cities.)
A positive outcome of the post-war spread of urban development 
was the growth of interest in bush-walking and nature study and the 
establishment of nature reserves. Ovington (1980) correctly labelled 
the period from the late 1960s to the late 1970s as the decade of 
growth in national parks in Australia. During this time there was 
a dramatic rise in the area dedicated to national parks, as shown in 
Table 3.3.
THE 1960s TO THE PRESENT: ENVIRONMENTAL
TRANFORMATION UNDER ADVANCED CAPITALISM
During the 1960s and the 1970s environmental awareness in 
Australia was expanded beyond the provision of national parks and 
wilderness areas to include broader problems, such as the threats to 
ecosystem stability presented by modem scientific and technological 
inventions, wasteful depletion of natural resources, and the dominating 
role which the powerful economic interests play in the overall process
of environmental degradation. This shift in environmental consciousness
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TABLE 3.3: CHANGES IN THE AREA DEDICATED TO NATIONAL PARKS
AND RESERVES IN AUSTRALIA
JUNE 1968 to JUNE 19783
NumberLocation national
parks
Area 
(000 ha)
Number
nature
reserves
Area 
(000 ha)
Parks and 
reserves 
percentage 
of state
New South Wales 19 803 55 59 1.0
46 1,735 126 339 2.6
Victoria 20 150
1500CM 51 0.9
26 260 22 35 1.3
Queensland 254 941 — - 0.5
323 2,182 3 30 1.3
South Australia 6 208 98 961 1.2
8 233 162 3,688 4.0
Tasmania b 288 _ _ 4.2
12 653 24 28 10.0
Western Australia 35 332 127 818 0.5
42 4,563 412 8,086 5.0
Northern Territory 4 195 5 4,647 3.6
12 251 6 4,971 3.9
Australian Capital - - 1 5 2.0
Territory — 3 10 4.0
Figures for Western Australia and the Northern Territory are for 
December 1968 and June 1978.
Nomenclature confused.
Source: Ovington (1980:51).
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occurred as the myth of superabundance was being instilled by 
discoveries of plentiful mineral and more than anticipated petroleum 
resources; and while the benefits from their exploitation were visible 
in national economic prosperity, high per capita incomes and low 
unemployment rates. However unlikely it may seem, a causal relationship 
may be explained in terms of the growing awareness in society of the 
constantly increasing scale of human activities and their actual and 
potential impacts on people in an interlinked world.
As a result of the mineral boom which began in the mid-1960s 
Australia joined the ranks of the resource rich countries. Of a 
worldwide total of 415 mines producing one million to over three million 
tonnes each of ore per year in 1971, 56 per cent (232) were concentrated 
in Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United States (United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, 1974:129). Australia's mineral 
and energy resources identified in 1978, presented in Table 3.4, 
indicate the magnitude of the country's endowment known at that date.
Despite its wealth of mineral and fuel resources, because of 
the small size of its industrial sector, Australia has had little 
internal demand for these resources. Moreover, since massive amounts 
of capital, often unavailable in Australia, are required to carry out 
minerals and energy resource development, overseas multinational 
investors dominate this sector of the economy. The involvement of 
overseas economic enterprises in the development of Australian resources 
since the 1960s has caused the economy to become more closely 
incorporated into the global capitalist economic system. Furthermore, 
the changed resource picture within the country has added to the 
potentials for political and environmental conflicts which already
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existed in Australia. The conflicts arising from the Moomba-Sydney 
gas pipeline development is a case in point.
Three of the most important factors comprising this changed 
picture are the location of new raw materials (usually in parts of 
the country not previously settled) and the increasing overseas 
ownership and control of these resources and of other economic 
enterprises; the growing awareness of environmental problems and the 
rise in activism of environmental interests within the community; and 
the increase in the amount of government legislation and the government 
bureaucracy needed to cope with some of the impacts of the new socio­
economic order. A brief discussion of each of these conditions is 
undertaken below.
Minerals and energy resources and the spectre of overseas control
The dependence of the Australian economy on manufacturing and 
rural industries until the 1960s gave New South Wales and Victoria 
political and economic dominance over the other States. The 
concentration of economic activities and people in the southeast also 
meant that this part of the continent has undergone intense environmental 
transformation and, consequently, has been the source of stresses for 
social change. Yet the growing importance of mining activities in the 
national economy since the mid-1960s has resulted in a shift of economic 
growth to other States which previously occupied a peripheral position 
relative to New South Wales and Victoria. For instance, as shown in 
Table 3.5, in 1973-74 Western Australia and Queensland together 
contributed over half the share of mining activities in the nation.
Matthews (1978:18-19) summarizes these trends:
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TABLE 3.5: SHARES OF MANUFACTURING, MINING AND RURAL
SECTORS IN TOTAL VALUE ADDED BY THESE SECTORS, 
AUSTRALIA, 1973-74 
(per cent)
Manufacturing Mining Rural
New South Wales 81.8 6.1 12.1
Victoria 82.6 7.2 10.2
Queensland 50.1 21.0 28.9
South Australia 71.1 4.4 23.9
Western Australia 42.3 31.1 26.6
Tasmania 68.9 17.3 13.8
Australia 72.7 11.1 16.2
Source: Industries Assistance Commission (1977:15).
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In place of the two industrial States and four States 
with rural-based economies which existed before World 
War II, the Australian States may now be classified 
into two States with advanced industrial economies, 
the rate of growth of which is now tending to fall 
(New South Wales and Victoria); two States with rich 
resource bases, the pace of development of which is 
tending to accelerate (Queensland and Western Australia); 
and two States with more limited resource bases, the 
growth of which is also tending to slow down.
The distribution of new raw materials source areas (e.g. iron 
ore in Western Australia, uranium in the Northern Territory and 
bauxite in Queensland) added another dimension to those conditions 
which cause conflicts. Apart from the likely effect of increasing 
interstate rivalry for economic development activity, the new mineral 
and energy resources have extended the spatial domain of exploitation 
to include the entire continent and its off-shore waters (e.g. natural 
gas exploration on the North West Shelf), on isolated Aboriginal 
reserves sind sacred places, and on other open spaces which have 
remained relatively free of human impact.
Another feature of economic change over the past two decades has 
been the increase in large firms and the growth of overseas investment 
in mining and manufacturing industries (Taylor and Thrift, 1980, 1981a, 
1981b). Taylor and Thrift (1980) identified the specific distribution 
of foreign capital in nine sectors of the economy and verified earlier 
observations (Hunter, 1961; Linge, 1977) that significant trends 
towards oligopoly or even monopoly exist in Australia. More 
importantly, Taylor and Thrift (1980) show that foreign ownership is 
concentrated in the highly capital intensive mining, exploration and 
related processing and manufacturing industries which dominate the 100 
largest companies in the country. They conclude (p.263) that 'if
91
control is defined as ownership of between 20 percent to 50 percent 
of a firm's equity, then in 1978 five of the largest eight firms and 
nine of the largest 20 firms in Australia were foreign controlled'.
Clearly, the pull on international investment has been the 
minerals and energy boom. The number of mining and processing firms 
within the top 100 firms doubled during the 1963-73 period (Taylor and 
Thrift, 1980). The global demand for Australia's mineral and energy 
resources is likely to intensify, and because Australia generally 
lacks the vast sums of money required to develop these resources, 
foreign capital is certain to dominate in the economy.
Such a situation is rife with problems involving conflicts 
between international (exploiter) and the national (exploited) interests. 
Of particular relevance to the argument being presented here are the 
effects of this situation on economic growth and the maintenance of a 
healthy living environment. Loss of control over resource development 
and the economy can contribute to environmental degradation since today 
'transfer of industries is a reality in which consideration of 
pollution-control costs may be an important element' (United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, 1974:149). But perhaps more 
specific to the Australian case is the fact that increasing economic 
control by overseas investors, in a politically and economically 
fragmented country, presents major impediments to the achievement of 
coherence, much less autonomy, in decisions having to do with the use,
allocation and conservation of environmental resources.
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Environmental awareness and community activism
As The Bulletin (May/June 1971) has commented,
It is almost like a religious revival movement.
There are now so many bits of Australia being 
saved that you could almost construct a middle- 
sized nation like Belgium out of them.
Such was the impression created by what the Duke of Edinburgh termed,
in an address to the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), the
'sudden and explosive' concern for the natural environment in
Australia (The Daily Telegvccph, 25 April 1970) . Indeed, in a country
which had never before experienced any mass expression of environmental
concern, the growth of interest in environmental protection in the late
1960s and, in particular, the incidents of direct confrontation
involving environmentalists and land developers, could very well have
appeared to be explosive.
Figure 3.2 shows the location of major environmental issues of 
concern to environmentalists during 1971. However, some of the most 
striking conservation conflicts of the late 1960s were not included, 
as they were substantially resolved by the time the data were collected. 
These were conflicts over the flooding of Lake Pedder in Tasmania by 
the Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania (an autonomous public 
corporation charged with responsibility for generating and distributing 
electricity in Tasmania) and the subdivision of the area known as the 
Little Desert in western Victoria. (An account of the former is given 
by Hundloe (1978) and of the latter by Powell (1974).) Concurrent 
with these controversies were a number of disputes over the development 
of resources in the Blue Mountains of New South Wales. The
environmentalists lost their campaign against the flooding of Lake Pedder
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but won their fight against the subdivision of land in the Little 
Desert. These were watershed cases in the history of the Australian 
environmental movement, mainly because of when they took place, the 
support they were able to mobilize from within the community, the 
attention they attracted from the news media, and the lessons they 
provide for future campaigns for environmental protection.
Figure 3.3 shows the change in the number of environmental 
organizations between 1970 and 1980 and provides a crude measure 
of the level of participation in the general environmental movement 
in the country. However, perhaps a better barometer of the changing 
consciousness within Australia can be provided by a brief examination 
of the ACF which was established in 1965. The support it has received 
from the Commonwealth and from influential and not so influential 
members of the society should serve as a useful indicator of the 
changing trends.
The ACF is the first national organization concerned with the 
conservation of all natural resources. It is governed by a Council of 
46 representatives of members from all over the country. Membership in 
the ACF is shown in Figure 3.4.
At the time of its inception the specific objectives were:
(1) To foster conservation of distinctive vegetation and 
fauna and important archaeological features of the nation.
(2) To act to ensure that competing demands for resources 
are resolved.
(3) To provide financial and other assistance for specific 
conservation projects.
(4) To act as a clearing house for conservation information.
(5) To cooperate with other conservation bodies.
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These objectives may be seen to reflect the initially conservative 
position of the ACF and especially its founders who were mostly 
influential members of Melbourne society. The conservatism was also 
demonstrated in the choice of presidents during the first decade of 
the ACF's existence. The first president was Sir Garfield Barwick,
Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia (from 1968 to 1981). He 
was succeeded by His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh who served 
as president from 1970 to 1975. The high social status of these 
individuals undoubtedly attracted the news media and raised the general 
level of awareness of environmental issues. The third president was 
Dr H.C. Coombs, academic and government advisor, who was not noted for 
his conservative politics. His election as president of the ACF 
reflected deep dissension within the organization which was, by the 
mid-1970s, attempting to cast off the image of a wildlife protection 
group and to come to terms with the role which some of its members 
felt it should play in solving broader issues in society (H.C. Coombs, 
pers. comm.).
In his presidential report in 1977-78 Coombs addressed the 
need for a change in focus from preservationistic and sentimental 
attitudes to nature to the problems of pollution, the energy crisis, 
anxiety about nuclear fuels, famine and poverty, the spread of deserts 
into croplands, the dehumanizing environment of the cities, and the 
disappearance of the culture and lifestyle of primitive peoples.
Coombs touched upon a wide range of problems which had been mounting 
not only in Australia but throughout the world since World War II.
Most of these problems had already been the subject of protests 
in Australia, for instance those of resident action groups who so
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effectively used trade union bans on construction projects in the early 
1970s in what became known as the 'green bans movement' (Roddewig, 1978). 
This latter movement was an alliance between trade unions, environment­
alists and resident action groups against development projects which 
they found objectionable. The movement emerged in 1971 with the 
imposition of strikes by the Builders' Labourers' Federation on 
construction projects. In Sandercock's (1975:174) account, by 1974 
bans worth $A3,000 million had been imposed on development in Sydney 
alone. This strategy is, indeed, the unique feature of Australian 
environmentalism. However, its emergence should be seen as a stage in, 
rather than the 'birth of, Australian environmental politics', as 
Roddewig (1978) asserts.
Here reference must be made to the importance of overseas
influence in the evolution of environmental consciousness in Australia.
Powell (1976, 1978) frequently emphasizes the significance of the
transfer of ideas from overseas to Australia. Apart from the obvious
links with Britain, the influence of United States environmental thought
may be traced as far back as 1864 when George Perkins Marsh wrote:
Australia is, perhaps, the country from which we have 
a right to expect the fullest elucidation of 
[ecological] problems ... the peculiarities of its 
fauna, its flora, and its geology are such as to have 
excited for it the liveliest interest of the votaries 
of natural science; its mines have given people the 
necessary wealth for procuring the means of 
instrumental observation, and the leisure required for 
the pursuit of scientific research; and large tracts of 
virgin forest and natural meadows are rapidly passing 
under the control of civilized man (Marsh, 1864:51).
In the 1960s, a number of international individuals and 
organizations played a part in altering Australian attitudes towards 
the environment. Among them, Rachel Carson, through her book Sttent
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Spring (1962), did perhaps more than any other individual to stimulate 
thought about the cost to human life of the exposure to large numbers 
of chemical compounds used in everyday life. Writing of the American 
conservation movement during this period, O'Riordan (1971) acknowledges 
the role of other individuals like Paul Ehrlich (1970), Barry Commoner 
(1966, 1972), Stuart Udall (1963), and others whose admonitions caught 
the attention of politicians and environmentalists all over the world. 
To their impact must be added that of groups like the Club of Rome 
whose publication The Limits to Growth (Meadows et at. , 1972) added 
credence to the more nebulous allusions to ecological concepts being 
propounded by the biologists. These ideas from the United States 
rapidly reached Australia and grew over the years into what may be 
termed a vision of 'the good society'.
The vision of the good society is an ecological vision, and 
more. It has been influenced by scholars like Galbraith (1958, 1973), 
Marcuse (1969) and Schumacher (1973) who have advocated a scaling 
down of human activities and a transcending of materialist values to 
arrive at new relationships between people and the natural environment. 
An important feature of this view has been the rejection of the 
dominant social norms governing modes of living. The associated 
pursuit of alternative life styles by a significant number of people 
gave rise to a retreat from the cities to rural areas, to communes or 
to simpler (more 'natural') living. However, utopian ideals of 
society have emerged and have been put into practice on a limited 
basis in Australia in the past. For instance, Powell (1973) describes 
how, as a result of the depression of the 1890s, utopian settlement 
schemes sprang up in Victoria and elsewhere in Australia. The growth
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of these settlements was greatly influenced by programmes being 
promoted elsewhere in the New World but they gained a foothold in 
Australia at a time when high unemployment fostered a trend towards 
radicalism among workers in the city and the search for alternatives 
to an urban lifestyle.
Government response to environmental activism
By 1972 each Australian state had adopted major environmental 
legislation (typically an Environmental Protection Act or an 
Environmental Control Act) which was intended to reduce environmental 
degradation through the assessment of potential impacts and the 
evaluation of alternatives to proposed actions. In 1974 similar 
legislation was enacted by the Commonwealth government (although, prior 
to this, a Commonwealth Environment and Conservation Ministry was set 
up in 1972). This new legal structure must be seen as the response by 
government to the demands of community pressure groups for a show of 
government commitment to environmental protection.
Harris (1980) carried out a 'preliminary count' of statutes 
relevant to environmental management and found that the number of 
laws applicable to the environment, in varying degrees, were:
Commonwealth 12 
New South Wales 42 
Victoria 19 
Queensland 27 
South Australia 15 
Western Australia 11 
Tasmania 10
Not all of this legislation is new, but laws enacted since the mid-1960s
101
have certainly caused some business firms to develop strategies to 
comply with the regulations, and this has had an effect on their 
operating costs. The environmental laws also brought about an 
increase in the number of public servants with environment-related 
duties as new state agencies have been created to implement and monitor 
compliance with the new rules. However, political support for 
environmental protection has waned in the late 1970s to early 1980s 
so that the regulatory potential of the laws and the effectiveness of 
the supporting bureaucracy has not been fully realized.
The response of affected business to environmental issues has 
generally been to see the swell in government action as a 1 costly and 
time consuming web of red tape' (Phillips, 1979:2) which adds new 
complexities to an already uncertain business climate through its 
effects on public opinion, on demands for products, and in increasing 
the cost of production. In bemoaning these effects on its members, the 
Australian Mining Industry Council {Mining Review, May 1980) lists 28 
State, federal and joint State-federal government departments and 
organizations whose rules (not all environmental) directly affect the 
mining industry.
A significant aspect of the constraints imposed on entrepreneurial 
behaviour by the large number of laws and diversity of legislative 
jurisdictions is that a single firm wishing to carry out the same type 
of activity concurrently in several States is, theoretically, required 
to seek approval from each State and the Commonwealth government. The 
rising resentment of enterprises like the mining industry may be 
inferred from the following comments by the Executive Director of the
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Australian Mining Industry Council, Mr P. Phillips (1979:2):
Regulation has been part of mining since a frightened 
Governor Fitzroy imposed the licensing system on 
gold diggers in 1851 in order to provide a means of 
sanctioning and controlling the rush to the goldfields 
near Bathurst, N.S.W. The revolt of capitalist miners 
against the Victorian licensing system at Eureka in 
November 1854 was a direct result of the manner in 
which that system was administered.
One solution, he suggests, is
for the States and the Commonwealth to find some means 
of rationalising the legislation, perhaps by putting 
real meaning into the notion of the 'new federalism' 
by leaving State matters under the control of the 
State Parliaments. A start has been made in this 
direction on environmental legislation, but it has 
been a slow process. In all areas, the move should 
be towards smaller and more efficient government.
Phillips here alludes to the successful efforts of the Australian
Mining Industry Council to weaken the Commonwealth Environmental
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act, 1974. An important factor
contributing to the erosion of this Act is the support which the mining
industry receives from many of the departments within the Commonwealth
bureaucracy (in particular the departments of Trade and Resources,
Finance, the Treasury, and National Development). These departments
resent the power that the Act gives to the Department of Science and
Environment over major development proposals like those which come
from the mining industry (House of Representatives Standing Committee
on Environment and Conservation, 1979:17-25).
The weakening of the Environmental Protection (Impact on 
Proposals) Act is a subtle reminder of the way that capitalist 
enterprises can evade unacceptable constraints imposed by governments
on their actions.
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Summary and conclusions
Nineteenth century Australian evaluations of the natural 
environment reflected general pioneer attitudes in other areas of 
European settlement where the primary motivation was to reap maximum 
material riches from the land in the shortest time possible (Nash, 1971). 
However, the settlement of Australia bore some unique characteristics 
which further shaped the development of environmental attitudes in a 
way that was different from other areas of major European colonization.
The penal nature of early British settlement in Australia was 
an important factor influencing environmental perceptions. The outcasts 
of British society could hardly be expected to arrive with positive 
attitudes towards the new land. Likewise, free settlers in search of 
material riches could not be expected to be sentimental about 
Australian nature. Furthermore, they were confronted with a physical 
setting that stood in stark contrast to the lush British countryside; 
it also lacked entirely any features of urban industrial landscapes.
The absence of familiar scenery in Australia must have contributed to 
feelings of alienation among the early settlers and impeded the ready 
formation of aesthetic or spiritual attachment to the land.
With the progress of economic development initial sentiments 
changed. The impenetrable bush became a retreat for the city dweller. 
Today both the bushwalker and the bush form a proud and important part 
of the Australian character. It was love of bush-walking that provided 
the initial force for the designation of national parks in the early 
twentieth century.
Rapid and uncontrolled economic development in the mid-twentieth
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century gave rise to concerns for protection of the natural environment 
from excessive degradation and for conservation of resources. An 
expression of these concerns was conflict which typically involved 
environmentalists and the developers of natural resources. These 
conflicts served to change the form and function of the state as new 
laws were enacted which called for new government institutions to 
monitor and control environmental degradation. The laws also imposed 
requirements on business enterprises to incorporate environmental 
considerations into their development plans. In view of all of these 
changes in Australian environmentalism it is apt to repeat Powell's 
(1976:6) conclusion that there are signs of awakening to a new 
interpretation of relationships with nature which can yield a more 
secure basis for human survival. It is doubtful, however, whether 
these new attitudes can flourish and predominate in the midst of the
present politico-economic conditions.
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CHAPTER 4
EVOLUTION OF THE MOOMBA-SYDNEY 
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CASE
A 1,300 km underground pipeline linking Sydney with the natural 
gas fields of South Australia was completed in December 1976, bringing 
to fruition the first and most crucial phase of an extensive plan by 
The Australian Gas Light Company (AGL) to develop a natural gas . 
pipeline system to service the major industrial centres of New South 
Wales. The realization of this project involved a process of protracted 
planning and implementation fraught with controversy — the most bitter 
the company had ever known and the first recorded in the history of 
pipeline construction within Australia.
A wide range of interests may become involved in negotiating 
the interstate sale and transport of a valued commodity. The resulting 
controversy can only intensify when a mode of transport such as a 
pipeline is involved since this can be variously perceived to carry 
either significant benefits or disbenefits to the areas it crosses.
This particular gas pipeline aroused general concern among governments 
and the community over problems of energy resource ownership, allocation 
and conservation as well as preservation of natural environments and 
archaeological sites. Divergent positions on these issues led to 
conflict and power struggles in both the private sector and within and 
between various levels of the Australian governmental hierarchy. In 
the case of inter-governmental conflict, unresolved issues over State 
versus Commonwealth responsibility latent in the Australian Constitution 
were brought to the fore. Within New South Wales locations potentially
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affected by the development, concern was focused more specifically on 
the advantages and disadvantages of alternative routeing schemes rather 
than on the broader questions of constitutional responsibility, national 
resource development policy or inter-industry competition.
This chapter presents an overview of the general context within 
which the pipeline debate took place, demonstrates the relationships 
between the members of the pipeline decision-making system, identifies 
the determinants of their actions, and evaluates the influence each had 
on the outcome. The story falls into four main parts.
1. Before the environmental Inquiry. Changing world and 
national conditions of fuel supply and demand threatened the economic 
security of AGL and led to its decision to construct an interstate 
gas pipeline. The proposal, while strongly supported by the New South 
Wales government, created reactions and resistance from other States 
and the Commonwealth government as well as from within the community.
2. The first environmental Inquiry. Active public protest 
groups and individuals were concerned with re-routeing the pipeline to 
avoid wilderness, national park areas and historic sites, and this 
led to an environmental Inquiry being called.
3. The second environmental Inquiry. State and industry 
displeasure with pipeline routeing recommendations of the Inquiry, 
plus the weakening political strength of the Commonwealth government, 
provided the opportunity for a new environmental Inquiry into the 
proposal for a natural gas lateral pipeline from Sydney to Newcastle.
4. After the Inquiries. Continuing industry dissatisfaction 
with recommendations of the second Inquiry led to the establishment of
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a joint industry-government working group to resolve their differences.
This chapter does not aim to carry out a detailed review and 
analysis of the issues raised or the strategies adopted by particular 
interests involved in the debate. Instead, it is intended, as an aid 
to the analysis in the remainder of the thesis to present a summary of 
the pipeline case which identifies the actors and the circumstances 
which to varying degrees influenced the outcome of the pipeline project.
BEFORE THE ENVIRONMENTAL INQUIRY 
THE CASE FOR A NATURAL GAS PIPELINE TO THE SYDNEY REGION
AGL's scheme to procure natural gas for its New South Wales 
market as well as for export was made public as early as 1966 when it 
began negotiations to buy natural gas from the United States controlled 
Esso-BHP partnership which two years earlier had discovered large 
off-shore reserves of natural gas in Bass Strait. This was AGL's 
response to the uncertainty of maintaining its position as the largest 
private utility in Australia and a government guaranteed monopoly 
within New South Wales. The utility's vulnerability arose, first, from 
post World War II exploitation of the massive petroleum reserves of the 
Middle East coupled with the development of technology for long distance 
transportation by pipeline and ocean tanker. Second, within Australia, 
the discovery of commercially exploitable quantities of oil and gas 
outside New South Wales meant that this State was placed at a disadvantage 
in keeping or attracting industry requiring large quantities of cheap
energy.
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Coal1s temporary departure
Indigenous coal reserves powered Australian industrial 
development throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Of all the States, New South Wales had the largest endowment of high 
quality, accessible black coal. Deposits in the other States were 
smaller and of lower quality. New South Wales was therefore in a 
position to export coal interstate.
The postwar competition from cheap overseas petroleum fuels 
caused the decline of coal use for industrial heating and power 
generation everywhere in Australia as it did throughout the world.
As well as being cost competitive, petroleum fuels (such as fuel oil, 
natural gas and naphtha) were more convenient to use and environmentally 
cleaner than coal. Further, their rapid acceptance for household 
heating meant that there was no domestic market for the coke and tar 
by-product which was produced in the manufacture of town gas from coal. 
Naphtha replaced coal in the manufacture of town gas and, despite high 
tariffs, its ready availability and comparatively low cost enabled AGL 
to increase its influence within the Central Coast Region.
The low cost of petroleum fuels created inter-industry antagonism. 
One aspect of inter-industry competition was the interplay of relatively 
constant, or slightly decreasing, fuel oil prices over the postwar years 
to 1973 juxtaposed with rising wage rates within Australia (Figure 4.1) 
which meant that labour productivity had to be increased to enable the 
coal industry to overcome the resulting disadvantages. As an example, 
in a heated public debate between oil and coal interests during the 
mid-1960s, it was revealed that during the 1954-60 period per capita 
wage rates for coal workers increased by 55 per cent compared with 34
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between Middle East oil prices and the
average weekly earnings for Australians.
Source: Energy Authority of New South Wales.
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per cent for factory workers and hence absorbed any productivity 
increases. The coal industry claimed that the oil importers were 
dumping their products on the local market to stimulate consumption, 
and called for formulation of a national fuel policy and an assessment 
of the roles to be assigned to the different fuels. But the oil 
companies' response was a predictably indifferent one since they saw 
the coal industry's problem as inefficiency rather than as hardships 
brought on by global competition for fuel markets. A typical sentiment 
of the oil industry, as reported by the Australian Financial Review 
on 4 November 1963, was:
If the increase [in employee wages] had been of a 
similar proportion to that of factory workers, then 
the coal industry would have had an extra £2.7 million 
at its disposal which may well have made possible an 
average reduction of six per cent in coal pithead 
prices.
Based on these facts, claims of hardship in the coal 
industry might reasonably be questioned and certainly 
there is no case of hardship to be demonstrated in 
regard to coal employees.
The struggles between the oil and coal industries in Australia reflected 
trends internationally since during the twenty years to 1973 oil 
consumption rose fivefold to represent just over half of the world's 
energy usage, whereas in 1953 it accounted for only a quarter of the 
world's primary energy consumption. Natural gas consumption doubled 
over the same period to account for approximately 20 per cent of total 
energy demand.
New internal resources relationships
The search for oil and gas began in earnest in Australia in 
1892 when a shallow hole of less than 300m was drilled in South Australia, 
but it was not until the early 1960s that substantial discoveries were
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made. Oil and gas exploration was financed largely by multinational 
interests with the Australian government providing direct assistance 
in the form of cash subsidy — up to one-third of the funds — and other 
infrastructural support. By the mid 1960s, large quantities of oil 
and gas had been discovered in all States except New South Wales.
Because economic and consequently political power accrue 
to the owners of these resources, the discoveries had several unique 
implications for overall national development and hegemonic relationships 
between the States themselves and between the States and the Commonwealth 
government.
The unequal distribution of resources anywhere normally results 
in uneven spatial distribution of production and consequently wealth, 
a condition which is magnified in the absence of redistributive 
policies. Under the Constitution, each State retains ownership of 
mineral and land resources, and the Commonwealth government can only 
exercise authority to regulate overseas trade and commerce and to 
safeguard national security. This creates irrationalities and 
independent goal setting since State governments can follow policies 
aimed at their own rather than the national well-being. To the extent 
that the governments do exercise their option to follow a path of 
independent development, conflicts arise not only between the States 
and the Commonwealth but among the States themselves as a result of 
changing relationships derived from unequal distribution of valued 
resources. Hence wasteful or exploitative practices may well exist 
alongside situations of scarcity and want. In many ways the competitive 
relations benefit multinational companies (notably mining and petroleum) 
which can play off one State against another as they bargain for
locational incentives (Linge, 1974; Fagan, 1981).
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Another factor contributing to conflicting relationships 
between and within layers of the governmental hierarchy is the existence 
in Australia of strongly partisan political ideologies which greatly 
determine attitudes and actions of decision makers.
Against this background of constitutionally reinforced interstate 
rivalry, opposing political ideology and weak Commonwealth powers, 
intergovernmental cooperation may be possible only when it serves, as 
in the case of independent nation states, to keep intact a particular 
set of hegemonic relationships. Given conditions that deter formulation 
of unified policies for directing resource use, the balance of power 
will favour multinational interests on which State governments rely for 
major investments. Australia's long-term interest will then predominate 
only if national goals can be established and an infrastructural 
arrangement capable of systematically pursuing such goals be agreed 
upon.
Industry and government in New South Wales were, therefore, 
well aware of the impacts of the discovery of vast reserves of oil and 
gas in nearby Victoria: the 'Start of the New Industrial Revolution'
was a phrase used in advertisements by the Victorian Gas and Fuel 
Corporation (a government Authority set up in 1950 to distribute gas). 
However, if a sufficient supply could be cheaply obtained for industrial 
use in New South Wales its impact on the economy could be minimized or 
negated.
These are the factors which 'threatened' the economic security 
of both AGL and New South Wales and led to the decision to seek a source 
of natural gas. They also point to the reasons why research and 
development into technology for the production of gas from coal was not
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vigorously pursued after World War II, a situation which is now being 
reversed with the cartelization of fuel oil prices by the OPEC since 
1973.
The AGL's first moves
Within a free market economy it was logical that AGL should 
counter threats to its economic security arising from international and 
national changes in the cost and pattern of energy supply. It could 
safely rely on the New South Wales government for support since 
politicians and the public would benefit from any attempt to preserve 
the economic status quo {wis-d.-V'Ls the continuing Victoria/New South 
Wales quest for industrial supremacy). In 1966 AGL sought to purchase 
gas from the Victorian producers which, besides being located closest 
to the Sydney market area, had sufficient reserves. AGL made no secret 
of its plans to liquefy and export some of this gas since that would 
render the scheme economically viable. In time, however, this idea 
was dropped when it became clear that exports of energy would create 
opposition in State and Commonwealth governments. For various reasons — 
mainly inter-industry and interstate rivalry — AGL's negotiations in 
Victoria failed and in 1969 it turned to South Australia with a proposal 
for natural gas supply.
South Australian gas
AGL and the South Australian gas producers (the Delhi-Santos 
consortium) signed an agreement on 26 May 1971 for 80 x 10^ m^ of gas, 
more than half the then proven reserves, to be supplied to AGL over a 
thirty-year period. The terms of the agreement, although not disclosed,
were believed to have been more favourable than could have been obtained
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in Victoria. Within South Australia there were some objections to the 
gas sale, but they were not insuperable. The agreement was supported 
by the New South Wales Liberal government through the then Minister 
of Mines, Mr W.C. Fife. Several considerations facilitated the 
agreement, and these factors may explain more fully why the usual 
causes of interstate rivalry were overcome. First, although Adelaide's 
electricity production relied on gas from the Cooper Basin, that demand 
alone was insufficient to keep the Delhi-Santos consortium economically 
solvent, and thus it was an eager seller. Second, the South Australian 
Labor government, led by Mr D.A. Dunstan, had hoped that a major petro­
chemical complex would be established in South Australia using the 
liquid fraction from the natural gas recovery process. But since such 
a project could only become economically viable through expanded output 
from the Cooper Basin fields (there being no additional markets to 
absorb such expansion within South Australia) interstate sale was the 
only alternative. The petrochemical plant was needed to boost South 
Australia's industrial strength which, though always weak, had diminished 
in the restructuring of industry throughout Australia during the 1960s.
However, in 1979 the Australian Prime Minister announced that 
the Caltex petrochemical plant previously being considered for Adelaide 
was to be located in Victoria instead. Given the considerable interstate 
competition for industrial investment which is easily manipulated by 
large corporations and politicians alike, this decision was perhaps not 
surprising. To the extent that it had any control over the final 
decision to sell the natural gas, South Australia had gambled its long­
term energy security for short-term economic and political gains.
Whether the 1979 election of a Liberal Party government in South 
Australia (obviously keen for Commonwealth largesse to consolidate
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power and meet election promises) can alter the political-economic 
climate favouring Victoria, has yet to be seen.
A pipeline from Victoria to Sydney rather than from South 
Australia would appear to be more logical: much shorter distances are
involved and proven Victorian reserves are in excess of its needs.
While South Australia has a range of energy resources (with the 
exception of uranium), none is abundant: unless more gas is discovered
a struggle is likely to develop for the resource if continued interstate 
sales threaten to curb the growth of the South Australian economy. The 
move by AGL in 1979 to acquire significant shares in the Cooper Basin 
consortium (through its subsidiary Goodacre Development Pty Ltd) was 
significant as an insurance against the time when both South Australia 
and AGL may be competing for the diminishing natural gas reserves. 
Interstate competition does not, clearly, make for the optimum use of 
Australia's resources and does not encourage any sympathetic analysis 
of the social and economic advantages of the use of one location as 
against another (Linge, 1974:34). It also illustrates the vigilance 
of the private sector in protecting its own interest as reflected in 
the extent of forward planning on the part of AGL.
Details of AGL's proposal
The company's proposal involved the construction of an 864 mm 
diameter steel pipeline, 1,300 km from Gidgealpa, Moomba, the centre of 
gas treatment and dispatch in the Cooper Basin, to the Sydney city gate 
(or termination point of the main pipeline) at Wilton from whence the 
gas was to be reticulated throughout the metropolitan area. From this 
trunk pipeline secondary mains were to be constructed to the subregional
centres of Newcastle and Wollongong.
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The trunk pipeline and associated laterals were to be buried 
over their entire length (a minimum of lmof soil cover and 500 cm of 
consolidated rock), with other design and construction standards set 
by the New South Wales Minister of Mines. Permanent pipeline 
appurtenances included above ground line markers (approximately 1 m high) 
located at suitable intervals along the pipeline; a radio tele­
communication system for monitoring operations, and repeater stations 
consisting of masts from 35 to 100 m high with radio and power huts. 
These accessories were to be located in 24 m easements, within which 
regrowth of large trees would not be allowed for 5 m on either side of 
the pipeline. Easements were also required for maintenance bases, for 
air strips and future compressor stations.
AGL argued that the quantity of gas contracted for (80 x 10^ m^) 
would enable the load to grow for up to thirteen years and continue at 
the rate then reached for twelve years before diminishing at an annual 
rate of 10 per cent for a further five years (Figure 4.2, curve A).
The company hoped that additional gas discoveries at the Cooper fields, 
or elsewhere, would allow growth to continue even beyond the thirtieth 
year: thus, although the agreement with the producers provided for a
demand growth for only thirteen years, the economic design of the 
pipeline was based on a load growth being sustained for twenty years 
(Figure 4.2, curve B). The estimated total cost of the project is 
shown in Table 4.1.
The East Australian Pipeline Corporation (EAPC), a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of AGL, was established in 1969 for the sole purpose of 
constructing, owning and operating the pipeline. Its directors and 
shareholders were employees of AGL and its paid-up capital was $5.
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TABLE 4.1: INITIAL CAPITAL COST OF TWO ALTERNATIVE ROUTES MOOMBA-SYDNEY
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE
Route Main trunk line Newcastle lateral Wollongong lateral
distance
(km)
cost
($m)
distance
(km)
cost
($m)
distance
(km)
cost
($m)
Centre 1,360 144.7 135 11.5 55 4.8
Southern 1,370 152.5 156 13.3 23 1.9
Source: Based or AGL submission to the 1973 environmental Inquiry.
The reasons for its formation are a matter for speculation, but they 
probably relate to the fact that the New South Wales Gas and Electricity 
Act, 1935 sets a ceiling of not more than 2 per cent above the long-term 
bond rate on AGL's profits, whereas no restrictions are placed on the 
profits of subsidiary companies which can therefore determine their own 
rate of payment to the parent company. In addition, AGL's profits must 
be used to reduce the price of gas sold by the parent company and 
cannot be employed to increase payments to shareholders. The details of 
EAPC's corporate structure were apparently a matter of some concern to 
the Commonwealth government. AGL explained, for the benefit of 'an 
insufficiently informed parliamentarian', that it would have been in 
direct conflict with its expressed intentions to fund the project 
predominantly with debt finance, and therefore in conflict with the 
'Public Interest' had EAPC's capital been large at that stage (Butters, 
1973b:5).
AGL itself was a private corporation established on 7 September 
1837 by an Act of the New South Wales Council
for the purpose of producing inflammable air or gas,
from coal, oil, tar, pitch or other materials, and
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for lighting and supplying with gas all public places, 
roads, streets, ways, lanes, passages and buildings 
and also all private houses, shops, manufactories, 
properties, and buildings within the town of Sydney 
(Statutes of the New South Wales Council 1837:153).
The AGL has been described (Donald, n.d.:l/l) as
one of those curious hybrids, popular in the late 
nineteenth century, a government guaranteed monopoly 
with a government limited dividend rate but no 
government limits on costs.
As may be deduced from AGL's establishment of EAPC, these government 
imposed disadvantages may be more apparent that real since it is 
conceivable that they may be overcome by corporate manoeuvrings.
Several possible pipeline routes were considered but by 1971 it 
was evident that the company favoured the most direct route — the 
centre route (Figure 4.3) — from Moomba to Sydney. This route was not 
strictly in conformity with what had been approved in principle on 
22 December 1970 by the New South Wales government when the Premier 
announced that
the main trunk of the pipeline will follow an approximate 
route from the north-west of New South Wales to Young, on 
to Yass, Goulburn, Marulan, and Mittagong then into the 
Sydney reticulation area. The line will provide for 
laterals from Young to Cowra, Orange and Bathurst, from 
Young to Cootamundra, Wagga Wagga, Albury and Wodonga in 
Victoria, from Mittagong to Wollongong, from Yass to 
Canberra and Queanbeyan and from Sydney to Newcastle.
The line will also incorporate provision for laterals to 
Broken Hill, Cobar, Nowra and the Shoalhaven, Maitland 
and Cessnock, when these are shown to be justified 
economically. In respect of the areas to be supplied 
with natural gas, approval has been given for the product 
to be made available to all distributors on a uniform 
basis (quoted in Coffey Report, 1973:1).
The New South Wales government believed that natural gas could benefit
country centres and hoped that it would provide an incentive, however
small, for industry to locate away from Sydney. It therefore made
approval of AGL's proposal conditional on construction of laterals to
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country areas.
Local governments in areas like Wagga Wagga, Orange, Bathurst 
and Lithgow exerted whatever pressure they could to influence the 
location of the trunk line, since distance from the trunk line would 
significantly affect the cost of laterals and therefore the probability 
of them ultimately getting natural gas. Theirs was the dilemma of 
small size and the consequent lack of political and economic muscle.
So determinate is this relationship that even Wagga Wagga, whose need 
for gas must have provided some motivation for Mr Fife's role in 
obtaining a contract from South Australia, could not be assured of a 
supply. This became more apparent when in April 1971 Mr Fife was 
forced to announce that it was likely that the main trunk line would 
be positioned north of the route originally considered by Cabinet.
The exact location would depend on economic studies of the following 
alternatives (Figure 4.4):
(a) a southern route via Goulburn;
(b) a centre route crossing the Blue Mountains;
(c) a northern route through the Hunter Valley.
The first signs of controversy
Having spent the period 1966 to 1971 in search of a natural gas 
supply, AGL anticipated quick construction of the pipeline and set 
early 1975 as the completion date for the trunk line to Sydney with the 
Newcastle lateral to be completed a few months thereafter. However, 
major events since 1971 altered these plans, in the light of which it is 
remarkable that the gas reached Wilton, the Sydney city gate, by 
December 1976. Paradoxically, it is not surprising that construction
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began on the lateral to Newcastle four years later in 1980. The delays 
were reflected in substantial cost over-runs; construction of the 
Moomba-Sydney line cost 8 per cent or $A20m (Butters, 1977:142) over 
the original estimate of $A155 million, and the Newcastle lateral is 
expected to cost $A80 million (1981 estimate) as against the original 
estimate of approximately $A13 million. When ranked according to the 
magnitude of their impact, the factors which contributed to the delay 
and modification of AGL's plans can be grouped in the following broad 
categories: environmental, political, industrial and natural.
Industrial relations problems (strikes and stop werk meetings, 
for example) caused significant delays in construction, but since they 
are here viewed as typical facts of the Australian industrial scene for 
which allowances should have been made, they were not controversial in 
the sense of having an effect on the outcome of the proposal.
Similarly, while the floods which occurred in western New South Wales 
during early 1974 were of record levels and caused months of delay in 
construction, and therefore added to costs, they were dramatic but again 
in no way controversial.
Environmental events
During the planning period Governments were becoming 
more aware of the environmental issues and the N.S.W. 
Government has established a State Pollution Control 
Commission to examine each new engineering project 
which could possibly cause damage to the environment.
When the Australian Gas Light Company announced its 
plans to construct the pipeline in December 1972, the 
N.S.W. Government called such an enquiry (The Pipeline 
Authority, n.d.:3).
While this statement incorporates certain facts relating to the case 
and conveys the impression of responsible governmental action towards
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environmental protection, it is in stark contrast to the following 
account which was constructed after discussion with individuals who 
participated in the planning process and subsequent Inquiry.
In May 1971 Williams Brothers-CMPS Engineers, pipeline 
consultants to AGL, produced a comprehensive proposal favouring the 
centre route from Moomba to Sydney directly through the Wollongambie 
wilderness area of the Blue Mountains National Park. It was upon this 
recommendation that EAPC on 1 December 1972 applied for a permit to 
conduct a survey of the general area along the preferred route. However 
in mid-1972 a group comprising members and ex-members of the Sydney 
University bushwalkers and others had formed a walking club whose aim 
was 'to explore and document lesser known bushwalking areas' around 
Sydney. The area initially chosen for investigation was within the 
Blue Mountains and included the Wollangambie wilderness. (The area 
had become known as 'wilderness' by popular rather than official 
designation.) On 12 and 13 August 1972 club members observed what they 
termed careless burning off and destruction of tree ferns and natural 
bushland and concluded that the rights given by a permissive occupancy 
were being abused. They continued investigations and on 17 August 1972 
wrote to the Minister of Lands for an explanation. They did not receive 
a reply but on 15 September 1972 a letter in the Sydney Momi-ng Hevatd 
expressed concern about two proposals within the Blue Mountains. One 
was a power line to run south of the Blue Mountain townships and the 
other was a natural gas pipeline in the Wollangambie wilderness. The 
author of the letter was Milo Dunphy, the son of Myles Dunphy, who along 
with others, had initiated and maintained the campaign to declare a 
large area of the Blue Mountains a national park in the early 1930s. The
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bushwalkers later formed an alliance called the Wilderness Protection 
Committee and, through the use of adroit political tactics as well as 
substantial support from the media and individuals within government 
agencies, worked towards blocking the proposed development within the 
National Park. Most members of the Wilderness Protection Committee had 
been aware of the struggles involved in securing national park designation 
for the area and the reasons why the proponents of the park idea had to 
maintain their stand for over two decades. For them the mountains could 
either be seen as a proximate nature reserve where Sydneysiders could 
go to experience the bush, or as the catchment for Sydney's urban spill. 
They were resolved to prevent the latter course.
Fortuitously for the wilderness protection cause, an unrelated 
controversy over the natural gas pipeline erupted at the same time and 
served to thrust the set of issues surrounding the project into the 
public arena. The details of that controversy, although tangential to 
this specific category of environmental events, are nonetheless 
important in so far as they help to fill in the context within which the 
pipeline saga took place*.
The media had given much publicity to the debate over whether 
the order for the pipes should be placed with Japanese or Australian 
suppliers and pipe size was a key variable. At issue was the cost — 
a major issue in Australian manufacturing for decades and which had led 
to the institution of high levels of tariff protection for local industry 
Steel pipe for the natural gas pipeline could be made in Australia by 
subsidiaries of The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (BHP). 
However, Mitsubishi of Japan (perhaps using steel produced from 
Australian iron ore) could for the same price supply pipe with three
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times the capacity. There were several advantages in a large diameter 
pipe: most importantly, such a pipe could serve as a reservoir for
gas — an insurance against interruption in supply. Because of the 
obvious cost advantages, in November 1972 AGL sought duty free 
importation of 224,000 tonnes of 860 mm diameter pipe from Japan on 
favourable terms of payment. Table 4.2 gives an idea of the savings 
provided by such a move.
TABLE 4.2? COMPARISON OF QUOTED JAPANESE AND 
AUSTRALIAN PIPE PRICES
Supplier Price per ton of steel pipe $A
Steel Mains Pty Ltd*3 339
(Australia)
Mitsubishi 190
(J ap an) w i th duty 248
These prices based on quote for 8,000 tonnes only 
A company in which BHP had substantial holdings.
The decision to purchase the pipe overseas occasioned a major 
controversy with BHP (which had an interest in the local pipe supplier) 
which argued that, throughout the negotiations, AGL had never requested 
a quotation for 860 mm diameter pipe and felt embittered at AGL's public 
allegation that it would have difficulty fabricating pipe larger than 
760 mm in diameter. BHP therefore concluded that the selection of a 
large diameter pipe was a deliberate manoeuvre to avoid the use of the 
Australian product. AGL had thus positioned itself in a collision course 
with Australia's largest manufacturing company and the resulting power
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play was predictable. BHP had at least two weapons with which to 
retaliate and it used them both. First, it filed suit against AGL, 
and, second, it resorted to the use of tariff protection under the 
regulations administered by the Department of Customs and Excise.
Donald (n.d.:l/5) viewed the suit and the events leading up to 
it as the consequence of gross mishandling of affairs by AGL whose 
General Manager, Mr William Pettingell (later Sir William), he alleged, 
engaged in 'less than honest' dealings with the Australian pipe suppliers. 
Donald (n.d.:l/5) notes:
From the time A.G.L. started seriously to think of 
supply of natural gas to Sydney up to March 1972 there 
were serious discussions with these manufacturers,
Tubemakers of Australia Ltd. and Steel Mains Ltd.
[These companies were wholly or partly owned by BHP]
... After that date, i.e. March 1972, after Butters'
[an employee of AGL and General Manager of EAPC] visit 
to Europe and Japan, there is evidence of a stalling 
policy in negotiations with A.I. & S. ...
The gross mishandling of the next move is hard to 
understand. A.G.L. decided to try for by-law, i.e. 
duty free, importation. There was only one ground on 
which by-law entry for all the pipe would be granted 
namely that pipe to the required specification or 
delivery schedule was not available from local sources 
and so A.G.L.. based its case on this and thus embarked 
on a course of action which brought it into collision 
with the Broken Hill Proprietory Co. Ltd. and the 
unions. Further it was a fight the government of the 
day could not ignore.
Donald further observes that the irony of the whole affair was that the 
fight was unnecessary and must have arisen out of complete misconception 
of the methods of the Customs Department, since there was no chance of 
by-law entry being granted if BHP had said it could make the steel and 
Steel Mains that it could fabricate the pipe.
The differences were resolved when the Commonwealth Department
of Customs acting as arbiter, negotiated an agreement between the companies
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which required that ten per cent of the 860 non diameter pipe and all 
smaller diameter piping should be purchased from Steel Mains which 
agreed to comply with AGL's warranty requirements, and the balance 
could be imported duty free from Japan. Butters (pers. comm.,
13 October 1981) notes that the final irony is that by-law entry was 
granted when, through Steel Mains, a solution was reached. In Butters' 
view the disagreement between the pipe supplier (Tubemakers) and AGL 
was because Tubemakers 'consistently refused to meet the fundamental 
conditions of the warranty' required by AGL. In essence, AGL emerged 
the winner and it is important to relate their victory to the cost 
factor when assessing the decision reached. Clearly for reasons of 
political prudence, the Commonwealth and the New South Wales governments 
wanted natural gas distributed in Sydney at the lowest possible rate, 
and because cost of pipe was a major component of the initial capital 
investment the existing regulations in favour of local industry could 
be compromised. (The Commonwealth (Labor) government would have been 
keen to gratify its urban support base, while the State government was 
concerned with maintaining an environment attractive to industry: 
cheap fuel is an essential part of that attractiveness.) Some further 
conclusions may, therefore, be drawn from the incident:
(a) that the particular public policy existed to protect powerful 
industrial interests and therefore it was amenable for use by 
them as a weapon of competition (BHP's resort to tariff protection 
against AGL);
(b) that a policy may be used to sway public opinion to advance the 
interest of one party against the other (media coverage and union 
support for tariff principles);
(c) that a policy protects the public interest only after other more
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powerful interests in the society have first been satisfied, 
but the corollary is not necessarily true that the public interest 
is served by the powerful interests (although the community would 
derive advantages from a supply of cheap natural gas this could 
only be realized if industry and politicians could benefit as 
well).
In assessing the impact of the controversy on the outcome of 
the environmental debate, it could be said that the Wilderness 
Protection Committee gained entry to the political decision system via 
the bridge created by the inter-industry conflict and largely through 
its own knowledge of how to attack the stress points within the political 
system. The net result of the Wilderness Protection Committee's actions 
was that on 21 December 1972 the Minister for Environment Control, 
Honourable J.G. Beale, ordered a public Inquiry into the environmental 
impact of the pipeline with formal hearings to commence on 30 January 
1973. It was the second Inquiry to be held by the State Pollution 
Control Commission (SPCC) (the first Inquiry was into pollution on 
Kooragang Island) and the first time in Australia that an Inquiry was 
called to assess the harmful effects of a development project on the 
environment.
The Commissioner for the Inquiry was Mr E.J. Coffey, Director 
of the SPCC, an agency established to provide supervisory, advisory and 
coordinating services towards prevention, control, abatement and 
mitigation of pollution, the control and regulation of the disposal 
of waste and the protection of the environment from defacement, 
defilement or deterioration; and purposes connected therewith (State 
Pollution Control Commission Act, 1970) . Section 23 of the Act states
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that in order to resolve environmental issues an Inquiry may be 
conducted by the Commission but shall be conducted only if required 
by the Minister. The Act is, therefore, clear as to the advisory 
nature of the SPCC, indicating that the weight of its recommendations 
would be directly proportional to the Minister's felt obligation to the 
forces favoured by the recommendations. It is a point that should be 
borne in mind when assessing the outcome.
The terms of reference required that the Commissioner:
(a) inquire into the likely impact on the environment of the proposal 
by EAPC to convey natural gas from Moomba to Sydney;
(b) recommend practical measures which may be taken to prevent, 
control, abate or mitigate the pollution of the environment,
to control or regulate the disposal of waste and to protect the 
environment from defacement, defilement or deterioration in 
conveying natural gas from Moomba to Sydney;
(c) inquire into and make recommendations in the public interest on 
any relevant environmental matter.
The decision for a public Inquiry was the critical victory for the 
environmental pressure groups and signified the growing potential 
(constrained by the terms of reference) of such groups to dramatically 
influence the outcome. This is underscored by Section 31(1) of the 
National Parks and Wildlife Act, 1967 which empowers the Minister of 
Lands to grant certain easements through a national park. Obviously, it 
was the degree of public animus that resulted in the foreclosure of 
this option.
Fifteen days before the scheduled hearing date a Preliminary
Environmental Impact Statement prepared by consultants for the EAPC was
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made available for public inspection at the Department of Environment 
and at the Blue Mountains, Lithgow and Windsor City Council Chambers.
It allowed insufficient time for community groups to study the proposal 
and their protest won yet another victory in the form of deferral of 
the public hearing from 30 January until 1 March 1973, with 22 February 
being set as the closing date for submissions.
Political events
In December 1972 Australians elected a Commonwealth Labor 
government. The Labor Party election platform made clear its intention 
to pursue new objectives centred around the democratic socialization of 
industry, production, distribution and exchange. But not many 
people within the community, or in the Parliament for that matter, 
anticipated the monumental actions which evolved over the administration's 
brief (three year) but stormy rule. The breadth of its policy initiatives, 
many of which stretched the limits of Constitutional powers, has been set 
out by Crommelin and Evans (1977:25) who, while applauding the 
government's bold actions and constitutional adventurousness, noted that 
some initiatives survived only by the 'skin of their teeth'. One action 
which, perhaps, embodied the range of Labor's ideologies and goals was 
to take over AGL's natural gas pipeline project. The action had 
received Cabinet authorization as early as 9 January 1973, and on 
15 January 1973 members of the government met with representatives of 
AGL to inform them of its intention to build an Australian pipeline grid. 
Since the Moomba-Sydney pipeline would be an integral part of it, the 
Commonwealth would take over construction and ownership. The Whitlam 
Government further explained that a national Pipeline Authority would 
be established to be responsible for the construction of the pipeline
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grid and for buying and selling petroleum to control reserves.
(Later the Petroleum and Minerals Authority (PMA) was established even 
though the Bill never received Parliament's approval, and it was 
responsible for the purchase of mineral resources for the nation. It 
bought fifty per cent of the Moomba gas reserves. But in 1975 under 
the Fraser Government the PMA was disbanded.)
The move by Labor was engineered by Mr R.F.X. Connor, Minister 
of Minerals and Energy, and orchestrated by Sir Lennox Hewitt,
Secretary of the Department of Minerals and Energy, in Canberra.
Mr Connor had been the Opposition's shadow minister for energy who in 
1966 had presented the Opposition Labor caucus with the idea of a 
national pipeline grid. Over the years he was instrumental in drafting 
the party's energy policies which, in part, were aimed at:
(a) regulating the exploitation, development, transportation, price 
and marketing and use of oil, natural gas, coal, fissionable 
materials and generative water;
(b) preventing the depletion of fuel and energy resources needed to 
match Australian requirements in mineral processing, general 
industry and national development;
(c) guarding the ecology and environment from pollution by fuel 
extraction and energy generation.
Connor (who died in 1977) is said to have been a convinced 
economic nationalist, both in the sense that he believed Australia 
should control its own resources and in that he deplored the 
particularism of the States. He believed that if all the main gas 
fields were linked together, no State or city would be completely 
dependent on a single source of natural gas. He also appeared to regard
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the interdependence that would be created by the pipeline grid as an 
antidote to what he viewed as the selfishness and parochialism of the 
State governments. Thus the pipeline was seen as a symbol of national 
unity. A national pipeline grid would have to be owned by the 
Commonwealth because no private firm would be willing to build it, 
or be able to borrow the funds with which to do so, before the end of 
the century (Stevenson, 1976:34).
Figure 4.5 shows the general location of the trunk mains 
comprising the proposed national pipeline grid which to many of Connor's 
political opponents was only a 'pipe dream'. In fact, Connor had no 
monopoly on the idea since, according to The Australian, 10 August 1966, 
it had been advanced by Frank J. Gardner, an American gas and oil 
expert, as one way of putting Australia's resources to work for 
Australians.
The national gas pipeline grid concept was also supported by the
management of AGL which saw how such a scheme could benefit industry.
In 1971 its assessment of the idea was as follows:
Viewed from the broadest and long-term aspect, we can 
now plan within Australia for the linking of provincial 
cities, capital cities and gas resources to give effect 
to a national grid in such a manner as to ensure that 
the widest spread of benefit derives from the 
availability and use of natural gas (Pettingell and 
Hokin, 1971:327).
In detail, the grid mains would provide for a 350 mm diameter spur line 
northward from Young to serve the requirements of Orange, Bathurst and 
Lithgow and a 500 mm diameter line southward from Young to serve the 
needs of Albury-Wodonga growth centre and link with the distribution 
system of the Bass Strait fields. The 'dream' on Connor's part was 
his expectation that he would be able to marshall support from the 
States for a project designed to rob them of autonomy over ownership
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and use of their energy resource — a major source of their economic and 
political strength. It was naive to think that support could come even 
from New South Wales — which desperately needed natural gas. Later 
events showed that New South Wales was prepared to resist the 
Commonwealth's interference to the furthest extent possible.
According to Donald, Connor had in mind that gas might one day 
flow from the coal-fields of New South Wales to Western Australia 
through the same pipeline that brought the natural gas from west to 
east. Donald, as well as Mr J. Kay (pers. comm., 6 September 1979), has 
commented on the unrealistic timetable which Connor had set for the 
establishment of the trunk pipelines contrary to advice that a more 
cautious implementation schedule should be constructed governed by 
economic viability. The Minister's dogged pursuit of his objectives 
reflected, perhaps, an impatience bred out of over twenty years of 
political impotence as a member of the opposition party, and full 
knowledge of the uncertain nature of political life. His obsession 
with rapid implementation of policies, often in disregard of existing 
political and constitutional constraints, was largely responsible for' 
the Whitlam Government's loan adventure and its ultimate dismissal 
through the blocking of Supply by the Opposition. (In 1974 the 
Whitlam Government sought to borrow from overseas institutions the 
sum of $4,000 million for minerals and energy projects.)
In a statement on 31 January 1973 Connor expressed support for 
the southern pipeline route since building the pipeline through the 
Blue Mountains National Park threatened to cause permanent damage to 
the Wollangambie wilderness. By 20 February 1973 the Deputy Prime 
Minister was able to announce that Cabinet had approved the creation of
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a national Pipeline Authority and that enabling legislation would 
follow in the next Parliamentary session.
The PTpetzne Authority Act was assented to on 7 June 1973.
Mr Connor explained in the House of Representatives on 10 May 1973,
that the purpose of the Bill was to establish an agency responsible for
the. pursuit of the government's policy for maximizing Australian
ownership, control, use and development of fuel oil, natural gas and
other hydrocarbon resources. This would be achieved through the
installation of an interstate pipeline system to ensure continuity of
supply and uniformity of price. The Commonwealth government indicated
that its objectives were similar to those stated by AGL and that it
supported the goal to bring natural gas to New South Wales at the
lowest possible price in the shortest possible time, but that the
fundamental difference was between its national concept and the limited,
private concept of the company. In the Commonwealth's view a national
pipeline system should take account of the much wider issues of defence,
decentralization, population growth, national development, the
importance of interconnected supplies to meet increasing long-term
demands, emergency situations, the exhaustion of particular regional
sources and the possible export of liquefied natural gas. Such a
clarification was necessitated by political self-interest as much as
by ideology because of Labor's urban base of support, and the fact that
Connor's constituency (Wollongong) was within New South Wales.
Mr Connor further explained (Australia, House of Representatives,
Debates, 10 May 1973) that:
the construction and operation by East Australian 
Pipeline Corporation Ltd of the Gidgealpa to Sydney 
pipeline would have pre-empted the Government's 
concept of, and decision for, a national pipeline
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system. In taking over responsibility for that 
pipeline and to obviate unnecessary delays, the 
Government has undertaken that it will stand in 
the shoes of the pipeline company; observe 
contractual commitments entered into by it ... The 
Government will enter into a contract with the 
Australian Gas Light Co. Ltd to carry the gas for 
that company and, in general terms, it is the 
Government's intention that the replacement of the 
company's proposed pipeline by the national pipeline 
system will not disadvantage the company in respect 
of the transmission of the gas which it has contracted 
to purchase from the South Australian field.
As a retort to the Opposition's complaints that to take over a 
private enterprise activity was a socialistic act Mr Connor asked 
'What better way is there to achieve [decentralization] than by what 
the Government proposes?' (Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, 
16 May 1973). He was convinced that only the national government could 
carry out such a measure.
AGL was outraged and immediately obtained the support of the 
New South Wales government in resisting the Commonwealth's take-over 
actions. Henceforward, the role of the state increased relative to 
that of AGL in fighting interference from the central government. But 
when it became obvious that the Whitlam Government was prepared to use 
all its powers to carry out the take-over — it could prevent the company 
from borrowing funds overseas to build the pipeline and also prevent the 
import of pipes from Japan — the New South Wales government and AGL 
relented in deference to their basic goal of getting natural gas to 
Sydney. But they continued, wherever possible, to resist the more 
centralist actions of the Commonwealth, such as ownership of EAPC and 
acquisition of pipeline easements within New South Wales. Compromise 
could only be achieved on a limited basis as reflected in an agreement 
signed by William Pettingell and R.F.X. Connor, after a meeting of the 
principals in Canberra on 26 March 1973:
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(a) the Australian Gas Light Company will negotiate with 
the Commonwealth an assignment of completion of construction 
of the pipeline from Gidgealpa [Moomba] to the city gate
of the Sydney Region;
(b) the Commonwealth will likewise negotiate with the 
Australian Gas Light Company Limited a contract for the 
delivery of gas in that pipeline from Gidgealpa to the 
city gate of the Sydney Region;
(c) both parties will cooperate in all possible ways in 
dealing with matters that will facilitate completion of 
the pipeline in the shortest possible time.
The Wh;tlam Government took the agreement to mean that the 
battle had been won, and that the job of constructing the pipeline could 
be turned over to The Pipeline Authority (TPA). That month Mr James 
Donald, an engineer from the private sector, was appointed Executive 
Member (analogous to Managing Director) of TPA. Donald saw TPA 
operating as a small, tight, high-grade technical organization 
capable of using and monitoring technical skills from any part of the 
world: in line with this thinking he retained the Snowy Mountains
Engineering Corporation which had had extensive experience in pipeline 
construction in Australia (Donald, n.d.). For the New South Wales 
government and AGL the battle had not been lost; in the short-run they 
continued to resist any legal take-over of EAPC, and in the long-run 
they thought of buying back the entire pipeline system, perhaps at a 
time when a Liberal government was installed in Canberra.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL INQUIRIES 
The first environmental Inquiry
The 1973 Inquiry was based on an application by AGL for a licence 
to construct the main transmission line between Moomba and Sydney in which 
it was mentioned that formal application for the Newcastle, Wollongong
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and Riverina (Wagga Wagga and Albury-Wodonga) laterals would be 
submitted at a later date. The environmental consequences of the 
national pipeline grid proposed by the newly-elected Whitlam Government 
were included in the terms of reference previously handed down by the 
New South Wales Minister for Environment Control.
The basic issue for the Commission was the impact of the portion 
of the pipeline grid, for which application was made, on those natural 
areas of particular concern to Sydney's population. As such, the 
Inquiry focused on the Blue Mountains and the region between Sydney and 
Newcastle which contain national parks and areas of scenic and 
archaeological importance. The role of the Commissioner, then, was 
to assess the worth of these areas to the community and the extent of 
any impairment that would result from the construction of a pipeline 
across them. These answers would provide a framework for evaluating 
the alternative routes.
The Inquiry began on 1 March 1973 and concluded on 30 March 
after seventeen days of formal hearings. Advisors to the Inquiry were 
Mr H. Bosward, chief of the engineering and scientific division of the 
SPCC; Mr W.H. Butler, a conservation consultant from Western Australia 
(who had been involved with the construction of the natural gas pipeline 
from Dongara to Perth); Dr F.L. Milthorpe, Professor of Biology and 
Chairman of the Committee on Environmental Studies at Macquarie 
University, Sydney; and Mr J. Rankine, consulting engineer and member 
of the technical advisory committee of the SPCC.
Witnesses were selected from among approximately 200 individuals 
and groups who had tendered submissions. The Commissioner explained 
that because of the large number of submissions, many of which expressed
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identical concerns, only a representative number was selected for 
participation at the hearings. But he said that anyone who had 
specifically asked to be heard publicly would be called and, in 
addition, all definite proposals made by interested parties would be 
admitted. Evidence was heard from seventy individuals, sixteen of whom 
appeared in a private capacity and fifty-four as representatives of 
thirty-six organizations.
Testimony by the proponents
Mr John Butters was the principal witness for AGL. He presented 
his case skilfully and with considerable fortitude throughout days of 
questioning in which the Commissioner made stiff demands for very 
technical information within very limited time constraints. He 
presented two main arguments in justification of the proposed project.
The first, which he stated to be the primary reason for the proposal, 
was derived from concern over the overall air quality in the metropolitan 
Sydney Region. He noted that approximately 35,000 tonnes of poisonous 
sulphur dioxide were being emitted into the air each year, an amount that 
was hazardous to health and property; a film, The ATv Ity Enemy, was 
presented to corroborate the risks. Although New South Wales was very 
fortunate, he observed, to have an abundance of low priced first class 
steaming coal with a low sulphur and low ash content plus the ready 
availability of fuel oil, the control of pollution even from these 
sources would depend on price and technology, about which not enough was 
known; and, therefore, the solution to the pollution situation could be 
found in natural gas which would save the Sydney area an estimated 
$A1,000 million in pollution control expenditure in the foreseeable 
future. No other single programme planned for New South Wales would 
make such a major impact on improving environmental quality. Butters'
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second, more plausible, argument was that natural gas was of vital 
importance in expanding New South Wales' economic strength by reducing 
energy costs to industry and commerce which would in turn contain 
prices and improve competitiveness in both internal and external 
markets.
Local governments and governmental agencies were all in favour 
of bringing natural gas to Sydney. Support for the industry's first 
argument came from the Air Pollution Branch of the State Department of 
Health. Mr P. Murphy of that agency said that the introduction of 
natural gas in Sydney, Newcastle and Wollongong would bring about 
reduction in air pollution through substitution of the fuel oil consumed 
in industry. When questioned about possible barriers to the penetration 
of natural gas into the fuel oil market, Murphy was able to point to new 
air legislation, effective 1 January 1973, which required that the 
sulphur content of fuel oil be less than one per cent. This, he 
concluded, would influence the consumption of natural gas in preference 
to low sulphur fuels.
Other government agencies saw the proposal as it would affect 
their own bailiwicks. The only maverick was the National Parks and 
Wildlife Service whose impressive submission arguing against the 'locat'Lon 
of the pipeline within national parks (designated or proposed) and 
archaeological sites was to be a key influence on the outcome. The 
Department of Development and Decentralisation, for example, considered 
that whatever route was chosen the aesthetic effect would be much the 
same, with the possible exception of some of the wilder areas in the Blue 
Mountains. However, it felt that the choice of the southern route would 
increase cost to customers and thus diminish the benefits to industry
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with negative effects on employment. Likewise, the State Planning 
Authority by reference to the 1968 Sydney Region Outline Rian, 
indicated where the pipeline could serve the planning framework.
While the proponents saw benefits arising from industrial use 
of natural gas, no one questioned the assertion that available cheap 
fuel would actually reduce the mass of air pollution. This would have 
been a valid question for no other reason than that industrial use of 
energy in New South Wales was only 40 per cent of the total energy 
consumed and, at the time, one-half to two-thirds was being used by 
the steel industry. If it is assumed that the steel industry could 
not convert to natural gas, the maximum share of the energy market 
available to AGL would be 20 per cent. Nor was any concern expressed 
over the potential impacts of the project on unemployment rates in 
those energy-producing industries which would be adversely affected by 
the switch to the less labour dependent fuel. (Butters (pers. comm.,
13 October 1981) has later argued that by making industrial users more 
competitive the secondary effect would be to increase employment.)
Testimony opposing the location of the pipelines
The handful of individuals who questioned the rationale for 
transporting energy from South Australia to coal-rich New South Wales 
and who saw the proposal as likely to have adverse cumulative impacts 
on the Sydney Region (by retarding government attempts to decentralize 
population from Sydney), did not strongly argue against the basic intent 
of the project. Rather than opposing the actual construction, therefore, 
these individuals and groups took the ultimate establishment of the 
project as given and worked towards gaining specific modifications to
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the proposed route. In general, their testimony exhibited great 
knowledge of the natural areas surrounding Sydney and reflected an 
intimacy with place which the expert witnesses could not effectively 
challenge. By far the most powerful submission from the community 
was prepared by Mr H. Bannister and Mr R. Wood of the Wilderness 
Protection Committee. Their approach was analytical rather than 
polemical and consisted mainly of a critique of the engineering and 
cost details associated with each of the alternative routes. Their 
choice was governed by the following main considerations:
(a) the centre route would cause considerably greater environmental 
damage than the southern route;
(b) the southern route could cost up to $A8.8 million more than the 
centre route but the extra cost could be more than offset by 
savings in a large diameter Riverina lateral which would be 
part of the Commonwealth's grid;
(c) Newcastle could be supplied by a lateral off the Riverina 
pipeline across the Hunter Valley;
(d) environmental damage was the only social cost which varied with 
the route chosen.
Testimony of the Commonwealth government
A representative of the Commonwealth government testified briefly 
in favour of the southern route, relying on nationalistic arguments to 
support this position. He stated, however, that the Commonwealth was 
prepared to abide by the Commissioner's recommendation for the location 
of the pipeline. A cynic could well have questioned the preference for 
a southern route in view of this qualification. Indeed it was one way 
of appeasing the environmentalists without being committed to their 
cause.
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Outcome of the first environmental Inquiry
Commissioner's Coffey's comprehensive report and findings were 
issued on 28 May 1973. In his view the evidence clearly demonstrated 
that a modified southern route would occasion the least harm to the 
important natural areas of New South Wales and that there was no 
argument based on economic considerations sufficiently strong to 
mitigate against its selection as the preferred route for the pipeline 
(Coffey Report, 1973:101). Applying the same logic in favour of 
environmental values, and taking into account the Commonwealth's plan 
for future extension of the trunkline to Brisbane, the Commissioner 
recommended that the lateral to Newcastle be constructed from the 
vicinity of Orange (Figure 4.6). Although the recommendations would 
result in increased construction costs for the modified southern route 
of $A7 million and of $A2 million for the Newcastle lateral, the 
Commission felt that the extra costs could be balanced against the 
benefits of decentralization and the possibility of future links to a 
national grid (Coffey Report, 1973:103).
Response to the Commissioner's recommendations
As might have been expected, the decision pleased environment­
alists and angered AGL which suffered major losses in the decision for 
(a) the southern rather than the centre route for the Moomba-Sydney trunk 
line; and (b) the inland rather than the coastal route for the lateral 
to Newcastle. Environmentalists within New South Wales have since 
hailed this as one of the two creditable major public inquiries in 
New South Wales (the other being the Kooragang Island Inquiry, Dunphy,
1978:24).
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Added to these losses to AGL was the ownership of the pipeline 
by the Commonwealth. It must not be overlooked, however, that the 
losses suffered by the company were within the range of the terms of 
reference and did not alter the basic victory for a government assured 
gas supply for AGL's Sydney market. Also, since the Inquiry produced 
recommendations rather than a mandate for action, AGL's losses might 
only be temporary. To have disputed the recommendation for a southern 
route would have been disadvantageous to AGL's own interests because by 
1973 petroleum prices had begun to rise and this added urgency to 
getting natural gas to the Sydney Region. In addition, severe delays 
would have resulted in increased construction costs which AGL would 
have to pay the Commonwealth in the form of pipeline user charges.
Thus the alternative was for AGL to resist the take-over of the EAPC 
and to discredit the wisdom of an inland location for the Newcastle 
lateral. Further, any ready acceptance of the recommendation for the 
Newcastle lateral would set a precedent for denial of future transport 
by pipeline along the coastal areas and, perhaps, preclude the sale of 
natural gas to that area between Sydney and Newcastle.
In a formal protest letter the AGL charged the Commissioner with 
incompetence and performance of function beyond the requirements of his 
Commission. The claim of incompetence referred to alleged inaccuracies 
in the extra costs of the recommended routes. Based on AGL's calculations 
the southern route would add $A13 million to previous estimates and 
$A7 million to the cost of the Newcastle line. AGL also rejected any 
recommendations unrelated to the main trunk line from Moomba to Sydney, 
arguing that the application was concerned only with that line. AGL 
focused on preventing TPA from gaining any legal claims to the EAPC and 
this produced awkward, if not ironic, situations in which TPA could only
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make recommendations for EAPC to decide upon, or alternately EAPC 
could enter into agreements for which the TPA would later have to be 
responsible (Donald, n.d.). On the ownership issue, the balance of 
power was clearly in favour of the company since it could refuse to 
sign a Haulage Agreement for TPA to transport its natural gas. It 
could also prevail upon the New South Wales government to deny a 
licence to TPA for construction on lands within New South Wales. The 
subsequent victories by AGL demonstrate how a favourable environmental 
outcome lies not in the decision of an Inquiry or similar event but in 
the subsequent actions during the implementation of the proposal.
After eighteen months of disagreement with TPA the charade ended 
abruptly with the signing of the Haulage Agreement on 17 May 1974, the 
day before an election resulting from an unexpected double dissolution 
of the Commonwealth Parliament. Stevenson (1976:35-56) has pointed out 
that it was the intention of the New South Wales government to prolong 
negotiations and build as much of the line as possible in the hope that 
the Labor Government would be defeated, but it relented when it was 
obvious that Labor would" not be returned to power.
During this time, TPA proceeded on the basis that the southern 
route and routes for other inland towns would proceed as recommended, 
but decided to wait for later and calmer considerations of the location 
for the Newcastle lateral. It was apparent that the location of the 
Newcastle lateral alarmed even the administrators of TPA who recommended 
to the Minister that they should push for a coastal route, since the 
inland location would not be consistent with the idea of a grid (letter 
dated 8 June 1973 from James Donald, Executive Member of TPA to
Mr Connor).
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In 1976, after the election of the Commonwealth Liberal 
government, AGL tried to buy back the pipeline without success. Although 
it is satisfied with the conditions of the Haulage Agreement, it has 
maintained its aim to secure a major role in future developments of the 
national pipeline grid. OPEC and time have served AGL well; escalating 
foreign oil prices and discoveries of significant supplies of natural 
gas in Western Australia have increased demand for natural gas so that 
markets once considered uneconomic (like Canberra) have in 1981 become 
attractive. Along with its vigorous pursuit of new market areas AGL 
has become an active crusader of the national pipeline grid concept and 
has begun discussions with the Commonwealth and New South Wales 
Cabinets on means of implementing the idea (pers. comm., New South 
Wales parliamentarian, October 1979).
The second environmental Inquiry
The AGL was resolved to supply natural gas to Newcastle via a 
coastal voute, a decision it made in response to the recommendations 
of the 1973 environmental Inquiry. For this, it had the full support 
of the New South Wales government and, upon close examination, no real 
opposition from the Commonwealth government. The New South Wales 
government favoured a coastal location for the pipeline so that the 
expanding urban centres between Sydney and Newcastle could benefit.
In Newcastle, support for the State's position came from the Newcastle 
Gas Company which needed natural gas for the same reasons as AGL in the 
1960s.
By 1974 it was evident that the State government and AGL were
gaining strength as a result of the weakening power of the Commonwealth
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government caused by its deepening troubles over increased spending in 
a period of economic recession. The State government could therefore 
assume that no funds would be available for early construction of the 
Brisbane link in the national grid. This fact made it difficult to 
understand the protestations by Mr Connor, and the statement by him 
on 21 August 1975 that the Commonwealth was ready to go ahead with the 
natural gas line to Lithgow, Bathurst, Orange and Wagga Wagga, and that 
the government had already spent $A500,000 on surveys necessary for land 
resumption, and $A100,000 for necessary equipment. In view of this, he 
is reported to have said, 'the request that has been made by the State 
Government on behalf of AGL is nothing less than humbug ... I know it 
is a matter of acute embarrassment to the State Liberal Government and 
to the Opposition here, but we are ready' (The Sydney Morning Herald,
21 August 1975). Likewise, it is also incomprehensible what the New 
South Wales government hoped to gain from a public Inquiry into the 
new application, since it had already, by the issue of a permit in 
October 1974, prescribed the limits of the land area within which the 
Newcastle lateral could be located. The New South Wales government also 
granted agreement, in principle, for a licence to construct on 
23 January 1975.
An Inquiry was called to begin on 25 September 1975 with public 
hearings to commence on 17 December 1975. The proposal involved 
construction of a 500 mm diameter underground steel pipeline over a 
distance of 136 km from Plumpton in the western suburbs of Sydney and 
terminating to the west of the city of Newcastle (Figure 4.7). The 
AGL application was joined in 1975 by an application from Caltex Oil 
(Australia) Pty Ltd (Caltex) to construct and operate a liquid 
petroleum products pipeline from its refinery at Kurnell in Sydney to
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Figure 4.7: Location of the Sydney-Newcastle gas pipeline as
proposed by AGL in 1975.
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Newcastle. Caltex had been supplying petroleum products to Newcastle 
mainly by coastal tankers. The company proposed that to minimize 
construction problems, cost and environmental impact it would consider 
the construction of the section of its pipeline from Plumpton to 
Barnsley at the same time and in the same easement as AGL.
The Commissioner was again Mr Coffey who had at the first 
Inquiry recommended against a coastal location for the Newcastle 
pipeline. However, he was powerless to alter the Ministerial directive 
for a new Inquiry and his position identifies the general role of 
reconciliation of conflicting interests in the development of the 
countryside. It also demonstrates the subservient relationship of 
state agencies to the political superstructure of the society.
The Inquiry process was altered from the previous one. As
Coffey (1975) explained, after 1973 it had become clear that the
legalistic Inquiry procedures needed to be streamlined and simplified
to save time, cost and effort. In the new process, the SPCC prepared
and distributed an agenda for a round table discussion confined to the
relevant facts, opinions and arguments contained in submissions and the
environmental impact statement or similar document. Witnesses to the
discussion were by invitation although non-invited persons were not
denied participation. Coffey stated that:
A particular strength of the method is that it permits 
the findings and recommendations to be reached by the 
State Pollution Control Commission as a body, rather 
than by an individual, even though for practical reasons 
the Commission cannot sit at the hearings (Coffey, 1978:4).
This may be a disputatious statement since the strength of the new
process depended on the possibility that a nine member Commission appointed
by the Governor (Part II, State Pollution Control Commission Act, 1970)
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could demonstrate objectivity and agreement in assessing values whose 
worth is impossible to measure along conventional economic lines.
In view of the background to the proposals, when the 'round-
table discussions' for the Inquiry were conducted on 17 and 18 December
1975 and on 7 and 8 January 1976, the Commissioner presented the logic
for the discussion (SPCC, 1976:50):
The New South Wales Government has announced its 
agreement in principle to supplying Newcastle with 
natural gas.
In the absence of a decision by the Commonwealth 
Government to proceed with the construction of a 
natural gas pipeline to Brisbane as part of a 
national pipleine grid, the New South Wales Government 
has rejected, on economic grounds, the concept of an 
inland pipeline to Newcastle.
. The New South Wales Government has approved in principle 
the concept of supplying Newcastle via a coastal 
pipeline, provided the proposed route is found to be 
environmentally acceptable.
. The general conditions under which the proposed 
pipelines might be constructed and operated were 
determined at the 1973 Natural Gas Pipeline Inquiry 
and the 1975 Metropolitan Pipelines Inquiry. These 
general conditions need not be reconsidered in the 
course of this inquiry, except where they may be 
deemed inappropriate because of circumstances peculiar 
to the proposal coastal route.
. A need exists and will continue to exist for some 
years for the conveyance of petroleum products from 
Sydney to Newcastle and associated areas.
Prior to these discussions the Inquiry requested comments on 
the proposal and obtained 213 submissions from affected land owners, 
public agencies and other interested parties. Of these, sixty-three 
were individual statements, the balance being signed petitions. The 
main issues were similar to those raised in the earlier Inquiry except 
that, because of greater fragmentation of land holdings along the 
coastal route, conflicts with individual property owners loomed as a 
major obstacle to construction.
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Arguments by the proponents
AGL stated that the application for a licence to construct 
the Newcastle pipeline was in fulfilment of a requirement by the 
government of New South Wales that natural gas be made available to 
Newcastle as part of the overall supply contracted for the Sydney 
Region, the criterion for which had been the lowest cost consistent 
with sound engineering practice, the protection of the environment 
and the interests of consumers in the area. Therefore, as perceived 
by AGL, the following were the only constraints on the project: the
supply point at Plumpton; the most feasible location across the 
Hawkesbury; the ease of future connections to Windsor, Gosford and 
Wyong; and the termination point near Newcastle. Other important 
considerations were identified as the shortest practicable route; 
the existence of national parks and proposed national parks; and the 
topography.
Arguments for and against the location of the pipeline
There was some indifference to the natural gas pipeline by 
local councils along the pipeline route. The Parramatta City Council, 
however, was, and remains, strongly opposed to the construction of 
the Caltex liquids pipeline across its administrative area. Its 
objection is largely that a pipeline from Sydney would eventually 
increase the need for additonal refinery capacity in the Sydney area 
and the deterioration of environmental quality associated with such 
expansion.
Apart from protests by individuals and resident action groups
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against infringement on private property rights the main objections to 
the project were over potential impacts on natural areas and scenic 
vistas near Sydney, for example at Gentleman's Halt on the Hawkesbury 
River. In addition there were the usual objections to pipelines 
crossing any established or proposed national park, archeological site 
or valued bushland.
Outcome of the second environmental Inquiry
In its Report and Findings issued 23 January 1976 the Commission 
found that the existence of several sensitive areas (the major ones 
being shown in Figure 4.7) would necessitate several deviations of the 
pipeline route (SPCC, 1976). Further, because the coastal area has 
already been criss-crossed by a large number of easements for various 
purposes, it was necessary to minimize the impact of the pipeline 
easement. Hence it recommended that the allowable easement be 15 m 
rather than 27 m as requested by the applicant.
Response to the Commission's recommendation
Once again AGL found the recommendations to be unsatisfactory and 
appealed to the State for mediation. The company was concerned over 
the mechanics of implementing the Commission's recommendations, 
especially the increased work and additional survey and drafting work 
required to reduce easements from 27 m to 15 m. In March 1977 a 
working group was established by Mr G.M. Maxwell (Under-Secretary for 
Mines and Deputy Chairman of the State Energy Authority) to review the 
existing impediments to construction of the pipeline as seen by the 
company. The working group consisted of representatives from government
155
instrumentalities, AGL and Caltex. After many discussions, nine formal 
meetings and five field inspections in which the group evaluated each 
of the recommendations of the Commission, it published a report in 
December 1977. Its report noted that, according to Clause 12.1(a) of 
the Energy Authority Act, 1976, the Authority is empowered 'to carry out 
such investigations relating to the locating and development, extraction, 
provision, transportation, distribution, conservation and utilization of 
energy resource as it considers appropriate or as the Minister directs' 
(Energy Authority of New South Wales, 1977). The working group 
approved of, or agreed to, alterations to each of the detailed 
recommendations of the 1975 Inquiry and, on the key issue of easement 
width, it noted that the limited natural gas reserves in the Cooper 
Basin and the abandonment of a trans-Australia pipeline meant that 
there was the possiblity for the establishment of a coal gasification 
plant in the low-cost coal-fields in the Hunter Valley. Therefore, it 
would be necessary to grant a wide easement (27 m) to allow for the 
future construction of additional pipelines to convey energy back to 
Sydney. Besides, the working group concluded, a 15 m easement would 
not generally benefit the landowners over one of 27 m and it certainly 
would not be in the best interest of the State or the Licensee. The 
group also recommended that to minimize against coal mine subsidence 
in the lower Hunter Valley, the pipeline route should join with the 
proposed Hunter Valley expressway beginning west of Wyong and on to 
Newcastle.
In a press release on 21 November 1979, officials of AGL 
announced that the project was scheduled to start 'in a few days' and 
explained that the delays in getting natural gas to Newcastle were 
largely caused by 'the inertia and muddling of New South Wales State
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Government instrumentalities' which had put the Newcastle town gas 
supplier in a difficult liquidity position, and that this was one of 
the reasons for its recent take-over of the Newcastle Gas Company 
(Australian Financial Review, 21 November 1979).
SUMMARY
AGL's proposal was designed to maintain, and if possible improve, 
its position within the economic structure of New South Wales in 
particular and Australia in general. The actions of the State 
politicians and their instrumentalities (agencies and commissions) 
generally aided the realization of this goal in the face of opposition 
from other governments and within the community. Attempts to alter 
certain aspects of the proposal (ownership and routeing) arose from 
within the community and from Commonwealth government politicians.
These oppositions were based on ideologies reflecting concern with 
equity in public access to valued natural resources and with preservation 
of valued natural environments.
To the extent that community activism led to public Inquiries into 
the environmental impacts of this major engineering project, the case 
represented a landmark in human-environment relations for New South Wales 
and Australia. The recommendations of the Inquiries in favour of 
environmental values were a tribute to the Commissioner. Yet, as has 
been demonstrated, following the Inquiries, the entrenched economic 
order was able to nullify some of these environmental gains. Therefore, 
it can be said that the pipeline case took place within a social system 
in which the governmental infrastructure acted to preserve the existing 
social order. Within this social reality, modifications can and did
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take place but only because of a number of watchful members of the 
community who were committed to action for the establishment of 
environmental values.
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CHAPTER 5
THE STATE IN RESOURCE USE DECISION-MAKING: 
AGENT OR NEUTRAL PARTY
This chapter identifies the nature and extent of state government 
involvement in the pipeline episode thereby demonstrating the relationship 
of the state to the community and the private sector. The theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter 2 postulated that the state, through its 
economic, political and ideological functions, acts to reproduce or to 
generally maintain capitalist relations of production. To do so the 
state must select policies compatible with its functions. Here it is 
hoped to pinpoint aspects of the reproduction and selection processes 
by examining various actions taken by the state in cooperation with the 
firm or in response to the demands of environmentalists within the 
community.
The typology of five 'alternative concepts of the role of the 
state' presented by Dear and Clark (1978:174) provides a useful basis 
for analyzing the actions of the state in the pipeline case: these are
(a) supplier of public goods;
(b) regulator and facilitator of the operation of the 
marketplace;
(c) social engineer, in the sense of intervening in the 
economy to achieve its own policy objectives;
(d) arbiter between competing social groups or classes;
(e) agent within society and the economy on behalf of some 
ruling elite.
Whereas Dear and Clark conclude that each concept 'represents a
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different perception of the state's behaviour, and provides a different 
ideological and analytical approach to the study of geographic process', 
this study shows that each concept represents a different aspect of the 
overall role of the capitalist state. Indeed, each of these aspects of 
the state's behaviour can be demonstrated by means of the pipeline case.
Because the main emphasis of the thesis is on action for 
environmental protection, the analysis will focus on two related issues 
which were raised by environmental interest groups in the particular case 
analysed — preservation of open space and population decentralization.
The approach first outlines some socio-economic and political factors 
of Australian society which were important contexts within which the 
state's actions took place and, second, identifies specific aspects of 
the state's behaviour through an examination of actions taken or not 
taken.
The period covered is generally between 1972 and 1975 although 
often it is necessary to look further into the past to understand 
actions during this time and also a little into the future to identify 
changes made by succeeding governments.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS 
WITHIN THE STATE STRUCTURE
This section outlines the socio-economic and political factors 
which influenced, or ought to have influenced, the actions of state 
decision-makers. The factors are presented for the Commonwealth, State 
and local levels of government to emphasize the range of concerns within
the hierarchy. The discussion centres on problems affecting New South
160
Wales and the way in which the pipeline project was used, or not used, 
to solve them. But necessarily it includes a consideration of national 
conditions which have a relationship to State decisions.
The national level
When the pipeline project became a controversial issue in New 
South Wales in late 1972 the Liberal Party-Country Party coalition was 
in government at both the State and Commonwealth levels.
At the Commonwealth level, the government of Prime Minister 
William McMahon was being vigorously challenged by the election campaign 
of the Australian Labor Party led by Mr E.G. Whitlam, and it stood to 
lose Liberal Party-Country Party control for the first time in 23 years. 
The force of Labor's campaign arose from the acknowledgement that the 
problems faced by the cities 'had grown far beyond the reach of state 
and local government. They were national problems — national resources 
and administrative skills should be deployed to resolve them' (Lloyd and 
Troy, 1978:26). Whitlam emphasized the disadvantages to the poor and 
the young arising from rapid urban growth following World War II. Chief 
among these were shortages of welfare housing, inadequate public 
transport, high cost of land in the metropolitan areas and the general 
loss of environmental amenity arising from the modernization/urbanization 
process. As part of the solution the Labor Party advocated the creation 
of new growth centres to syphon population away from Sydney and 
Melbourne in particular. Whitlam also became a strong advocate of 
greater powers for local government to enable that tier to better provide 
basic services and facilities (Lloyd and Troy, 1978; Logan, 1978).
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So effective was Labor's tack that The Age (31 August 1971) 
observed, 'in the past year or so talk of decentralization has been 
dynamically transformed to a rising tide of public concern over 
environmental quality — particularly in the metropolitan capitals and 
big cities which now contain more than 80 per cent of the population'.
Apart from identifying the most pressing set of issues of the 
time, it is said (Oakes, 1973:60) that Whitlam's appeal to the 
electorate was that he could speak convincingly about urban problems 
since his, like thousands of other young families, had experienced the 
disadvantages of life in a new suburb on the fringe of Sydney.
In response to Labor's politicization of the problems of urban
and regional development the McMahon Government declared its own
commitment to action in a statement to the House of Representatives
on 19 September 1972 (quoted in Lloyd and Troy, 1978:29).
It is against this background that the commonwealth 
government has decided that it will take immediate 
steps, financially and in other ways, in a 
co-ordinated program with state governments directed 
towards fostering a better balance of population 
distribution and regional development in Australia.
I have written to the State Premiers informing them 
of this and seeking their co-operation. Funds will 
be made available for the remainder of this financial 
year to provide for the initial operations of a new 
commonwealth authority concerned with urban and 
regional development.
Thus arose the National Urban and Regional Development Authority (NURDA), 
responsible for carrying out the government's policy of selective 
decentralization through the development of regional growth centres and 
the promotion of sub-metropolitan centres around existing cities (Lloyd
and Troy, 1978:30).
162
Whitlam's period as Prime Minister (December 1972 to December 
1975) allowed him to attack urban problems. On 19 December 1972, the 
role of NURDA was subsumed by the Department of Urban and Regional 
Development (DURD) with the former Shadow Minister for Urban and 
Environmental Affairs, Mr T. Uren, as Minister. In its essentials the 
main thrust of the new Ministry was more far-reaching than that of 
NURDA. (Lloyd and Troy (1978) give a detailed account of the structure 
and function of DURD over the Whitlam years.)
Labor also acted swiftly in other policy areas. Of particular 
importance to this analysis are the initiatives of the Ministries of 
Environment and of Minerals and Energy. Their significance relates to 
actions which they could or could not undertake because of their situation 
at the level of the Commonwealth in the overall state structure. Unlike 
DURD, whose relationship with the individual States was fundamentally 
one of negotiating the apportionment of funds from the new departments' 
'considerable largesse' (Lloyd and Troy, 1978:35), the policies of these 
two Ministries threatened the autonomy of the States in matters of resource 
management and allocation. By mid-1973 the 'big Brother tendencies of 
centralist Canberra' {The Age, 6 June 1973) were being criticized 
throughout the nation. Indeed, the right to make decisions over 
development actions is constitutionally vested in each State and the 
'States' rights' issue has, since World War II, been a major subject 
of dispute between the two levels of government because of 'the 
remarkable, and ... un-anticipated growth of central power in Australia' 
(Menzies, 1967:152). This rise in the number of centralist actions 
(i.e. Commonwealth intervention in State affairs) arose from the 
'increasing importance of the international economy in this century
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[which] inevitably thrust the central government into a position of 
power, given its responsibilities in co-ordinating the national economy' 
(Patience, 1978:109). Additional power also devolved on the Commonwealth 
from the need to modify the negative regional and national effects of 
inter-state competition for capital to develop the mineral and energy 
resources discovered since the 1950s. (A brief discussion of the role 
of overseas capital in the development of Australia's natural resources 
is undertaken in Chapter 3.) It was in this context that the Labor 
government shaped its mineral resources and environmental policies.
Resources and environmental management policies: overcoming
constitutional constraints
The Commonwealth government does not have any direct constitutional 
authority to control actions affecting the environment within a State. 
Legislative power over land and its resources are part of the States' 
rights. However, national environmental goals may be achieved indirectly 
by using parts of Section 51 of the Constitution. The House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation 
(1979:6-7) found that some of the most important items were:
(i) Trade and commerce with other countries, and among 
the States:
(ii) Taxation; but so as not to discriminate between States 
or parts of States:
(xxvi) The people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary 
to make special laws:
(xxix) External affairs:
(xxxi) The acquisition of property on just terms from any 
State or person for any purpose in respect of which 
the Parliament has power to make laws:
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(xxxvii) Matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
by the Parliaments of any State or States, but so that 
the law shall extend only to States by whose Parliaments 
the matter is referred, or which afterwards adopt the 
law:
(xxxix) Matters incidental to the execution of any power vested 
by this Constitution in the Parliament or in either 
House thereof, or in the Government of the Commonwealth, 
or in the Federal Judicature, or in any department, or 
officer of the Commonwealth.
Although the potentially powerful Environmental Protection 
(Impact of Proposals) Act ;vas not assented to until December 1974, 
after the main decisions in the Moomba-Sydney pipeline case had been 
made, the possibilities for control that such a concept offered the 
Commonwealth were immediately explored by the newly-elected Whitlam 
Government.
Yet,the extent to which a political administration can implement 
environmental resource conservation or egalitarian policies in a free 
market situation is well demonstrated by the subsequent overturn of 
many of Connor's policies and those of the Whitlam Government in 
general (see Patience, 1978; Wilsenski, 1978; Evans, 1980).
The criticisms of Connor, Australia's first Minister of Minerals 
and Energy, are well known. He was an elderly man when he came to power 
with a grand ideology and perhaps a too urgent ambition to put it into 
effect. From the start Connor's policies encountered difficulties 
arising from the interpretation of the Australian Constitution on the 
States' rights issue. On accession to office he immediately took 
measures (Connor, 1974:3)
to assert and secure the exercise of full National 
sovereignty over all energy resources ... to correct 
the failure of the preceding Government to act in 
terms of National sovereignty during a period of
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office from 1949 to 1972. The former Government had, 
in fact, permitted the usurpation by the constituent 
States of the Australian Federation, of the National 
functions in planning, development and export of energy 
resources.
These measures included:
(a) The enactment of The Pipeline Authority Act, 1973, for the 
construction of a transcontinental pipeline system for the 
transmission of natural gas to all the mainland States, their 
capitals and major centres of consumption;
(b) legislation asserting national sovereignty over the resources of 
the continental shelf;
(c) legislation to establish the Petroleum and Minerals Authority 
(PMA) which would engage in the search for energy and mineral 
resources.
The measures were intended to achieve, as far as possible, Australian 
independence from international influences over ownership and supply of 
mineral and energy resources, 'to replace disparate activities and 
rivalries of the respective States' (Connor, 1974:15), and to gain 
national control over resources allocation.
One rationale for TPA Act, though clearly not its primary 
purpose, was the leverage it provided the Commonwealth for the construction 
of lateral pipelines to growth centres selected by DURD and agreed to 
by the States. The PMA Bill was also intended to secure ownership of 
the resource by the nation. Together these two actions might have 
substituted government-owned enterprise for the free market to achieve 
the desired allocation or redistribution of minerals and energy resources, 
had it not been for the constitutional conflicts they engendered.
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The means-ends disjunction
The ALP was clearly a reformist party when in office 
between 1972 and 1975: it worked within the broad
limits of the existing system, treading the 
parliamentary road and not engaging in a fundamental 
or direct assault on the parliamentary and the 
capitalist system ... it was not committed to the 
revolutionary or overall transformation of things 
(Duncan, 1978:78).
Duncan (1978) and Wilenski (1978, 1980) have tried to show that 
there are several limitations on a government pursuing policies aimed 
at creating greater social justice and increased opportunities for its 
citizens within a capitalist socio-economic system functioning under a 
parliamentary governmental framework. As Wilenski (1980) has pointed 
out, there were several additional constraints operating on the Labor 
government arising from the party being 'in office but not in power'. 
Among them was the fact that the Opposition dominated the Senate (Upper 
House) which had control over the nation's money supply in the sense that 
it has the power to delay transmission of money Bills. The lack of 
parliamentary power in this vital area meant that Labor's programmes 
requiring legislative consent were doomed to failure without Senate 
approval. In addition, Labor failed to gain the influence over the 
bureaucracy necessary to implement those goals for which it secured 
parliamentary approval. The problems which Labor faced emphasized the 
need for correspondence between state structure and state function: a
problem which Offe (1972, 1975a) maintains characterizes the capitalist 
state in the advanced stages of economic development.
A further basic problem for the incoming Labor government was a 
pre-existing bureaucracy with traditional beliefs in rationality and 
efficiency in management. Many of the top bureaucrats whom Labor
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inherited would have been instrumental in shaping conservative policies 
over two decades of the Liberal Party's reign. This militated against 
the implementation of Labor's reformist policies. As Wilenski (1980:48) 
points out:
Labor, apart from one or two controversial appointments 
of permanent heads, attempted to undertake its reform 
program through a body of men and women whom the Chairman 
of the Royal Commission of Australian Government 
Administration (Coombs Commission) described as "selected 
by processes which give greatest weight to qualities most 
likely to be possessed by those with privileged social 
background and access to privileged educational institutions. 
The composition of the bureaucracy therefore reflects not 
the structure of Australian society as a whole but that 
of the already privileged sections of it. The unconscious 
presumptions which influence its patterns of thought tend 
therefore to lean heavily towards preservation of the 
status quo".
But not all of Labor's problems were the result of external forces.
In its haste to implement pre-election promises, the Labor government 
failed to develop much overall coherence among its many objectives. 
Consequently, it was believed that at times certain of its Ministers 
were in conflict. Whether true or not, Ministers like Dr Cass were 
obliged to publicly declare: 'I wish that people would stop saying
that Mr Connor and I are on a collision course ... it is just not true' 
{The Age, 22 May 1975).
Finally, some of Labor's policies had adverse effects on the 
private sector and on the national economy in general. The effects of 
across-the-board tariff reduction have been described by Price (1976). 
According to Price (1976:92) the effect of the government's 
'restructuring exercise' was to cause an influx of imports and the 
closure of a large number of manufacturing firms. The most damaging 
effects, he said, were felt by small-sized manufacturing establishments 
and the thousands of workers they employed. In Linge's (1979c) view,
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however, the mineral boom, the inflation rate in Australia and the 
failure to adjust the Australian exchange rate were the main causes 
of the problems experienced by industry during the period. In addition, 
Labor's efforts to redistribute income brought a severe slump in profits 
and exacerbated the capital shortage, while the pursuit of resource 
reallocation goals frightened off investors. (No new major investment 
of any size was undertaken in the country between December 1972 and late 
1975. The response of one major industry, the petroleum industry,is 
shown in Figure 5.1.) The rise in unemployment during the period of 
Labor's reign produced a severe crisis causing it to lose overall 
credibility, and by 1975, its governance of the nation.
While Labor's departure from office diminished the impacts of 
some of its more unconstitutional initiatives, certain victories like 
the takeover of the pipeline project from its private enterprise 
developer, and the enactment of the Environmental Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act, 1974, set important precedents for Commonwealth 
intervention in traditionally State controlled decision areas.
The State (New South Wales) level
By late December 1972 the political situation in New South Wales 
was exactly the reverse of that at the national level. The Liberal 
Party-Country Party coalition controlled the State parliament with a 
majority of two seats and relied on two Independents to form a government 
It had assumed leadership in 1965 after 24 years of Labor Party rule and 
its precarious position was being undermined by external as well as 
internal socio-economic and political forces.
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Externally, it had to contend with a new Commonwealth government 
whose ideological basis for action was at variance with its own but on 
which it had to depend for most of the revenues to implement its own 
planning programmes. Interstate competition (discussed in Chapter 3) 
also presented new challenges for New South Wales to maintain its 
position as Australia's most economically powerful State. New South 
Wales was faced with increasing economic competition from its 'arch-rival' 
Victoria and from other States in which new resource discoveries had 
been made throughout the 1960s. The Victorian Premier, Sir Henry Bolte, 
a powerful force since 1955, was said to be so firmly committed to the 
material development of Victoria that he offered generous concessions to 
industry in his world trips 'selling Victoria' (Staley, 1971:16). As 
Staley observed, Victoria did have some good selling points: the value
of factory production per head of population was ahead of that in New 
South Wales, and population growth and per capita income were greater 
than in any other State. Another major source of Victoria's attractiveness 
to industry was its Bass Strait oil and gas resources which came into 
production in the late 1960s.
Internally, the main stresses on the New South Wales political 
system arose from problems associated with the concentration of people 
in the central coastal areas from Wollongong to Newcastle. In 1967 the 
State Planning Authority of New South Wales (SPA) predicted that 
population in the Cumberland Plain alone (Figure 5.2) would grow from 
2.7 to 4.0 million in the year 2000. In addition, a total population 
of 1.5 million was expected to be accommodated within the Sydney Region 
which extended beyond the County of Cumberland to include the Blue 
Mountains among other areas (Figure 5.3). Academics (Woolmington, 1971;
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Woolmington, Pigram and Hobbs, 1971; Scott, 1978), planners (SPA, 1967, 
1968), and environmentalists (National Trust of Australia (N.S.W.), 1968) 
all saw decentralization of population through planned dispersal of 
industry as the main solution to the concentration of people in the 
port cities and the attendant problems of urban pollution and congestion. 
The Ministry of Industrial Development and Decentralisation, established 
in 1963, incorporated the Decentralisation Fund set up in 1958 with the 
aim of providing assistance to industries outside of the Newcastle- 
Sydney-Wollongong urban-industrial complex (Searle, 1981:15). Searle 
observes that to qualify, 'industries had to be at a locational 
disadvantage compared to metropolitan firms and be unable to expand 
without government aid'. And, incidentally, subsidies were available for 
gas charges in excess of Sydney rates. However, if commitment to 
industrial decentralization as a strategy for population re-distribution 
was evaluated in terms of expenditures on initiatives, the figures belie 
the idea of the policy as a government priority. In 1969 to 1970 
$A5 million, 0.6 per cent of the New South Wales budget, was used on 
decentralization programmes (Bourne, 1975:144) and the total expenditure 
from the Decentralisation Fund to 1977-78 was $A95.7 million (Department 
of Development and Decentralisation, 1979:48) a figure which, as Searle 
notes, is minute in relation to the total capital accumulation in the 
State.
Another response of the New South Wales government to the problems 
associated with metropolitan growth but, more specifically, in response 
to citizen pressure was the enactment of pollution control laws in the 
early 1970s. But these laws only achieved minor improvement in
environmental conditions because the new instrumentalities created through
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them were not equipped adequately to deal with the causes of the problem. 
What Ryder (1976:242) said in criticism of air quality management efforts 
applies equally to the attempts at managing other environmental 
problems:
the basic change needed in Sydney is for a much 
greater recognition that the task is much more 
difficult and much more related to social 
considerations than has been perceived. It is the 
integration of environmental criteria in the variety 
of Sydney's planning and management agencies rather 
than in the enforcement of specific controls that is 
essential.
One reason for the general discontent within Sydney in particular was
the erosion of recreational open space set aside as 'green belt' areas
in the Cumberland County Council's master plan of 1948. Green belt
areas were intended to serve as recreational open space and as buffers
against urban sprawl. In rationalizing the non-implementation of the
Cumberland County Council's plan, the SPA (1968:14) explains:
The green belt-satellite town concept has certain, 
inbuilt weaknesses ... It is not always reconcilable 
with the most economic and orderly expansion of public 
utility services, and this leads to pressures to amend 
the green belt where the two principles are found to 
be incompatible. The development of satellite towns 
requires a degree of correlation between the distribution 
of employment and residential population which is 
sometimes very difficult to achieve, and this necessarily 
affects the rate of urban development in relation to 
demand.
The links which the planning programmes of the Cumberland County Council 
and the SPA had to the demands for open space in the Sydney Region are 
discussed more fully in Chapter 7.
In 1968 the National Trust of Australia (N.S.W.) published 
Sydney 2000 which contained its own assessment of requirements for 
conservation of natural areas, scenic preservation and recreation. Among
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the favoured sites was the Blue Mountains National Park, over which the 
community-private sector confrontation resulted in a public Inquiry into 
the pipeline proposal. The park was identified as open space of regional 
importance. The Trust (1968:1) maintained that its seemingly ambitious 
and demanding statement of conservation needs was presented 'in the firm 
conviction that nothing less will adequately cater for the expanding 
recreational, aesthetic, psychological and cultural needs of five million 
people'. The significance of this public stance is attributed to the 
status of the Trust within the community. A private organization, begun 
in 1946, by 1972 the Trust had about 20,000 members in New South Wales.
In 1960 its work, of preservation of buildings and objects of historical 
and cultural significance and protection of natural areas, was recognized 
by the New South Wales Government when the organization became formally 
incorporated by an Act of Parliament.
There was agitation from other groups within the community for 
the general improvement of environmental quality in the region, and 
this activism influenced government decision-making when it occurred in 
conjunction with other political events such as parliamentary elections. 
For example, after careful analysis of the pipeline case, the conclusion 
must be reached that the decision for a public Inquiry was forced on the 
government by the actions of environmental interests in the Hawkesbury 
district by-election. The criticial importance of this event was 
therefore related to the potential to diminish the already narrow lead 
of the coalition government in the New South Wales parliament. (The 
significance of the by-election is considered later in this chapter.)
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The local council level
In reporting her research into the power of local government in
Australia, Bowman (1976:3) observes that it
has never been local self-government: rather it is
State government writ small. However, elected 
councils and [their] officers often facilitate 
community self-help, particularly in the country 
districts and act as spokesmen for local demands on 
State governments. These are latent or informal 
functions of considerable importance.
Local government therefore has influence, but its power is only 
that conferred on it by the State government. Furthermore, because most 
local government influence is exerted through their representatives in 
State parliament, political factors can be significant in determining 
which local government demands are met.
The New South Wales Minister for Local Government can suspend or 
dismiss a council at any time, and the Minister for Planning can override 
a council's development decisions. The powerlessness of local government 
bodies is illustrated in New South Wales where the Wran Government has 
carried out 'sensible amalgamation' to reduce the number of local councils 
from 223 in 1976 to 180 in 1981. All but one of these councils were 
outside the Sydney area (Sydney Morning Herald, 11 August 1981). But 
the process of dissolution and consolidation of local governments is 
not unique to Australia. Bennett (1980:278) has shown that the process 
has resulted in a reduction in the total number of governments in the 
United States from 155,000 in 1942 to 80,000 in 1978. Consolidation 
and dissolution of governments is also occurring in Britain and other 
Western European countries, usually for political or economic reasons. 
Councils may also be dismissed for misuse of their discretionary powers.
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Because most local governments (especially non-metropolitan 
councils) are usually eager to improve their weak politico-economic 
status they tend to support development projects — government and 
non-government —  often to the neglect of environmental considerations.
Lloyd and Troy (1978:25) observe that the prospect of State
government financial support for economic development can provoke a very
competitive spirit among potential recipients:
the social structure of country towns and the development 
ethos which dominated Australia during the fifties and 
sixties was conducive to small-town boosterism which 
found an outlet in a voluminous literature of plans and 
proposals for industrial development in scores of towns 
and cities, many of them based on extremely dubious 
economic justification. Political pressures on state 
government multiplied, with Country Party members in 
particular feeling the strong wind of local patriotism.
This particular scenario can be demonstrated in the pipeline episode
in which local governments of various sizes lobbied for natural gas
lateral pipelines and failed, despite promises by the State government.
This questions the ability of the state to direct private capital to
inefficient locations or for it to overcome the competitive relations
of capitalist development and supply its own decentralization funds
for the growth of firms in non-urban areas. Searle (1981:16) found
that
Most of the decentralisation programme's funds have 
gone to firms originating in the Sydney metropolitan 
area or overseas rather than the country firms, and 
for these non-country firms there is evidence that 
their decentralised manufacturing operations would 
generally have taken place even in the absence of 
state assistance.
The main reason for this, he points out, is that local firms tend to 
be small, and such firms have a greater chance of going out of business
in the short-term. 'The Department of Decentralisation has almost always
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checked and confirmed the lack of alternative finance for small applicant 
firms' (Searle, 1981:18). Further, the initial emphasis on capital 
rather than labour subsidies has tended to benefit the mechanization 
process, thus eroding the potential for generating employment. Even 
given the need to strengthen the existing employment base, and 
consequently the overall locational attractiveness of local areas, the 
state government must conform to principles of economic efficiency which 
in this instance erodes the possibility of reducing population growth 
in the metropolitan area. As will be demonstrated, the implication is 
that local governments that lobbied in State and Commonwealth parliaments 
for, and were promised, natural gas pipeline laterals lost out in the 
end because of their small demand for this commodity.
In summary, within the context of the state structure, the 
concerns at the Commonwealth level which had a bearing on decisions in 
the pipeline case were mainly urban spatial problems and the.consequences 
of foreign ownership and control of Australia's mineral and energy 
resources. Because the cities were the locale where major social 
problems were felt, the alternative of population decentralization to 
non-metropolitan areas was seen as a logical solution. But there are 
hindrances to the implementation of decentralization policies. One such 
hindrance is interstate rivalry for economic development activities.
From the perspective of the local governments, the successful implementation 
of either Commonwealth or State decentralization policies would benefit 
non-metropolitan locations since the attendant economic development and 
population increase could only bolster the relatively weak economic status 
of those areas. The following analysis ascertains the extent to which 
each level of government was able to use the pipeline project to meet its 
own interests, and, importantly, identifies why their efforts failed or
succeeded.
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THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE PIPELINE EPISODE:
EVIDENCE OF STRESSES ON TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
The history of the New South Wales government's involvement 
with the developer of the natural gas pipeline project exemplifies the 
traditional Australian relationship of partnership or cooperation between 
state and capital in which a state aligns itself with a firm as initiator 
of a major development proposal. AGL's status as one of the country's 
oldest firms and its long history of successful operations as New South 
Wales' major supplier of town gas made such a relationship certain. 
However, the reasons for cooperation in this instance were not only to 
foster economic development for its own sake but also to provide 
guarantees for the success of the proposal within the context of inter­
state competition. The stresses that impinged on this longstanding 
relationship arose primarily from the environmentalists who objected to 
the location of the pipeline within natural areas of scenic,.recreational 
or archaeological importance. By contrast objections from within the 
private sector (e.g. the controversy with BHP over the supply of steel 
pipes discussed in Chapter 4) did not bring into question the fact of 
state support for private sector activities but rather represented 
competition for some of the economic benefits of the proposal. And the 
belated involvement of the Commonwealth sprang from the concerns of a 
new reformist Labor government over national energy selfsufficiency 
and equitable distribution of the then scarce energy commodity. The 
specific ways in which the State, Commonwealth and local governments 
became entangled in the pipeline case are analyzed in the following 
sequence:
(a) negotiating for a supply of natural gas;
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(b) deciding the route of the pipeline;
(c) resolving environmental conflicts between the firm and the 
community;
(d) ownership of the pipeline.
Throughout this discussion, links will be made between actions and the 
socio-economic and political structure already outlined.
The state as agent; negotiating a supply of natural gas
Mr W.C. Fife, New South Wales Minister for Mines, Minister for 
Power and Assistant Treasurer from 1967 to 1975 indicated to the author 
on 23 June 1980 that Esso-BHP and AGL had approached the New South Wales 
government, prior to 1967, with a proposal to bring natural gas to Sydney. 
The plan was for Esso-BHP to be the Victorian supplier and AGL the gas 
distributor within Sydney. It was then that the decision was made to 
allow private enterprise to bring gas into New South Wales. But by the 
time Mr Fife became Energy Minister the partnership between AGL and the 
Victorian supplier had broken down because of pricing disagreement with 
the Bolte Government and contractual details with Esso-BHP.
Despite its vast coal resources, in the 1970s, the age of petroleum 
fuels, New South Wales could be considered as an energy-poor State, and 
it 'did not want to be left behind in relation to natural gas' (Mr Fife,
New South Wales Parliament, Debates, 15 November 1972). It was therefore 
in the State's interest to assist the firm in whatever ways it could to 
procure a gas supply. Hence in 1968 the New South Wales government 
employed a Canadian engineering consulting firm (Cancrude) to determine:
(a) other sources of natural gas available besides Bass Strait;
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(b) which centres other than Sydney could be economically supplied 
with natural gas;
(c) the relative cost of alternative sources of natural gas.
Cancrude found that both Victorian and South Australian sources 
of gas were available to New South Wales but advised that there were 
certain disadvantages in Australia's two largest cities relying on the 
same source. The consultants also recommended a uniform wholesale 
price for natural gas supplied to centres other than Sydney. The 
growing involvement of different levels of government henceforward 
eventually reduced the role of AGL to one of relative insignificance in 
negotiating the supply of natural gas: in this way the state acted
directly as the firm's agent.
Community input was not solicited up to this stage. The 
determination of the source of natural gas had to be made on the basis 
of the marginal economics that underlay the viability of the project. 
Invited community participation would only have increased costs either 
through delays or through demands adding to capital cost requirements. 
Moreover, prior to the early 1970s there was 'no comprehensive official 
consideration of participation in urban planning ... nor experiments in 
planning with public participation of the kinds that have been tried ... 
in Britain, America and Europe' (Loveday, 1972:129). Neither was 
technical advice sought from State agencies, or local governments.
The state as impotent supplier: deciding the route of the pipeline
In December 1970 when Mr Fife announced that an agreement had 
been reached with the Cooper Basin gas producers he also said that, as 
a condition of granting approval to AGL, certain other areas in New
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South Wales would be serviced with laterals from the Moomba-Sydney trunk
and that a uniform wholesale price would be applied throughout the
State. (The locations slated to receive natural gas were listed in
Chapter 4.) When the economics of supplying natural gas were taken
into account, however, it seemed unlikely that the demand in some of
the smaller towns could warrant construction of lateral pipelines. As
noted in the Coffey Report (1973:15), in Australia
The economics of long-distance gas transmission 
depend upon access to a large volume market ... 
the principal potential market for natural gas 
exists in the industrial sector rather than in 
the domestic sector.
With the exception of the industrial cities of Newcastle and Wollongong 
none of the country areas was of sufficient size or growth potential 
to render the construction of laterals economically feasible.
Evidently then, the question of whether or not to build laterals to 
country districts had to be resolved by government policy on 
decentralization and development rather than by conventional economic 
evaluation. Hence the responsibility of the state would be to ensure 
the supply of the needed good to the local area and to enforce the 
necessary requirements on the firm (cf. the supplier and regulator 
views of the state identified by Dear and Clark, 1978).
Wagga Wagga and Orange-Bathurst were singled out for consideration 
since it was felt there was sufficient demand in the former area while 
natural gas would be an essential attraction for the decentralization of 
industry to the latter (Coffey Report, 1973:17). Table 5.1 gives the 
relative significance of Wagga Wagga as a consumer of natural gas based 
on estimates of gas sales in the fifth year after introduction. The 
significance of other country areas may be assessed by comparison of the
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TABLE 5.1: ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE NATURAL GAS 
SALES AT YEAR FIVE3
Location Per cent of total
Sydney 81
Newcastle 13
Wollongong 5
Wagga Wagga 1
Estimates by New South Wales Energy Advisory Committee. 
Source: Coffey Report (1973:17).
TABLE 5.2: SALES OF MANUFACTURED GAS AND LPG IN 1970 IN
COUNTRY AREAS PROMISED NATURAL GAS LATERALS
Location Feedstock Gas sold LPG sold
(000,000 megajoules) (tonnes)
Albury LPG 45 699
Bathurst Coal 118 403
Cootamundra LPG 26 1
Cowra LPG 9 700
Orange Coal 67 68
Wagga Wagga Coal 245 n. a.
Source: Coffey Report (1973:19).
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figures in Table 5.2. It can only be concluded that the New South 
Wales government's promise that laterals would be constructed to 
country towns was an action on the part of the New South Wales 
government designed to assuage the several local governments who saw 
natural gas as a panacea for the attraction of industry to their 
jurisdictions. A verification of this conclusion is provided by 
Butters (transcript of the 1973 Inquiry:664-8) who informed the Inquiry 
that 'submissions were received from numerous councils and shires 
requesting that natural gas be made available to their areas' and that 
the conditions attached to the State Cabinet's approval were 'in effect 
the "model" from which it was planned the final lateral policy would 
emerge'. Moreover, 'at the stage of the initial lateral policy certain 
fundamental aspects related to decentralisation policy had not been 
determined and also the location of the final trunk route had not been 
finalised'. Butters drew attention to the press release on 21 April 
1971 in which Mr Fife said that it was possible that the main trunk 
would be located north of the one originally approved in principle by 
Cabinet since the exact route would depend on economic studies.
To further demonstrate that the permit condition requiring the 
construction of certain lateral pipelines was a legitimizing action 
taken from the standpoint of political expediency rather than a firm 
commitment to the policy of decentralization, the two examples of 
Bathurst-Orange growth centre and Wagga Wagga are briefly considered
here.
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Case study 1: the Bathurst-Orange growth centre
This account of the political factors in the designation of 
the Bathurst-Orange growth centre is based largely on Searle (1981).
In 1965 the Liberal Party-Country Party coalition, then the Opposition, 
pledged its support for decentralization from Sydney and development 
of country areas. And although the coalition government did increase 
assistance for industrial development of country areas, it was not until 
1972, seven years after it came to power, that it announced that the
neighbouring towns of Bathurst and Orange were to be chosen as a growth
centre. But this was contrary to the advice of the Development 
Corporation, a government appointed advisory body on decentralization, 
which in 1969 recommended the development of either Albury-Wodonga 
(straddling the border between Victoria and New South Wales) or Coffs 
Harbour (a coastal town in the north of New South Wales) as the prime
decentralization areas. These were identified on the basis of their
potential to attract people and industry. They were safe government 
seats, however, unlike Bathurst which required only a 2 per cent swing 
to fall to Labor (Mackerras, 1973). Furthermore, Orange was represented 
by the leader of the Country Party and this was 'an important factor 
in itself as well as in terms of the necessity of avoiding the political 
repercussions which would have resulted if the rival town [Bathurst] had 
been singled out' (Searle, 1981:23). Under these circumstances it seems 
unlikely that the selection of the Bathurst-Orange growth centre was 
other than a political decision aimed at minimizing potential electoral 
losses in the 1972 State elections.
For the politicians on the City Councils of Bathurst and Orange 
a supply of natural gas was extremely important to the future development
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of the growth centre. Mr K.M. Forrest, Town Clerk of Bathurst City 
Council,submitted to the 1973 Inquiry (13 December 1972) that after 
the growth centre announcement there had been 'numerous inquiries' about 
the establishment of industry and the availability of natural gas. The 
two local governments wanted natural gas for the same reasons that AGL 
did — the price of coal gas was no longer competitive with the price of 
electricity.
Without an internal demand capable of exerting its own pull on 
the lateral, Bathurst-Orange had to rely on the New South Wales government 
either to require that AGL comply with the condition of the permit or 
to supply the necessary construction capital from the State's budget.
The Commonwealth could not, without the agreement of New South Wales, 
interfere in the internal policies of the State especially those concerning 
the development of land, even if it could supply the funds needed. The 
Commonwealth was also constrained because the natural gas within its 
pipeline was owned by AGL — there was no point in having an empty 
pipeline. The New South Wales government chose not to intervene on 
behalf of the local governments. Instead it granted AGL's request to 
defer construction of the laterals until the company's financial situation 
improved (New South Wales Parliament, Debates, 20 August 1975) and 
directed the councils to make estimates of the costs to themselves and 
to the consumers and then negotiate directly with AGL (New South Wales 
Parliament, Debates, 14 October 1975). These decisions were made even 
while the State government was still actively supporting the growth centre 
concept in Bathurst and Orange. Indeed, on 30 October 1974 the Premier, 
Sir Robert Askin, announced to Parliament that $A9.5 million was being 
made available to further decentralize and, of that, $A4 million was being
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given to the Bathurst-Orange Development Corporation for land 
acquisition and other growth centre development costs. In subsequent 
years the funding was increased and other supporting moves made.
The position taken by the government of New South Wales 
reflected the Liberal Party's fundamental belief in allowing market 
forces to determine supply and demand. The supply of funds on the one 
hand and non-intervention on the other are not such contradictory 
stances for a government to take as may at first seem. The supply of 
capital to purchase land for development estates and workers' housing 
(cf. O'Connor's (1973) 'social costs') in Bathurst-Orange aids the 
capital accumulation process by providing facilities whereby the area 
could become less unattractive relative to Sydney (or even Melbourne) 
for the location of industry. Involvement in the construction of 
lateral pipelines, however, would require State intervention in the 
affairs of the private sector and would have been unacceptable to AGL.
Case study 2: Wagga Wagga
In the early stages of planning the Moomba-Sydney pipeline the 
chances of a lateral being built to Wagga Wagga appeared very good. Wagga 
Wagga's representative in the New South Wales parliament since 1957 was 
Mr Fife who had played a leading role in negotiating the South 
Australian contract for AGL. In addition, the town was located just 
north of Albury which, together with Wodonga situated just across the 
border in Victoria, was a growth centre supported by the Whitlam 
Government. Whitlam's plan for a nation-wide gas grid included a 
pipeline connecting the Albury-Wodonga growth centre to the Moomba- 
Sydney trunk and the Victorian gas pipeline system. Because of
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Wagga Wagga's location such a line could pass through the town. On 
its own, however, the town did not provide an adequate base demand to 
justify construction of a lateral of any considerable length. Unlike 
Bathurst and Orange, the Wagga Wagga council did not make a statement 
of its needs to the public Inquiry even though it lobbied for natural 
gas behind closed doors. Perhaps, therefore, the Wagga Wagga council's 
apparent inaction reflected too much confidence in its political 
connections with the decision-making structure of the State. But 
Mr Fife's political position and his desire to have Wagga Wagga served 
with natural gas could not overcome resistance from AGL which was 
finding it difficult to penetrate the energy market in Sydney (Freeman, 
1977).
By late 1975, when it became clear that the laterals were not 
to be built to any of the country towns, local governments began to 
pressure the New South Wales and Commonwealth governments for action 
and a complex pattern of accusations and explanations emerged. For 
example, Mr Sheehan, Labor Member of the New South Wales Legislative 
Assembly for Burrinjuck, and an advocate for laterals to country 
districts, accused the Liberal government of granting AGL a deferment 
of its obligation to construct laterals without consultation with the 
Commonwealth which in his view was 'a partner in the venture for the 
delivery of natural gas to the people of New South Wales' (New South 
Wales Parliament, Debates, 20 August 1975). The Leader of the State 
Opposition, Mr N.K. Wran, accused the Premier of representing the 
interests of businessmen only: 'Corporate profit and corporate
dividends come first, the consumers in the urban areas a poor second 
and the country customers a disastrous last' (New South Wales Parliament,
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Debates, 6 August 1975). New South Wales' Premier Lewis, successor 
to Askin, tried to explain that the delay to country areas was due to 
the expected high cost of gas to the Sydney consumers which was 
attributable to delays caused by Commonwealth intervention.
The Commonwealth's position was explained by Mr Connor 
(Australian Government Weekly Digest, 16 July 1975) : the government
regretted that the New South Wales government had excused AGL from any 
obligation to provide for laterals. In fact, TPA had already 
notified AGL that it was ready to begin construction. The Minister 
also explained that
On present indications the total cost of the 
Commonwealth's sector after taking into account any 
delays to date and all known future costs was 
approximately $190m, a most satisfactory figure when 
compared with the estimated cost of construction of 
$186m made at the commencement of construction on 
17 May 1974.
The figure of $268m quoted by Premier Lewis included 
Australian Gas Light Company's own internal costs and 
was a crude attempt by him to discredit the efficiency 
of The Pipeline Authority.
The State government's retort, and likely its longstanding position, is 
conveyed in the following exchange (New South Wales Parliament, Debates, 
7 October 1975) :
The Hon. J.R. Hallam asked THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE 
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL -
(1) Do recent announcements by the New South Wales 
Government that laterals from the natural gas pipeline 
will not be built to Wagga Wagga apply to the Bathurst- 
Orange Growth Centre?
(2) What effect will these decisions have on the future 
growth of those centres?
The Hon. Sir JOHN FULLER replied -
I have been advised by my colleague the Minister for 
Mines and Minister for Energy as follows:
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(1) The New South Wales Government has not announced 
that laterals will not be built to Wagga Wagga.
The situation of the Bathurst-Orange Growth Centre will 
be considered when it is clearly established what specific 
requirements there will be for that area.
The decision taken by the New South Wales Government was 
that it agreed to the request of the Australian Gas Light 
Company that construction of natural gas laterals to 
Wagga Wagga, Cootamundra, Cowra, Bathurst, Orange and 
Lithgow be deferred at least until the main metropolitan 
areas of New South Wales have achieved a successful 
introduction of natural gas.
The Government also stated that suitable methods of review 
should be established so that laterals are constructed when 
considered necessary.
There is provision for laterals to be built to any country 
centre when it can be established that there is a specific 
and adequate demand for natural gas.
It is essential to stress that the laterals to the 
nominated country towns can only be provided where there 
is some form of subsidy either directly by the Government 
of New South Wales, or indirectly by the application of 
an average cost of service accounting concept to the 
entire pipeline system, so that the branch pipelines can 
be subsidised by the metropolitan area markets.
(2) It is unlikely that the current deferment will have 
any significant effect on the future growth of these centres.
While natural gas could be an advantage in attracting industry 
to a particular area, it is one of many factors which has to 
be considered by a company wishing to relocate in the country. 
For general industrial factories with average fuel 
requirements, the total value of electricity and all fuels 
used in adding value during the production process is in 
the order of 4 per cent. If half of this fuel can be 
replaced by natural gas at say 75 per cent of the cost of 
conventional gas, then the saving attributable to natural gas 
in terms of production cost is 1.5 per cent. It becomes a 
matter of determining whether this saving is significant when 
it comes to considering all the other production costs 
involved.
The struggle for lateral pipelines was fought largely amongst 
the politicians and between them and the AGL. It is evident that 
within the context of a capitalist society economically weak local 
governments cannot influence the outcome of private enterprise activities 
which must take account of economic costs and benefits to the firm.
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Indeed, when asked the reason why laterals had not been built to the 
country districts, Butters' reply was essentially that governments 
must realize that these things can only be done when private enterprise 
can afford to do them (pers. comm., 17 March 1981).
The failure of the New South Wales government to carry out its 
lateral pipeline policy augurs ill not only for the concept of 
decentralization but for any policy (especially policies for environmental 
protection) whose proper implementation requires state intervention into 
the internal business affairs of the private sector (O'Connor, 1973; Offe, 
1975a; Walker and Storper, 1979; Storper et at., 1981). This conclusion 
is, of course, based upon a specific historical event within a particular 
socio-economic and political context and it is possible for individuals 
to attempt to alter this relationship.
The state as arbiter: resolving environmental conflicts between the
firm and the community
The location of the trunk pipeline created public controversy 
between community interests and the firm. Through this controversy is 
demonstrated the 'institution-based' arbi-tev view (Dear and Clark, 1978) 
of the state from which one can infer that by entering the conflict the 
State politicians acted to promote their own interest.
Dear and Clark (1978:176) observe that the arbiter role 
reflects more than any other 'the reality of power and its use by the 
state' and the New South Wales government's resort to the public inquiry 
process to resolve environmental disputes demonstrates when and how the 
state may choose to use its not inconsiderable power. This discussion
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considers the way in which the basis of a major decision in the pipeline 
case changed from being an economic one (as in the decision over 
distribution of lateral pipelines) to a political one. The major 
decision for the State government was how to resolve the public 
controversy over the anticipated negative impacts of the Moomba-Sydney 
pipeline on national parks, wilderness and archaeological sites.
Crenson (1971:29) was among the first to investigate how and 
when a controversial environmental matter becomes a political issue.
He defined an issue as 'any unresolved matter, controversial or non- 
controversial, which awaits an authoritative decision'. Enloe (1975:12) 
further explains that
An issue exists when a condition requires resolution; 
if it is not resolved, some facet of society will be 
in a state of uncertainty, conflict or instability.
If neglected, an issue can undermine political 
confidence ... "authoritative" resolution suggests 
that a decision will have to be made by some public 
official invested with governmental authority.
The Hawkesbury by-election: providing the necessary conjuncture
The Hawkesbury by-election was the link that elevated the 
environmental impact of the pipeline to the status of a political issue. 
The Hawkesbury district had, for over two decades, voted for the 
Liberal Party but by 1971 it had become a marginal Liberal seat requiring 
only a 5.1 per cent swing for it to go to Labor (Mackerras, 1973:67).
And, given that the ruling Liberal Party-Country Party coalition 
lacked a strong majority in the State parliament, any conflict that 
threatened to reduce its power base became a signficant item to be 
selected for its agenda.
In October 1972, Mr B.S.L. Deane, Liberal Member for the
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Hawkesbury district, retired after twenty-two years and consequently 
a by-election was set for 17 February 1973 — less than two weeks before 
the start of the public hearing stage of the environmental Inquiry into 
the pipeline proposal.
On 5 December 1972 the Wilderness Protection Committee (WPC) 
nominated its Chairman, 29-year old Hugh Bannister, as its candidate for 
the by-election. Bannister entered the election expressly to campaign 
for the environment, probably the first time that an independent 
environment candidate has stood for elections in New South Wales. 
Bannister planned to focus on the issues of city sprawl and its impact 
on the Hawkesbury region, despoilation of the Hawkesbury River, and the 
gas pipeline across the Blue Mountains. The race was entered by six 
others who eventually assigned their preference to the WPC candidate as 
shown in Table 5.3.
TABLE 5.3: 1973 HAWKESBURY BY-ELECTION: THE CONTENDERS
PREFERENCE FOR THE WPC INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE
Party Candidate Preference
1. Democratic Labour Party Allen, J.F. 4 th
2. Australian Labor Party Dunn, P.A. 4 th
3. Property Owners Protection 
Party
Crane, M.J. 4 th
4. Australia Party Berzen, V.P. 2nd
5. Independent MacDonald, D. 4 th
6. Liberal Party Rozzoli, K.R. 4 th
7. Wilderness Protection 
Committee (WPC)
Bannister, H. 1st
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On 8 December 1972 the WPC and a coalition of Sydney-based 
environmental groups held a public meeting at Springwood in the Blue 
Mountains to discuss the environmental impact of the pipeline. The 
meeting was attended by residents of the area, representatives from 
AGL and Premier Askin who addressed the gathering. The Premier's 
speech did not address an alternative to the centre route but focused 
on the reasons why a common corridor (as was advocated by some 
individuals) for the location of services like gas, transportation and 
electricity arteries was not technically feasible.
M. Hatherly, Professor of Metallurgy at the University of New 
South Wales, a local resident spoke on behalf of the environmentalists.
He called for an overall plan for the area since the pipeline project 
was just one of many development proposals which could produce major 
changes in the landscape. He exhorted the group that 'public opinion 
can sway the anonymous "they" who make secret policy decisions' and he 
drew attention to an overseas example of successful citizen protest in 
Rotterdam where in 1971 citizens' activism stopped the construction of 
a large steel works outside the city. 'This affair has become a case 
history in the struggle between "quality of life" on the one hand and 
the "unbridled urge for expansion" on the other' (WPC manuscript, 
section A).
The environment eventually became a major issue in the by-election 
as the campaign literature for Rozzoli, the endorsed Liberal candidate, 
demonstrated. In one of his campaign brochures Rozzoli was portrayed 
as a good conservationist who 'has a real concern for the Hawkesbury 
area and for the environment'. In answer to the question: 'What is
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being done about the natural gas pipeline', he wrote
Under the Environment Impact Policy the Government has 
ordered a public inquiry into the proposed Natural Gas 
Pipeline from Moomba (S.A.) to Sydney. The Preliminary 
Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the pipeline 
company's consultants has been made public ... The 
Commissioner's recommendation will be made public before 
the whole matter is considered by State Cabinet.
This was the necessary first step the WPC had hoped for since the Inquiry 
procedure could reveal most of the considerations that ought to have 
been taken into account in reaching a decision over location of the 
pipeline. It would also provide them and their allies with an 
opportunity to present their arguments and to challenge those of the AGL.
The election was won by the Liberal Party candidate. The 
independent environmental contender won only 2.6 per cent of the votes 
(Table 5.4) on an expenditure of $A800 approximately. But there was a 
gain: the raising of concerns like protection of national parks and
wilderness to the level of a political issue.
TABLE 5.4: RESULTS OF THE HAWKESBURY BY-ELECTION
17 FEBRUARY 1973
Candidate First preference votes
number per cent
Rozzoli 11,621 45.5
Dunn 10,495 41.1
Allen 1,003 3.9
Berzen 703 2.8
Bannister 677 2.6
MacDonald 672 2.6
Crane 379 1.5
Source: Mackerras (1973:67).
196
The outcome of the Inquiry was that the New South Wales Cabinet 
accepted only part of the Commissioner's recommendation. Cabinet 
agreed that the pipeline should follow a route south of the Blue 
Mountains. In rejecting the recommendation that the pipeline to 
Newcastle should follow an inland route via Gulgong the politicians 
had obviously concluded that the coastal area between Sydney and 
Newcastle was a less critical concern to the environmentalists than 
the crossing of the Blue Mountains. The lack of strenuous protest 
from these same environmental groups when AGL resubmitted its proposal 
for a pipeline to Newcastle along a coastal route confirmed that it 
was an issue which they were willing to trade for the victory already 
won.
The politician's selection of the recommendation for the 
southern route was, from AGL's viewpoint, not entirely in its interest 
because of the extra costs involved. Although the decision cannot be 
said to have been disadvantageous for AGL, the estimated $A8-10 million 
extra for the longer southern route plus the cost of delays resulting 
from the Inquiry must be seen as the price the State decision-makers 
were willing to have AGL pay for their own political gain. Therefore, 
it may be concluded from this example that the state will select a 
decision which reduces the efficiency of the capital accumulation 
process when to do otherwise could be detrimental to its own political 
power position.
The state as social engineer; state ownership of the pipeline
The controversy over pipeline ownership arose generally from a
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clash between State and Commonwealth political party ideologies but, 
more specifically, from the commitment of particular individuals to 
put into practice certain principles that comprised their own system 
of beliefs. However, attribution of cause must fundamentally be 
related to the specific resource distribution and consumption 
relationship which created the need for action.
In a speech in Queensland on 29 June 1975 {Australian Government 
Weekly Digest) Mr Whitlam gave the reasons for the take-over of the AGL 
pipeline project in 1973:
One of the promises on which my Government was elected 
was our undertaking to stop the overseas takeover of 
Australia's mineral and energy resources. That process 
has been going on unchecked under successive Liberal- 
Country Party Governments. When Labor came in, we had 
reached the stage where 62 per cent of Australia's 
energy resources ... were in foreign hands ... I doubt 
if there is any aspect of Labor policy which is better 
understood or more widely accepted — both here and 
overseas — than this commitment to maximum Australian 
ownership of our resources.
The various initiatives on minerals and energy taken by the Whitlam 
Government were aimed at increasing national autonomy in decisions 
over the consumption and distribution of Australia's resources and 
this, in that government's view, necessitated intervention into ongoing 
private sector proposals which fell within the ambit of its schema. 
Opposed to this view were the Liberal and Country Parties which are 
firmly pledged to support a private enterprise economy in which 
typically:
The role of government is not to interfere with those 
areas in which industry has particular expertise and 
capability, but to provide a framework wherein industry 
interests and government objectives can be harmonised 
(K.E. Newman, Minister for National Development,
11 May 1978).
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As Minister for Minerals and Energy, Mr Connor was the 
individual most responsible for carrying out the social engineer 
actions (Dear and Clark, 1978:175) the Commonwealth decided to take.
Dear and Clark explain that in assuming this role the capitalist state 
adopts normative policy goals which reflect its own judgement of what 
society ought to be rather than what it is, and the implementation of 
these policies requires state intervention to adjust usual market 
outcomes. Connor was well suited to the task. He was convinced that 
it was an 'archaic Constitution' (Australia, House of Representatives, 
Debates, 3 April 1973) that impeded the formulation of a national energy 
policy which should attempt to limit overseas ownership of resources so 
that Australians could direct the future use, development and 
distribution of their natural endowment. Connor perceived the need to 
act urgently to safeguard against further loss of national autonomy 
in resource decision-making especially since it was obvious by the 
early 1970s that reserves of energy raw materials were diminishing in 
the major overseas centres of consumption. From this arose another 
fear: that Australia could over-sell its supplies to the extent that
it would be unable to meet future internal demands. This mix of 
nationalistic, conservationist and egalitarian concerns were not 
unique to Connor or the Whitlam Government. Over the years respected 
government advisers like Dr H.C. Coombs had advocated the establishment 
of scarce resource corporations and the formulation of a national enery 
policy. However, it may be said that Connor's zeal to implement certain 
normative policy goals was unique in modern Australian political 
history. The ownership take-over of the natural gas pipeline project 
demonstrates the motives and methods whereby the Labor Party and 
Mr Connor sought to operationalize their visions for Australian society.
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Connor felt he had the support of individual members of the 
Country Party who, he said, made personal representations to him on 
behalf of their constituencies. Along with this clearly weak alignment 
which had developed between the Commonwealth and certain local 
government interests a stronger and much more overt alignment emerged 
between the New South Wales government and AGL. Whereas the objective 
of the local governments was the augmentation of their own chances of 
getting a supply of natural gas, that of the State government was to 
overturn the Commonwealth's decision to take over ownership of the 
Moomba-Sydney gas pipeline. Even though the take-over action would 
not deny New South Wales a gas supply since AGL still owned the gas, it 
represented an assertion of Commonwealth dominance. The Commonwealth's 
action was also in conflict with the Liberal and Country Parties' belief 
in a laissez-faire market economy. The portent of this sort of 
Commonwealth power over the States and the private sector interests 
within them was the reason why the States' rights provision was included 
in the Australian Constitution. This same concern with States' rights 
was, perhaps partly responsible for the outcome of the national election 
of 13 December 1975. Indeed the former Premier of New South Wales,
Sir Robert Askin, admitted that he played a part in the Whitlam defeat:
'I was one of those who thought [Governor General] Kerr had done the 
right thing' but added 'I'd be breaking my word if I was to tell you 
what I did' (Sun-Herald, 27 May 1979).
In 1981, TPA remains in existence and there is a Liberal Party- 
Country Party coalition Commonwealth government and a Labor government 
in New South Wales. The AGL has assumed an active role in energy 
planning inside the state bureaucracy — Mr J.W. Butters of AGL was
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appointed an Executive Member of the State Energy Advisory Board and 
the company has aired its support for the further implementation of 
the national pipeline grid to connect the existing system with the 
Barrow Island gas fields in northwest Australia. The situation 
suggests that AGL may yet realize the plan long advanced by its former 
Director, Sir William Pettingeil, (Pettingell and Hokin, 1971:327) 'for 
responsible people 'in the right areas to write a score in which every 
element in the national energy orchestra has its rightful place' (emphasis 
added).
CONCLUSIONS
This analysis shows that the State provides an arena in which 
conflicting interests are acted out. This function is best described 
by the New South Wales government's actions as arbiter in the pipeline 
controversy. But, as arbiter, the state was not a neutral party since 
the act of ordering an environmental Inquiry, through which the WPC 
gained its victory, would not have been possible without the fortunate 
conjuncture of the Hawkesbury district by-election, and/or the WPC's 
own strategic acumen. This conclusion has been corroborated by a New 
South Wales Liberal Member of Parliament who agreed that the Inquiry 
would not have been called had the Liberal government not concluded 
that the WPC presented a significant threat to the maintenance of its 
political power. Moreover, the WPC action did not threaten what was 
essential for AGL since it did not strongly object to the pipeline 
development per se. Therefore, the Inquiry could only have reduced 
the short-term efficiency of the capital accumulation process. The 
imposition of the cost of the Inquiry on the firm supports Offe's 
(1975:259) argument that 'the capitalist state is not oriented towards
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doing anything efficiently'. It may be concluded from the actions 
it took as arbiter plus the other actions identified in this chapter, 
that the state's behaviour is bound by three imperatives or functions 
which are economic, political and ideological. The way in which these 
functions influence the outcome of policy decisions defines the role of 
the state in capitalist societies.
The economic imperative was demonstrated by the activities of 
the New South Wales government as agent in securing a source of natural 
gas for AGL. This considerable State cooperation with the firm suggests 
that success in finding a gas supply was as important to the politicians 
as it was for the AGL. It is important to remember, however, that close 
state-private sector cooperation is a historical relationship in 
Australia which Butlin (1959) described, perhaps incorrectly, as 
'colonial socialism'. Such cooperation arose from the need in the 
second half of the nineteenth century for the Australian State 
governments to borrow funds and secure labour overseas to stimulate the 
capital accumulation process within Australia. Similarly, state support 
was a necessary guarantee for AGL to obtain loans overseas to develop 
the pipeline project. State-firm cooperation in the pipeline case was 
also related to interstate rivalry — which involves a vying for 
economic development projects —  and this is also a condition which is 
as old as the Australian States. It is argued in the chapter that the 
discovery of natural gas in Victoria presented New South Wales with the 
task of finding a gas supply to maintain its own economic strength 
against the advantages which Victoria would gain from having a local
supply of that energy resource.
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By the political imperative is meant that state politicians 
will act to promote their own ambitions (party or personal) at the 
cost of short-term inconveniences to the private sector. Thus the 
pursuit of political goals may require that the state elect to alter 
its traditional relationship with either the firm or special interests 
within the community when by doing otherwise it risks undermining its 
political ambitions. This situation was demonstrated in the pipeline 
case by the State Premier's decision to call the environmental Inquiry. 
By this act the Premier showed that the politicians were willing to 
have AGL bear the consequences of the outcome of the Inquiry which, 
in dollar terms only, were an estimated $A8-10 million for relocating 
the pipeline along a southern route instead of the centre route 
preferred by the firm. In addition, the Inquiry caused delays thereby 
incurring further costs among which was the action of the Commonwealth 
government to take over ownership of the pipeline.
In acting as supplier and social engineer the state demonstrates 
how it maintains its ideological imperative. The pipeline case 
illustrates how, in attempting to act as supplier, the capitalist 
state is dependent on the performance and cooperation of the private 
sector. According to the New South Wales government, its agreement 
with AGL contained a requirement for a supply of natural gas to be made 
available to certain non-metropolitan areas by means of laterals off 
the Moomba-Sydney trunk line. The fact that successive Premiers (Askin, 
Lewis and Wran) from both political parties were either unwilling or 
unable to enforce that requirement shows their commitment to the 
laissez-faire market ideology in which the private sector essentially 
determines which areas of the country are supplied with particular
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resources and when. Likewise the State government's failure (i.e. 
inaction) to intervene and construct the laterals, despite the 
availability of decentralization funds, also reflects this same 
ideological position. The story of the laterals further illustrates 
how certain issues can serve as a political football.
The social engineer role by which the Commonwealth government took 
over ownership of the pipeline from the firm presented an alternative 
ideology to that supported by the State government. The fact that the 
pipeline take-over along with other 'misadventures' led to the downfall 
of the Whitlam Labor government meant that it was not possible for an 
opposing ideology to dominate within a capitalist socio-economic 
structure.
The power relationships theorised in Chapter 2 between the 
national, regional and local levels of government within the state have 
been supported by the pipeline case. That is, despite the unique 
Constitutional empowerment of the States over land use and mineral 
resource development decisions, because of its responsibility for 
managing the overall economy of the country, and the power it accrues 
from its authority over revenues, the Commonwealth government can 
intervene to alter a State government's decisions as shown in the 
successful take-over of the ownership of the pipeline. However, the 
States' rights provision of the Constitution considerably limits the 
chances for success of Commonwealth intervention. In addition, political 
party ideology and the willingness of the bureaucracy to cooperate may 
enhance or diminish chances of survival of initiatives. Again, this is 
borne out by the squashing of the concept of a Commonwealth owned
national pipeline grid by the succeeding Commonwealth Liberal government
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whose policies are supportive of States' rights and private enterprise 
ownership of production.
The power of local (in this case non-metropolitan) governments 
was shown to be limited by both ecological (locational) and economic 
(profitability) factors which severely affected their ability to obtain 
pipeline laterals. Their efforts failed despite the links which local 
politicians had with influential leaders at the centre of decision­
making in the State and the Commonwealth governments. Because small 
local government districts like Wagga Wagga, Orange and Bathurst have 
low market demand for goods such as natural gas, they have little 
alternative but to wait until other conditions arise which make it 
possible for firms like AGL to locate their activities within their 
area. This dependency of local governments on the other levels in the 
state hierarchy is further compounded by the fact that in Australia they 
have no legal and legitimate authority separate from that of the State 
(Neutze, 1977; Power al. , 1981) and so cannot act effectively without 
State support.
Clearly, in all of its actions in the pipeline case the state 
was compelled to take account of the support it could get from the rest 
of society. Furthermore even though the government appeared to be the 
ultimate decision-maker, its actions were constrained by the ability 
and/or willingness of the private sector to provide the needed goods 
and revenue. As a consequence, even where the state's actions do not 
always appear to assume the role of agent on behalf of the dominant 
interest in society, because of its dependence on and the domination by 
the private sector over policy decisions, the state's actions tend to 
support the interest of capital. There is strong support for this
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general conclusion in the evidence of the decisions made by both the 
Commonwealth Liberal government and the State Labor government after 
the initial decisions were made in the pipeline case.
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CHAPTER 6
THE FIRM: ADJUSTING TO CHANGING SOCIAL CONDITIONS
The arguments in Chapter 2 suggested that the fundamental 
relationship of the firm or, collectively, the private sector is one 
of dominance over the state and the community. This dominance is not 
absolute but is manifested mainly over those functions which are 
essential to the continuance of capitalist relations of production. 
Further, the reliance of the state on the private sector for maintaining 
the material production process necessarily creates a condition of 
cooperation between the various sectors of society. However, while 
the theory emphasized a generally cooperative relationship between the 
state and the firm it postulated that the firm's relationship with the 
community is one which, in general, leads to conflict rather than to 
harmony. Through conflicts environmental and other interest groups 
within the community impinge on the relationship between the firm and 
the state.
This chapter focuses on the specific ways in which the actions 
of environmentalists in the pipeline episode impinged on the cooperative 
relationship between the state and the firm. It aims to illustrate how 
the demands of environmentalists affected the behaviour of the AGL as 
evidenced in the actions taken by the company either voluntarily or in 
compliance with State laws.
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the power of the private sector is 
usually expressed in its domination over the outcome of major policy 
decisions, especially those dealing with the location of economic 
activity and the consumption of natural resources. But since the private
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sector is motivated by the imperative of capital accumulation it tends 
to externalize social expenses like pollution control costs or it 
seeks to minimize the actual cost of production as, for example, 
through the use of publicly owned resources such as national parks. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the increasing incidence of 
environmental conflicts during the 1960s caused the States to adopt 
legislation to regulate those actions of firms which have undesirable 
effects on the environment. The overall intent is to minimize the 
level of conflict in society. Environmental legislation can therefore 
be divided into two broad groups: those laws which ratify the
arrangements between the state and a particular firm over the use and 
ownership of resources, and those which set out requirements for 
environmental protection. But, in view of the dominating influence of 
the private sector in policy decisions, such laws usually only impose 
minimal controls over the actions of firms. And compliance with the 
letter of the law can fall short of what is really needed to meet the 
general requirements to change or prevent the adverse environmental 
impacts of certain actions.
The following discussion emphasizes three aspects of the 
pipeline case: the environmental controls contained in the enabling
legislation relating to the pipeline project and AGL's compliance with 
this law; the elements of the social milieu or the contextual 
conditions which influenced the environmental responsiveness of the 
firm; and the reactions by AGL to changing community standards of 
environmental protection.
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COOPERATION BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE FIRM:
EVIDENCE FROM THE ENABLING LEGISLATION
The view of law presented by Thompson (1975) is the most 
applicable to a social condition in which cooperation and conflict 
generally describe the relationship of the state and the community 
respectively to the private sector. Thompson (1975:259) asserts that 
law is 'part of a "superstructure" adapting itself to the necessities 
of an infrastructure of productive forces and productive relations'.
Seen in this way law is an instrument of the dominating or ruling 
class. But Thompson (1975:258-69) qualifies this position by arguing 
that, while law must be seen in instrumentalist terms, its exercise 
can impose effective restrictions on the actions of the rulers, thus 
protecting the citizen from total domination. In acknowledging this 
contradiction Thompson also recognizes that the characteristics and 
logic of law are historically specific.
From what Thompson says, the assessment of any law must be 
carried out in the context of the society whose needs it reflects.
This is a most important point since in the late 1960s when the New 
South Wales Pipelines Act was promulgated the changing environmental 
consciousness in society at large had only just begun to affect major 
development projects in Australia. An environmentally slanted assessment 
of the Pipelines Act can therefore serve not only as an evaluation of 
state/private sector cooperation but also as an indicator of the general 
level of demand in society for the incorporation of environmental 
concerns into the planning and implementation of major development
projects.
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Assessment of the New South Wales Pipelines Act
The Pipelines Act was enacted by the New South Wales Parliament 
in 1967 mainly to facilitate the development of the natural gas 
pipeline proposed by AGL. As such, it is not normative, but rather 
it outlines the procedures and requirements for the acquisition of 
permits and licences by the developer as well as those governing their 
issuance by State administrative agencies.
The procedural elements of the Act are outlined in Figure 6.1. 
Of the administrative agencies identified therein, it is important to 
note that none is specifically entrusted with responsibility for 
environmental protection, or with the responsibility to designate land 
uses.
Provision for public information and comment are also included 
in the Act but no significant means of redress is provided for persons 
aggrieved. Instead, the ultimate control over the issuance of permits, 
the acquisition of land for easements and the granting of licences to 
construct pipelines is political. The permit which allows the grantee 
'to enter lands specified in the permit and to carry out on the lands so 
specified such surveys as the permittee considers necessary for the 
purpose of determining the route of the pipeline' (Part II, Section 10) 
has to be issued by the Minister for Mines. And the decision to issue 
a licence to construct and operate the pipeline is made by the Governor 
upon the advice of the Minister. Additional evidence of the dominating 
influence of the firm is found in the absence of State guidelines for 
the location of the pipeline route. Proper land use controls, for 
example, might have obviated the ensuing locational conflict.
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A natural gas pipeline on the scale proposed by AGL could 
affect land use in several ways. At one level the pipeline could 
influence the location of industrial activities which depend on or in 
which the use of natural gas presents economic advantages. At another, 
the easements required for pipeline installation and maintenance could 
alter the general character of a site through impairment of its 
aesthetic aspects, and adverse impacts on soil erosion and natural 
ecosystems composition along the right-of-way.
For every kilometre of pipeline installed a multiple of its
diameter is required as permanent right-of-way to accommodate ancillary
structures and service areas, and to facilitate access for maintenance
and repairs. At least 4,000 ha of right-of-way were required for
the Moomba-Sydney pipeline. But since the Act does not address the
implications for land use it consequently fails to recognize the
relationship between land use control and overall environmental
management. Instead the Act allows the developer to dictate the
desired pipeline route and calls for private negotiations between the
initiators of the projedt and the property owners to secure right-of-way.'
It further implies that compulsory acquisition of land or easements over
land for the pipeline is justified in the public interest. Thus, Part II,
Section 18(b) provides for compulsory acquisition
in the case of lands or easements over land over which 
the owner has the right of disposition to the extent 
applied for by the applicant, if the Minister is 
satisfied that the applicant for the licence has 
taken all reasonable and practicable steps to enter 
into an agreement for the acquisition of the land or 
easements.
The consent of the property owner is therefore not a prerequisite for 
acquisition of land. Nonetheless the relationship between the firm 
and the owners of land over which an easement passes is legally binding .
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The only evidence of what may be taken as a land use or an 
environmental consideration is in Part II, Section 8(2)(b) which 
declares that
The Minister shall, in considering an application 
for a permit, take into consideration whether the 
construction of a pipeline on the lands specified 
in the application ... would be unsuitable by reason 
of the pipeline being likely to interfere 
unnecessarily with improvements, improved land, flora, 
fauna or scenic attractions or for any other reason 
that the Minister thinks sufficient.
Nevertheless, the text also makes it clear that even when such impediments 
to construction exist the final decision is a political one. The 
outcome of any impasse may therefore depend on political or economic 
concerns of importance at the time (Coward, 1976; Clark, 1980).
In both its treatment of easements and its failure to adequately 
incorporate a requirement for the assessment of environmental impacts the 
Act fails to recognize that the construction of pipelines can bring 
about significant changes in the use of space. It certainly requires 
that the pipeline not 'interfere unnecessarily with ... flora, fauna 
or scenic attractions' but it does not accord any weight to the 'rights 
of nature' (cf. Stone, 1972) or, even more concretely, to the protection 
and preservation of scenic, recreational or ecologically valuable lands. 
Nor does the Act attempt to convey any notion that a least cost route 
which is potentially environmentally disruptive may not be approved.
When considered in the light of the wide discretionary powers granted 
to the Minister and the Governor, these criticisms become even more 
significant.
The Act can be seen as a mechanism which provides the pipeline 
developer with several safeguards against conflict (e.g. with land 
owners) and uncertainty (e.g. through the provision of statutory time
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limits for actions). The Act also, to a considerable extent, provides 
a guarantee for the implementation of pipeline projects which have the 
approval of politicans.
AGL and the Pipelines Act
In 1967 when the Pipelines Act was promulgated AGL's plan was 
to construct a gas main from Victoria to Sydney. Had these plans been 
successful, the project might have been completed long before the rise 
of the kind of environmental politics which characterized the late 
1960s and early 1970s. But the environmental politics of the early 
1970s resulted in much more careful evaluation of the potential 
environmental impacts of the proposal and scrutiny of compliance with 
the procedures required by the Act.
Because five years had been lost from the start of negotiations 
with the Victorian government to mid-1971, when AGL signed a contract 
with the South Australian gas suppliers, time was of the essence in 
bringing gas to the Sydney market. All the firm's actions indicated 
that maximum economy in transmission became the key factor in its 
planning. In pursuing this goal it could count on the cooperation of 
the State since most politicians perceived the project to be as crucial 
for New South Wales' continuing competitive struggle with Victoria as 
it was to AGL's economic viability.
The company had determined that the centre route would be the 
cheapest since it was approximately 1,260 km as against the 1,400 km 
(approximately) southern route initially advocated by the state. Since 
pipeline length largely determines cost, the longer route was uneconomical. 
Once this had been established by AGL, its subsidiary East-Australia
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Pipeline Corporation (EAPC) applied for a permit to survey a pipeline
right-of-way on 1 December 1972, some months after it had conducted
surveys across properties along the central route. As the Inquiry
found (Coffey Report, 1973:29):
The Minister for Mines has not yet made a decision in 
respect of E.A.P.C.'s application, but E.A.P.C. have 
[S'io] been conducting preliminary surveys and 
negotiations over an extended period in respect of the 
route for which they have applied.
This action could be seen as having contravened Part II: Section 6(1)
of the Act which states that
Where a person desires to construct a pipeline, he may 
submit to the Minister a proposal for the construction 
of the pipeline and apply to the Minister for a permit 
to enter and carry out surveys of the lands on which 
he desires to construct the pipeline.
But, the ambiguous language of this (and other) sections of the Act could
lead to the conclusion that no obligation was implied by the use of such
phrases as 'may submit'.
And, as Mr D. Boddam-Whetham (Executive Officer of the Energy
Advisory Commitee of the New South Wales Department of Mines) explained,
the work carried out by the firm prior to the application for a permit
was 'pre-permit surveys' authorized by the National Parks and Wildlife
Service. Such an arrangement was necessary, he said, because applying
for a permit entailed a lot of work and could not be justified until a
route was definitely decided (WPC manuscript, section A). If this were
the case there is really little weight to that part of the Act (Part II:
Section 6(5)) which reads:
Not less than seven days before a person makes an 
application under subsection one of this section, he 
shall cause to be published in two daily newspapers 
circulating throughout New South Wales a notification-
(a) stating his intention to make the application;
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(b) describing the lands on which he desires to construct 
a pipeline or which he desires to use for any 
apparatus or works;
(c) containing a plan, drawn to the prescribed scale, 
showing the approximate route of the pipeline that 
he desires to construct and the situation of the 
apparatus or works that he desires to construct or 
install.
Public comment, recommendations or objections would have served little 
purpose once a route was definitely decided upon. This is an important 
point especially in view of the statement made by Mr W.C. Fife at the 
second reading of the Pipelines Bill wherein he referred to the granting 
or refusal of a permit as 'the point of no return' (quoted in the 
submission to the 1973 Inquiry by the Minister for Lands and Tourism).
The action therefore, reflected a disregard for community inputs on the 
part of the firm and of the State. But, as can be seen, the requirements 
of Part II: Section 6(5) are somewhat problematic since information at 
the level of detail specified seems to necessitate some preliminary ground 
survey work.
Public notification for what environmental interests perceived 
to be the crucial segment of the pipeline — from Bathurst to Sydney — 
was made in November 1972 after the concern of environmentalists had 
been aroused. The ensuing community protest over the location of the 
pipeline within national parks dramatically altered the political 
context for granting a licence to construct the pipeline. On 21 December 
1972 the Minister for Environment Control, the Hon. J.G. Beale called 
for a public Inquiry into the environmental impact of the proposal.
This was an action for which the environmentalists had worked, although 
time and effort could have been saved had the politicians insisted that 
the company abandon plans for the centre route and adopt the southern 
route instead. It is possible, even probable, that the politicians
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intended the Inquiry simply to placate the environmental interests 
but did not expect it to significantly alter the proposed location 
through the National Park. That the outcome did not conform to these 
expectations in no way signified a change in the basic cooperative 
relationship between the state and the firm. But in this case the 
conjunction of political and cultural circumstances and individual 
action had made the pipeline location a significant environmental 
issue, and most importantly, one which the environmentalists could win.
The five years from the enactment of the Pipelines Act, 1967 to 
1972, when the pipeline route surveys were conducted coincided with 
the time of rapid growth of interest in environmental protection in 
Australia. Not surprisingly, therefore, the cooperative relationship 
that the state and AGL had previously enjoyed changed to take account 
of environmentalists' demands in the 1970s. It is therefore appropriate 
to identify the ways in which AGL's actions reflected the incorporation 
of environmental concerns in response to the changing social context.
THE CHANGING CONTEXTUAL CONDITIONS:
PRESSURES FOR ECOLOGICAL INCORPORATION
By the late 1960s Australian environmentalists were causing 
politicians to consider more seriously the impacts of policy decisions 
on valued landscapes and on the general level of environmental fitness. 
Thus by the early 1970s a body of laws was enacted (e.g. in New South 
Wales there was the National Parks and Wildlife Act, 1967, the Clean 
Air Act, 1961, and in 1970 the State Pollution Control Commission Act, 
the Waste Disposal Act and the Clean Waters Act) which in varying ways 
altered the decision-making framework of firms. In general these laws
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required that ecological considerations be incorporated into the 
planning of projects which could have adverse effects on the 
environment.
The term 'ecological incorporation' was employed by Goodwin
(1977) in his study of environmentally responsible behaviour by
multinational corporations. It 'pertains to the effective integration
of ecological considerations into the succession of activities involved
in project planning' (Goodwin, 1977:16). As such, the concept can be
applied to the actions of any firm — locally based or multinational —
and it will be used here to guide the analysis and appraisal of AGL's
attitude and actions towards the environment. The need to look for
evidence of ecological incorporation when the pipeline's enabling
legislation did not specifically direct the firm to do so could be
questioned. But since established law reflects the existing relationships
of 'the ruling power of the moment' (Murphy, 1971:16), it cannot
therefore be expected to reflect impending relationships or pressures
for change in existing conditions. Lanteri (1972:276) succinctly
states the reasons for this:
It is often difficult in a democracy to canvass public 
opinion and give its fluctuating ethic swift expression 
through the political process and the legal system.
This is especially so when the issues involve such 
fundamental rearrangement of community priorities as 
does the conservation movement. Change is bound to 
encounter resistance to the degree that it is 
inconsistent with the pursuit of vested interest. It 
is also difficult to effect swift reforms in the 
structure and procedure of a legal system which operates 
as a self disciplinary tool of society and which is 
founded on a concept of stability and resistance to 
hasty and importunate change. It is therefore unrealistic 
to expect legal changes to precede ethical ones.
The following discussion identifies pressures for environmental
incorporation during the project planning phase. Some factors affecting
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AGL's decision-making are outlined to show how they impinged on the 
firm's attitude and actions towards environmental protection. A brief 
summary of the analytical framework is followed by an analysis of the 
process of environmental incorporation.
Ecological incorporation: an outline of the analytical framework
Goodwin (1977) conceptualizes ecological incorporation as a 
multidimensional construct in which each of the dimensions are viewed 
as functional alternatives or the different paths by which environmental 
considerations come to be included in the planning process. The focus 
therefore is on inputs to and means employed in project planning to 
achieve environmentally responsible actions. Goodwin identified the 
following dimensions of environmental incorporation.
1. Professional involvement is an assessment of the nature 
and range of environmentally oriented participant 
skills and competencies utilized in the planning process.
2. Systematization is concerned with the use of systematic, 
analytical techniques and procedures in the review and 
consideration of environmental factors. The procedures 
would be applicable to baseline surveys and 
environmental assessment.
3. Inclusiveness implies that the environmental setting 
to which the project will be introduced has been 
examined comprehensively. It assesses the degree to 
which a range of elements within the ecosystem are 
included in the determination of environmental impact.
4. Public participation is concerned with the efforts 
(direct and indirect) expended to obtain the views of, 
and to inform, the members of the community which may 
be affected by the project. This dimension would 
render the project planning process more sensitive and 
responsive to community needs and desires. It would also 
extend the alternatives considered.
5. Continuousness deals with the temporal integration of 
ecological considerations into the various phases of 
project planning.
6. Formalization considers the degree to which formal rules 
and procedures for including ecological concerns have 
been established internally within the organization.
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Formalized rules are believed to increase accountability 
for environmental incorporation within a business 
organization.
In addition, it is important to recognize that the project
planning process is closely related to the contextual setting in which
an organization functions. The stimulus for ecological incorporation
is thus largely related to contextual influences. This thinking
reflects the 'open systems' concept of the business organization (Emery
and Trist, 1965; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Buckley, 1967; Terreberry, 1968;
Child, 1972). According to Katz and Kahn (1966:448-9):
The basic hypothesis is that organizations and other 
social structures are open systems which attain 
stability through their authority structures, reward 
mechanisms, and value systems, and which are changed 
primarily from without by means of significant change 
in inputs. Some organizations, less open than most, 
may resist new inputs indefinitely and may perish rather 
than change. We would predict, however, that in the 
absence of external changes, organizations are likely to 
be reformed from within in limited ways. More drastic or 
revolutionary changes are initiated or made possible by 
external forces.
Accordingly, project planning must be viewed as a process 
occurring within a context which can be conceptualized as three tiers 
representing the influences of the organization itself, the requirements 
of the project and the external or 'task-environment' (Emery and Trist, 
1965). This structure is presented in Figure 6.2 which illustrates 
that ecological incorporation is influenced by three nested subsystems. 
The nature and interaction of the variables within and between each 
subsystem determine the context within which decisions are made by the 
firm.
The project nature system is comprised of variables such as 
cost of construction, year, site, and the ownership structure of the
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Public policy system
Figure 6.2: Structure of the contextual systems affecting
a firm's behaviour.
Source: Goodwin (1977:34).
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venture. These variables interact to give rise to a particular 
assessment of environmental impact, perceptions of community demands, 
and the ability to meet those demands.
Several factors within the firms' organizational system will affect 
its ability and willingness to include environmental considerations in its 
plans. Organizational variables like profitability, company size, status 
within society and the attitudes of top management interact to influence 
the environmental behaviour of a firm.
The public policy system plays, perhaps, the most important role 
in influencing a firm's environmental actions. This is primarily comprised 
of environmental laws although the influence on a firm's behaviour does not 
reside solely on the letters of the law since their effectiveness greatly 
depends upon the state's enforcement of them. Further, since the letter 
of existing laws is often an inadequate reflection of the mood or pressure 
for change within society, a vital component of the public policy system 
is the level of conflict experienced over projects that are similar or 
related to that proposed by a firm.
The contextual influences in the case of the AGL pipeline project
This discussion briefly examines the main factors of the 
project-nature system, the organizational system and the public policy 
system which are believed to have (or ought to have) influenced the 
extent of environmental incorporation in AGL's pipeline project.
The project-nature system: pipelines and environmental conflict
Despite their widespread use, natural gas (or oil) pipelines have 
caused relatively little environmental controversy. The proliferation of
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pipelines and of the pipeline industry throughout North America and Europe, 
for example, attests to the versatility, efficiency and success of this 
transport mode. In 1964 de Lavilleon estimated that over 1.5 million km 
of petroleum pipelines existed throughout the world and that 50,000 km 
more were being added annually. Lambert, Cornhill and Ives (1977) 
reported that over 170,800 km of pipelines were either under construction 
or planned around the world, excluding the United States, and that in 
Australia more than 10,770 km of gas, petroleum crude, products and 
slurry pipelines were proposed or awaiting start of construction.
It is generally believed that transport of substances, especially 
petroleum by pipeline, offers many advantages over transport by rail, barge, 
ocean tankers or trucks since it involves significantly lower environmental 
and human safety risks. The OECD Special Committee for Oil (OECD, 1969:3) 
found that pipelines are safer than other means of transport, with smaller 
product losses and with fewer injuries and fatalities. The success of 
pipeline (and pipeline technology) is due to the functional and economic 
advantages they offer over other systems for moving goods.
Because pipelines are usually buried underground, their impact 
varies depending upon the designated land use of a site. In agricultural 
districts, for example, the negative impacts are usually minimal since 
the land can be put to shallow rooting crops soon after pipeline 
installation and testing are completed. In industrial and residential 
areas pipeline safety and maintenance restrictions prohibit the 
establishment of permanent structures on the right-of-way. In built-up 
areas there is the potential for explosions and gas leaks which may 
endanger public safety and be destructive to property.
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Conflicts over pipelines: the overseas experience. Controversy
erupted with the installation of the first major petroleum pipeline in 
Pennsylvania in 1864 (Johnson, 1956). Protests by displaced workers 
took the form of riots, pipeline sabotage and arson, but did nothing to 
thwart further development of that technology, for the prospect that 
the pipeline would overcome the disadvantages of barrel and horse-drawn 
conveyances offered a large dividend to those for whom pipelines 
presented realistic alternatives. Modern advances in pipeline technology 
(e.g. improved pipe strength, resistance to corrosion, electronic 
fault detection and thin-walled large diameter pipes) have only served 
to entrench their use and underline their versatility.
The most celebrated pipeline controversy surrounded the proposal 
by Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. for the construction of a 122 cm 
diameter by 1,300 km crude oil pipeline (of similar dimensions to the 
Moomba-Sydney gas pipeline) from Prudhoe Bay on the Arctic coast to 
Port Valdez on the Pacific coast of Alaska. So pervasive were community 
forces antagonistic to the proposal that construction only began in 1974 
after four years of delay and at a final cost of $US7,700 million as 
opposed to the initial 1969 estimate of $US900 million. The delay in 
construction was almost entirely due to intense community insistance 
that environmental considerations be incorporated into the project.
Mr E.L. Patton, Alyeska's President, explained that the biggest cost 
over-runs were $US3,200 million from inflation and $US1,000 million for 
an above ground pipe support system designed to prevent perma-frost melt 
as a result of the heated (between 38°C and 60°C) crude oil (The Watt 
Street Journal, 20 June 1977). Extensive environmental baseline studies 
of the physical environment and wildlife populations together with 
measures for their protection were also major cost items.
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More significant than the delays and cost over-runs, perhaps, 
were the implications of the environmental controversy and its effect 
on the outcome of the project. The obvious issues were preservation 
of a fragile ecosystem and the despoliation of the last unspoilt State 
(Sugden, 1972; Hansen, 1976), as well as concern about the wasteful 
patterns of energy consumption in the United States.
Opposition to the pipeline was resolved through the imposition 
of regulations to safeguard against gross detrimental impacts on the 
Alaskan ecosystem. Even then, Federal and State monitors found that 
Aleyska violated many of their stipulations (James, 1977). As James 
notes, 'Alyeska concedes it has violated some of the unusually stringent 
regulations' but the company maintained that overall they did as good a 
job of protecting the environment as they could.
The controversy served as a major lesson for subsequent 
pipeline planning. Mr W. Wilder, Chairman of Canadian Arctic Gas Study 
Ltd, conceded 'We have been studying this thing since 1967 and when we 
apply for regulatory approval, we'll have answers for every question 
that can be raised about the project' (quoted in Wallace, 1973). Wilder 
said his company, which planned a multimillion dollar trans-Canada 
natural gas pipeline, had spent about $US30 million up to 1973 to avoid 
the conflicts which delayed construction of the Alaska pipeline.
The Alyeska experience demonstrated that by the late 1960s 
pipeline developments were being subjected to the same environmental 
scrutiny as other types of projects, such as smelters which pollute the 
air, or plant effluents which contaminate waterways, and which have 
traditionally been seen as environmentally destructive activities.
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Conflicts over pipelines: the Australian experience. If the
outcome of the trans-Alaska pipeline case was uncertain during the mid 
to late 1960s when AGL made its original plans to bring natural gas to 
Sydney, the situation — of growing environmental awareness — ought to 
have been fairly clear to the company and its overseas team of 
consultants by 1971 when new plans were drawn up for the transmission 
of natural gas from the South Australian source.
By 1971 the following natural gas pipelines were in operation 
within Australia (also see Figure 4.5).
(1) In Western Australia, from the Dongara field to Perth, 415 km,
36 cm diameter, completed in 1971.
(2) In South Australia, from Gidgealpa and Moomba fields to Adelaide,
766 km, 56 cm diameter, completed in 1969.
(3) In Queensland, from the Roma field to Brisbane, 438 km, 27 cm 
diameter, completed in 1969.
(4) In Victoria, from the Baracouta and Marlin fields to Melbourne,
174 km, 76 cm diameter, completed in 1969.
At no time during the construction of these lines were there any conflicts 
with community interest groups over environmental protection (submissions 
to the 1973 Inquiry). For the most part, the pipelines traversed 
grazing and agricultural land which could be returned to its former use 
once restoration took place along the right-of-way.
Of the four, the Dongara to Perth pipeline was the only one 
which incorporated environmental considerations in the early planning 
stages in any systematic way. In a submission to the 1973 Inquiry 
Mr J.M. Hopkins, General Manager of West Australian Natural Gas Pty Ltd
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(Wang), stated that 'environmental considerations were given careful 
thought by Wang on its own initiative to ensure that its activity 
could be carried out harmoniously with other interests'. Hopkins 
explained that Wang's 'environment-oriented activity' consisted of 
retaining a well-known Australian naturalist, Mr H. Butler, with 'a 
high reputation in the fields of flora and fauna conservation and 
implementing his recommendations'. For the project Butler formulated 
a 'Conservation Ethic' which provided initial guidelines to be observed 
by the company and its contractors. The Wang Conservation Ethic 
(Appendix 1) is a thoughtful document which outlines procedures for the 
preservation of flora and fauna and for the general restoration of the 
pipeline right-of-way. It is the sort of statement of procedure which 
ought to have widespread application in pipeline development projects.
But the scale of the Moomba-Sydney gas pipeline was nearly 
twice as large as any natural gas pipeline development previously 
undertaken in Australia and, unlike them, threatened to adversely 
affect several open areas, national parks and archaeological sites.
And, if because of these dissimilarities there was not much that could 
be learned from the other local examples, the developers might have 
looked to the international scene for guidance given the long tradition 
of overseas influences on the environmental movement in Australia (as 
argued in Chapter 3). The fact that AGL's actions did not reflect 
significant ecological incorporation may have been due to the priority 
given to economic concerns and the company's faith in firm/state 
cooperation. It might also have been a display of awareness that the 
company held a certain amount of power, derived from its role, and the 
role of the project, in satisfying the desire of the State to compete 
with Victoria for the location of energy dependent industries.
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The organizational system: the case of AGL
As Australia's oldest privately owned company, the AGL has had 
a long history of operation in New South Wales, during which it has 
enjoyed the cooperation of the State and a conflict-free relationship 
with the community at large. Under the 1837 statute by which it was 
established, AGL is permitted to purchase 'any lands, messuages, 
tenements, and hereditaments for the manufacture and conveyance of gas' 
and this has provided it with various means of capital diversification 
over the years. For example, one of its oldest, and perhaps its most 
consistently profitable subsidiaries — Goodacre Development Pty Limited 
— is involved in the connection of gas to new homes. It does this 
through the acquisition of land for residential or commercial buildings 
or by assisting new home builders and developers with finance. At 
present AGL is Australia's largest privately owned utility with total 
assets at the end of 1979 of $A350 million. AGL's subsidiary companies 
in 1979 are listed in Table 6.1.
In the 1970s the company started to expand following the successful 
completion of negotiations for a domestic supply of natural gas at a 
price which allowed it to be sold profitably and competitively in New 
South Wales. The company's growth was made possible through constant 
expansion into new markets beyond the Sydney metropolitan area and 
through the incorporation of changes in technology and raw materials in 
the gas manufacturing process. Its move to secure a supply of natural 
gas was in keeping with this tradition. It was also motivated by the 
desire to overcome the competition presented by the supply of cheap 
electricity by the Electricity Commission of New South Wales.
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TABLE 6.1: AGL WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARIES AT YEAR END 19793
Name Acquired before 1971
Acquired0 
after 1976
Agex Pty Ltd X
Goodacre Development Pty Limited^ X
Grafton Gas Limited X
Kitchen Design Services Pty Limited X
Newcastle Gas Company Limited X
Porta-Gas Pty Limited X
Regional Gas Centres Pty Limited X
Sangas Development Pty Limited X
Singleton Gas Company Limited X
The City of Goulburn Gas & Coke Company Ltd X
The Katoomba and Leura Gas Company Pty Ltd X
The North Shore Gas Company Limited X
William Press Energy Services Pty Ltd X
Wollongong Gas Limited X
All subsidiaries are involved in some aspect of gas development, 
exploration, and distribution.
Goodacre Development Pty Limited has a 14.3 per cent holding in 
Santos Limited which owns 45 per cent of the consortium of nine gas 
producers in the Cooper Basin.
1971 was the year in which AGL secured a supply of natural gas in 
South Australia and in December 1976 natural gas arrived in Sydney 
via pipeline from South Australia.
Source: AGL Annual Reports, various years.
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Competition from the Electricity Commission. The reaction from
within the New South Wales government to the threat to existing patterns
of energy supply and demand presented by the introduction of natural
gas is conveyed in a comment in the report on 'Future energy requirements
of New South Wales', prepared by Mr D. Boddam-Whetham (1972:14):
From the viewpoint of philosophy and the effect of 
change it may also be worthwhile considering 
Le Chatelier's principle, which is based fundamentally 
in the second law of thermodynamics, viz: "If [there
is] a change in one of the factors ... under which a 
system is in equilibrium, the system will tend to 
adjust itself, so as to annul, as far as possible, the 
effect of that change".
The Department of Mines estimated that the market would adjust to the 
availability of natural gas as shown in Figure 6.3. The fact that 
the electricity and gas industries shared the same market in Sydney 
was not a problem for either until the cost of production rose 
significantly higher for one than for the other. Figure 6.4 indicates 
the pricing advantage which the Electricity Commission had over AGL in 
the Sydney energy market.
The abundance of high grade black coal for electricity production
had had a critical impact on AGL's profitability since the 1940s.
Sir William Pettingell revealed {Australian Financial Review, 6 December
1972) that during the 1950s the AGL was:
virtually insolvent, we had to get hold of the 
situation and develop strong budgetary controls 
... at this point there was emerging a very highly 
subsidised State electricity industry. There was 
developing a relatively strong oil industry.
The company switched from coal to imported petroleum fuel for gas
manufacture during the late 1950s (AGL, 1955) and its ability to maintain
a share of the market depended on ensuring that the price of whatever
basic raw material it chose allowed it to be competitive with electricity
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Figure 6.3: Projected increase in annual primary energy requirements
for New South Wales at three levels of per capita consumption.
Source: Boddam-Whetham (1972).
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rates. Among the reasons for the shift from coal gas to petroleum 
(naphtha) gas manufacturing process was the loss of its Sydney market 
for the by-products of coal gasification. This was a significant 
factor influencing the firm's decision making since, for example, half 
a tonne of coke was produced from each tonne of coal used.
Clearly a range of factors interacted to make the construction 
of a natural gas pipeline a matter of survival for AGL. Under these 
very competitive conditions much attention was paid to the economy of 
gas transmission and very little to environmental protection.
The public policy system: the influence of State policy in the case
of AGL
Whereas there had been agitation by community pressure groups 
for designation of national parks and for preservation of open areas, 
in Australia in general and New South Wales in particular, for most of 
the twentieth century, it was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s 
that 'environmental impact', 'pollution control', or 'national parks and 
wildlife reserves' became issues for State and Commonwealth parliamentary 
action. The cluster of environmental policies adopted around this time 
was indicative of changing norms in the social environment — a reaction 
against the previous Zai-ssez-fa'lve policy framework. The pressures for 
change were, more often than not, specifically intended to alter the 
role of the firm towards environmental responsibility. In this regard, 
the New South Wales Minister for Environment Control, Hon. J.G. Beale, 
who held the first of such portfolios in the country, proffered (Beale,
1972:8) that
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the greatest avenue for genuine long-lasting 
improvement in technological pollution can only 
come through industry and commerce taking a more 
pragmatic attitude to the environment ... one of 
the root problems is less a malicious, selfish, 
cynical exploitation of resources at minimum cost 
than a failure to date to realize that regard and 
protection for the environment must be a normal 
part of the cost of doing business.
Within New South Wales the adoption of the environmental laws 
mentioned earlier offered the possibility for new management approaches 
to be added to existing environmental management programmes. Together 
this legislation could impinge on a major project like the natural gas 
pipeline in significant ways. Yet there is a suite of complex 
government bureaucratic relationships which can affect the implementation 
of policy and some of these were acted out in the pipeline episode.
The new laws led to the creation of new State agencies with the 
responsibility of developing a strategy to carry out the aims of the 
various Acts. However, the bureaucracies emerged within an incumbent 
(Liberal Party) government and at first operated uncertainly and non- 
assertively until such time as their roles and power were further 
defined by those community forces which gave rise to them. This is a 
condition which can easily be exploited by the firm, State politicians 
and State bureaucrats who may attempt to deny power to the newer 
agencies by maintaining their established linkages and traditional 
pathways to action (Powell, 1974). The actions and inactions of the 
National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS) and the State Pollution 
Control Commission (SPCC) are two examples of how this process operated 
in the pipeline case.
Case Study 1; the NPWS: an agency asserting responsibility.
The National Park and Wildlife Act and the Pipelines Act were adopted in
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1967. The responsibility for administering the former was given to 
the Minister of Lands while the Minister of Mines and Energy was 
responsible for the latter. Both these management agencies were old 
established bureaucracies with which AGL had had a long association 
either because of its gas manufacturing or its land development 
activities.
While the purpose of the Pipelines Act was to enable pipelines
development that of the National Park and Wildlife Act was:
to reserve certain national parks, state parks and 
historic sites, and to provide for the reservation 
of further national parks, state parks and historic 
sites; to make provision for and with respect to 
the development, use and preservation of, and the care, 
control and management of national parks ...
Of relevance to the pipeline routeing is Section 21(1) which reads:
notwithstanding anything in any other Act the 
reservation of lands as a national park, state park or 
historic site shall not be revoked or altered and 
lands within a national park, state park or historic 
site shall not be appropriated or resumed except by 
Act of Parliament: provided that the provisions of
this section shall not prevent the withdrawal of land 
from or the termination of any lease, licence or 
occupancy in accordance with the terms and conditions 
thereof.
But Section 31(1) contains the exception to this rule, providing that:
the Minister [for Lands] may upon such terms as he 
thinks fit grant for joint or several use easements or 
rights of way through upon or in a national park, state 
park, historic site or nature reserve for the purpose 
of providing access to any area included in any lease 
or licence within the park, site or reserve, or for the 
erection of pipelines, or for the erection of standards, 
posts, wires and appliances for the conveyance or 
transmission of electricity or for any other purpose 
deemed necessary.
It was this exception that was used to provide justification
for granting permission to carry out 'pre-permit' surveys even though
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the existence of the exemption did not obviate compliance with the 
Pipelines Act. And, although individuals within the NPWS disapproved 
of the location of the pipeline within the Blue Mountains National Park, 
the agency's personnel were actively involved with AGL in carrying out 
the surveys. It was only after environmental pressure groups had 
successfully campaigned for a public Inquiry that the NPWS felt 
sufficiently secure about its community power base to assume an active 
role in defending the amenity of the Blue Mountains.
The NPWS's submission to the environmental Inquiry was a 
forceful statement of opposition to the plan for locating the pipeline 
through several national parks and archaeological sites in New South 
Wales. Its submission, perhaps more than any other, served to influence 
the decision reached by the Inquiry. Naturally, the AGL was dismayed by 
the actions of the agency: 'We have received a great deal of
cooperation from government departments and see it difficult [to 
understand] why there is now resistance from the National Park Service' 
(Butters, transcript of the 1973 Inquiry:908).
In its submission the NPWS maintained that it 'has moral as well 
as legal obligations to object to certain aspects of the pipeline'.
The Chief Resource Officer, Mr P. Hitchcock later explained (in an 
interview on 27 September 1979) that 'the concept of nature conservation 
requires a moral stance'. He added, however, that the NPWS's action 
should be viewed as a 'personalized corporate stance' reflecting the 
leadership of the agency which was aggressive and not afraid to speak 
out. The pipeline case was the first time that the NPWS was involved 
in a public controversy and in Hitchcock's view the agency gained from 
the precedents set by the protection of national parks and archaeological
sites.
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Case Study 2: the SPCC: an agency abdicating responsibility.
The SPCC Act of 1970 provided the agency with authority 'to ensure that 
public authorities carry out the control functions assigned by 
legislation to them' (Beale, 1972:12). If they do not, the SPCC 
has overriding powers. Further, in February 1972, the New South Wales 
Premier instituted a requirement that all proposals and actions which 
could significantly affect the environment be subjected to environmental 
impact studies in the planning stage and once again the SPCC and its 
Minister (the Minister for Environment Control) were responsible for 
implementing this rule. Despite these responsibilities, the SPCC did 
not become involved in the natural gas pipeline project until the 
public Inquiry was ordered by the Premier in December 1972. The Inquiry 
itself was forced by the politically threatening strategies of the 
environmentalists who had resolved to see that the responsibility for 
the scheme be claimed by the SPCC (WPC, manuscript, section A).
However, once its involvement became politically sanctioned the SPCC 
acted with efficiency and integrity in performing its responsibility.
Although the Chairman of the Inquiry, Mr E.J. Coffey,has since 
been praised by environmentalists for his rigorous, if at times 
excessively detailed, and time consuming procedures, the procedure 
followed in the conduct of this Inquiry was, however, abandoned 
after 1973. In essence, the new system has established a procedure 
whereby an interested party must obtain the right to participate in 
the evaluation of environmental impacts through the submission of a 
written statement at an appropriate time. The new procedures have 
increased the need for constant watchfulness on the part of environmental 
interests within the community and, therefore, the generally ad hoc, 
transient and voluntary nature of most environmental campaigns is bound
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to reduce their impact and ensure savings of time, cost and effort to 
the firm and the state.
THE PROCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL INCORPORATION:
THE CASE OF AGL
As argued earlier in this chapter, the relatively conflict-free 
conditions which prevailed prior to 1970 in Australia, did not create 
strong demands for ecological incorporation into the planning of 
development projects. After 1970, however, the rise of environmental 
activism led to a change in the legal framework within which firms 
operated. In this new context the environmentally disruptive activities 
of firms were subjected to regulation by state laws. The relationship 
of cooperation between the state and firms like AGL was consequently 
mediated by the laws which were adopted in response to environmentalists' 
demands (cf. Thompson, 1975). The condition as it affected a firm and 
the process of adjustment to such a changed context is demonstrated by 
AGL's activities in the pipeline case.
Prior to 1970: the pre-conflict stage
The period prior to 1970, when the firm looked towards Victoria 
for a supply of natural gas, may be designated the eavly plann-ing phase. 
From the evidence, the main factors of importance to AGL were: 
determining the extent of the market for natural gas within the Sydney 
region, obtaining a supply of natural gas at a price competitive with 
electricity rates in the State, establishing the technological 
feasibility of pipeline construction in Australia and arranging the 
necessary financing.
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The studies undertaken by AGL during this time were all 
carried out to assess the market feasibility for natural gas. The first 
study, completed in September 1965 was: 'Survey of the Market for
Natural Gas in New South Wales and Victoria, Australia', by Chas R. 
Hetherington & Co. Ltd of Calgary, Alberta. In May 1967, Bechtel 
Pacific completed 'The Economic Effect of Natural Gas on the Australian 
Gas Light Company', and in September 1968, Cancrude Engineering Limited 
of Calgary, Alberta submitted a report on 'Natural Gas Marketing Survey 
for the Australian Gas Light Company'. In addition, AGL's own marketing 
staff made 'repeated and detailed contributions to the understanding of 
the present and future natural gas market in New South Wales, by 
maintaining update on surveys' (AGL, 1975). In the absence of any 
evidence of consideration of environmental impact of the development, it 
must be concluded that such an element was not an important issue in the 
early planning phase.
After 1970: the conflict stage
By 1971 AGL was preparing to construct the gas pipeline from Moomba 
to Sydney. In February 1972 environmental impact studies were required 
in New South Wales for all projects which could significantly alter 
established ecological patterns in the environment. Also, in May of 
the same year, there was a Commonwealth government White Paper which 
specified that projects requiring Commonwealth assistance be subjected 
to the environmental impact assessment process. Although AGL did not 
require Commonwealth assistance it would need its approval to borrow
funds from an overseas bank, as it intended to do.
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A Preliminary Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the 
Moomba-Sydney pipeline alternative routes was prepared jointly by 
Dames and Moore, an overseas consulting firm, and the Sydney firm of 
Crooks Michell Peacock Stewart Pty Limited. The Preliminary EIS was 
submitted to the Minister for Mines on 15 January 1973. A final EIS 
was never prepared and it may be assumed that it was pre-empted by the 
public Inquiry. The Preliminary EIS had many shortcomings which were 
pointed out in most of the submissions to the Inquiry (Table 6.2).
Among these were an inadequate methodology and the use of inappropriate 
criteria for assessing environmental impacts. For example, field 
investigations consisted of limited air inspections along certain 
portions of the three alternative routes, and ground inspections 
between Sydney and Molong plus the sand hills at Moomba on the central 
route. Aerial inspections were made along the entire length of the 
centre route, but only from Sydney to Narromine along the northern 
route, and Sydney to the crossing of the Darling River on the southern 
route. Furthermore, no baseline studies were conducted for any of the 
routes. Quite apart from its inadequacies, the methodology demonstrated 
a bias towards the centre route —  the shortest of the alternatives and 
the only one which did not require construction of a separate lateral 
pipeline to serve the towns of Orange, Bathurst and Lithgow located 
along the urban corridor across the Blue Mountains (see Figure 5.3).
The existence of bias in the EIS is not an unfamiliar problem. The 
environmental impact evaluation process, rather than being an objective 
appraisal quite often seeks to justify developments which have been 
proposed for a particular site and this appears to be an unavoidable 
shortcoming when the EIS is prepared by parties which have a vested 
interest in the proposal (see Friesma and Culhane, 1976; O'Riordan, 
1976:193-9; Storper et at., 1981).
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TABLE 6.2: COMMENTS ON THE PRELIMINARY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT FROM VARIOUS SUBMISSIONS TO THE 1973 
ENVIRONMENTAL INQUIRY
Contents of EIS
- very superficial
- in some cases quite inaccurate
- impact on vegetation not properly assessed
- literature used out of date
- limited to study of existing legalities rather than to the effect
of action on the environment
- understates impacts on agricultural lands
Omissions from EIS
- consideration of humanitarian matters
- impact at terminals at Moomba and in Sydney
- study of socio-economic impact
- assessment of impact on public facilities such as national parks
- effects of team of construction workers on the environment;
especially in terms of sewerage facilities and controls on 
weed distribution
- discussion of future maintenance needs
- the effect project will have on wetlands and swamps
- impact on stream turbidity (a problem in Wollangambie Creek)
Conclusions in EIS
- drawn prior to investigation
- questionable, especially with regard to vegetation regeneration
Other comments
- inadequacies of EIS reflect time devoted to preparation - six to
twelve months only
- evaluation of environmental impact left to a United States citizen
and resident
- questions suitability of engineers for the task of environmental
impact evaluation
- there was an absence of input from universities, wildlife
organizations and the National Parks and Wildlife Service
- EIS should be prepared by the State Planning Authority in
collaboration with experts in the environment and ecology fields
- EIS reflects no contact with people working in the field in New
South Wales
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As indicated earlier, the preference for the centre route arose
from the fact that AGL believed that being the most direct it would be
the cheapest to construct. The longer southern route was expected to
cost about $A10 million in excess of the centre route and the company
believed that (Preliminary EIS, 1973:5.2-2):
If ten million dollars were added to the initial 
Project cost, then for this initial penalty to be 
recouped over the Project life of thiry years, the 
city gate price must rise to a point where natural 
gas will capture only about 48 percent of the 
potential market, thus abandoning about fourteen 
percent to other forms of fuel.
The assessment of aesthetic impacts of the pipeline project 
presented a fine example of the application of inappropriate evaluative 
criteria. (This judgement is made while recognizing the problem of the 
highly qualitative and subjective nature of aesthetic appraisals.) The 
investigators found that the short-term aesthetic impacts of each 
alternative route would 'generally be of the same order of magnitude', 
and that in the long term the effects would also be the same for all 
the routes with the exception of the five 'critical areas' shown in 
Table 6.3. This conclusion was made despite the finding that there 
were more critical areas along the centre route than along the others. 
When the criterion of 'observation days' (the number of observations 
by different individuals in a day) was used to evaluate each area it 
was found that 'the number of observation days was likely to be much 
higher in critical areas 1, 3, 4 and 5 than in 2' (Table 6.3). The 
consultants and the firm were aware that critical area 2 — the Blue 
Mountains National Park and wilderness area — was the focus of 
environmental protest over the pipeline location. Clearly, the 
criterion 'observation days' was quite unsuited to the evaluation of 
impact on wilderness. Indeed it is antithetical to the concept of
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TABLE 6.3: CRITICAL AREAS IDENTIFIED BY THE PRELIMINARY
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STUDY
Pipeline route 1
Critical 
2 3
area2 3 45
4 5
North trunk
North lateral to Wollongong
X
X
Centre trunk
Centre lateral to Wollongong 
Centre lateral to Newcastle X
X X
X
South trunk
South lateral to Wollongong 
South lateral to Newcastle X
X
X
a
1 The crossing of the Hawkesbury River south of the Mangrove Creek 
junction.
2 The crossing of the Blue Mountains National Park Wilderness 
area, Wollangambie Gorge, Bowen's Creek.
3 The descent from the foothills northeast of Grose Vale.
4 The crossing of the Nepean River near its junction with the Avon 
and Cordeaux Rivers.
5 The descent to Wollongong from the escarpment to the west.
Source: Preliminary EIS (1973).
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wilderness conveyed in the submissions to the Inquiry (see Table 6.4). 
Nonetheless its use provided a rationale for the preferred location of 
the pipeline.
Other ways in which AGL sought to justify its choice of the 
centre route were revealed at the Inquiry. However, in the atmosphere 
of uncertainty that undoubtedly surrounded Australia's first public 
environmental Inquiry the posture of the company could be seen as one 
of negot'iat'ion for the most favourable determination of its proposal.
Strategies of negotiation
During the Inquiry AGL adopted strategies which'could be seen as 
a response to two levels of criticism. First, at the general level, it 
aimed to show that its proposal would accomplish ’conservation’ and that 
it would also contribute to the reduction of air pollution in New South 
Wales. Second, at the more specific level, a balance sheet approach was 
adopted; adhering to strictly quantifiable variables to demonstrate the 
economic advantages of the preferred centre route. AGL also endeavoured 
to promote itself as an old and reliable Australian firm whose social 
responsibility could be demonstrated, for example, in the civic actions 
of its top executive Sir William Pettingell.
Butters (1973a:1-3) outlined the conservation benefits of the 
project as follows:
The plan to pipe natural gas 800 miles from South Australia 
to New South Wales will probably make the largest single 
contribution to the conservation of our environment in the 
broadest sense of the term that will be made by any one 
undertaking here.
The main reason for the Moomba-Sydney pipeline is the 
conservation of nearly half of Australia's industrial 
strength by maintaining the flow of cheap energy which has 
been the unique natural advantage of this region in which 
the industry is established.
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TABLE 6.4: EXPRESSIONS ON THE MEANING OF WILDERNESS FROM VARIOUS
SUBMISSIONS TO THE 1973 ENVIRONMENTAL INQUIRY
Wilderness in general The Wollangambie wilderness
provides relief from the stress of 
modern day life for the urban 
dweller
reserve for flora and fauna
cannot be effectively regenerated 
or restored
a place where true solitude can be 
found
removed from civilization
a form of land use which cannot be 
created by man
represents a part of the geography 
of hope
wild and difficult
special values are easily destroyed
gives comfort and pleasure to know 
it exists
has scientific value
impossible to evaluate on the 
basis of costs and benefits
is no place for the artifices of 
man
is inviolable
- an unspoilt area
- designated but not dedicated
- largest in the State
- close to Sydney
- status is insecure
- is unique and priceless
- not just another park area
- spectacular scenery
- favourite area for bush 
walking
- should not be used for a mere 
profit
- belongs to the people of 
Australia and their children
- most scenic area in the Blue 
Mountains
- ranks equal to SW Tasmania and 
the Kosciusco Region
- features magnificient rock 
canyons, partially submerged 
caves and little beaches along 
river course
- still in its primitive beauty
- should have no man-made 
features in it
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Natural gas offers consumers the prospect of an early 
reduction in their bas bills, since the cost of supply 
is essentially fixed and therefore largely immune to 
inflationary pressures.
The need for conservation is the prime factor behind 
these costs.
Butters' (1973a) arguments on the merits of the project with 
respect to the reduction of air pollution were logical and valid when 
presented in defence of the proposal. He maintained that because the 
market potential for natural gas was more than 80 per cent of the 
total heat energy requirement of the Sydney area there was the 
possibility to remove one of the major causes of air pollution in New 
South Wales. Metropolitan Sydney has considerable air-borne waste (smog) 
problems (Ryder, 1973; SPCC, 1977). Likewise, heavily polluted air is 
a common feature in Newcastle and Wollongong — the main centres of iron 
and steel manufacturing in the State. However, to attain the greatest 
reduction in sulphur dioxide pollution, fuel replacement in the 
stationary manufacturing sources would also be essential. Such a fuel 
substitution process appears to be rapidly proceeding in the Sydney and 
Wollongong areas as evidenced by the dramatic increase in gas sales.
In 1979, for example, gas sales increased by 49 per cent over the previous 
year with sales to the industrial areas of Sydney and Wollongong 
accounting for 58 per cent of the increase. Natural gas is being used 
for energy in a range of industries which include motor vehicles, 
automotive component parts, motor vehicle tyres, glass, bricks, roof 
tiles, ceramics, food processing, metal treatment, chemical products, 
plastics, oil refining, household applicances, building materials, 
pipes, aluminium, paper and printing. The potential for natural gas 
to replace other fuels in the industrial energy market, could result in 
a significant reduction in the emission of air pollutants (SPCC, 1977).
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The economic advantage of the centre route was that it was the 
cheapest to construct. It would therefore allow AGL to market natural 
gas in Sydney at a price competitive with electricity rates. The 
Preliminary EIS (1973:5.2-2) found that for the centre route 'estimates 
of cost and sales show that the city gate price of gas will be such that 
natural gas will capture about 62 percent of the potential market'.
This showed the 'extreme sensitivity' of the Sydney market to fuel 
costs and emphasized the critical relationship between total costs, 
both capital and operating, and the economic feasibility of the project.
Throughout planning for the project, cost was the item of 
paramount importance. It was responsible for the failure of AGL to 
reach an agreement with the Esso-BHP producers and Sir Henry Bolte in 
Victoria. Mr W.A. Fife agreed that the 'critical' factor in the choice 
of route in the case was economic (pers. comm., 23 June 1980).
'I would be less than honest to say it was otherwise', he offered.
Mr Fife recalled that the procedure was to use cents per therm of gas 
plus haulage costs for each route and compare them.
Butters stated that the broad average haulage costs adopted 
for agreement in principle were $A280,000 per km of 860 mm main trunk 
line, $A234,000 per km for 500 mm laterals to Wollongong and Newcastle 
and $A80,000 per km for laterals less than 180 mm in diameter 
(transcript of the 1973 Inquiry:666). In addition the base cost of 
administration over thirty years was estimated at $A50,000 per year for 
the trunkline plus laterals, $A160,000 per year for administering each 
compressor station and $A5,000 for the purchase of each compressor. An 
allowance of $A550 per km was made for each additional kilometre over 
the length of the centre route (transcript of the 1973 Inquiry:906).
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Based upon the projected gas sales two compressors would be required 
for either the centre or the southern route and these would dramatically 
affect the total operating costs as shown in Figure 6.5. A major 
difference, however, was that for the centre route compressors would 
be required in years 12 and 15 while for the southern route they would 
be needed in years 10 and 13. This timing so drastically affected 
operating costs that it was an important factor in the choice of routes.
Notwithstanding AGL's display of figures and facts, the lengths 
of the trunk main and laterals, and consequently the relative costs of 
construction of the alternative routes proved to be a major item of 
disagreement throughout the Inquiry. The relatively large amount of 
time the Commissioner devoted to probing the length/cost issue was a 
clear demonstration of the interrelatedness of environmental protection 
and economics. In the end, Commissioner Coffey estimated that the 
extra cost of the southern route would be $A8 million, and in recommending 
it reasoned that 'more money can always be found, but the natural 
beauty of the countryside can never be recovered if it is permanently 
damaged ... the aesthetics of the environment should not be adversely 
affected in order to minimize the cost of natural gas' (Coffey Report, 
1973:98).
Throughout the Inquiry the firm maintained that the impact of 
the pipeline route on the physical environment would be insignificant 
for the alternative routes. Moreover, AGL reasoned that the Wollangambie 
'wilderness' was not an officially declared area and that since there 
was no official plan of management the impact on wilderness values could 
not be assessed. Butters told the Inquiry that AGL would not take a 
pipeline through a 'dedicated wilderness' since he would then regard the
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Figure 6.5: Impact of the introduction of compressors on total
operating costs.
Source: Butters (1973b:18).
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impact as 'infinite' (Sydney Morning Herald, 20 March 1973). This 
reasoning suggests that the company lacked much idea of what 
its social responsibility could have been in this instance. AGL must 
have calculated that there was little to lose and possibly much to gain 
from this logic. For in a society where the law generally describes 
the range of acceptable and unacceptable behaviours this strategy could 
well have succeeded.
The other strategy employed by AGL was to project an image of 
itself as a socially responsible organization. But responsible 
environmental behaviour is not just a question of image creation.
The labels 'responsible' or 'irresponsible' which have been attached 
to firms by environmental activists are usually derived through a 
process of assessment of actions. Thus, firms like utilities, oil 
companies and steel companies which pollute the environment are usually 
seen to be less socially responsible than banks and insurance companies 
which are not believed to be polluters (Business and Society, 1972:1). 
Ludlam (1974,254) found that many corporations which have been branded 
as 'polluters' or 'socially irresponsible' have taken to defending 
themselves in corporate environmental image advertising which takes 
the form of promotion devoted primarily to selling the corporate 
personality. 'The emphasis in such advertisment is on the worth or 
reputation of the company, its employees and therefore all of its 
activities' .
It is difficult not to see an interview with Sir William Pettingell 
reported in the Australian Financial Review, 6 December 1972, in this 
light. Sir William was portrayed as a very public businessman 'whose
activities in the past few months have spilled far beyond narrow commercial
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interests into areas of major concern to governments and tax payers'.
Sir William's account of how AGL survived in the 1950s despite 
competition from the coal and oil industries was relevant to the need 
to garner support for the pipeline proposal.
Likewise, Butters' (1973a) contribution to the Environment '73 
Conference in which he outlined the benefits to 'conservation' and to 
air quality expected from the project was undoubtedly intended to pull 
the environmentalists on to the side of AGL. These and ether efforts 
failed because the environmentalists could not be convinced that a 
wilderness required legal sanction to become a wilderness. They 
therefore continued to press for the location of the pipeline outside 
the Wollangambie wilderness area in particular, the Blue Mountains 
National Park, other national parks and archaeological sites in general.
The post-conflict stage: subversion and adjustment
I do not expect the inquiry to affect our proposals 
and we would hope to issue tenders and start work in 
July as planned (Sir William Pettingell, Australian 
Financial Review, 22 December 1972).
This was Sir William's response to the announcement of the 
Inquiry. He was therefore predisposed to protest against the 
recommendations of the Inquiry that the main pipeline follow a southern 
route to avoid the Blue Mountains National Park, and that the lateral 
to Newcastle be located inland from coastal areas. Commissioner Coffey 
emphasized the relationship of these recommendations to the Commonwealth's 
national pipeline grid system which greatly influenced the final decision.
Sir William was, naturally, disappointed and announced his 
intention to make a new submission to the Minister for Environment
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Control, Mr Beale supporting AGL's original proposal for a centre 
route (Sydney Morning Herald, 2 June 1973). He objected to the extra 
costs to be incurred by the recommendations and particularly to the 
'cavalier treatment' of the line linking Sydney and Newcastle. Reports 
of the firm's estimates of cost over-runs ranged so widely as to be 
confusing (i.e. from $20 million to $240 million), but what was of 
importance to the company was that there would be a major increase in 
capital requirements and this would affect the selling price of gas in 
Sydney.
The second Inquiry (Sydney-Newcastle Pipelines Inquiry) was an 
outcome of these objections. But, again, the recommendations were 
unacceptable to AGL. The location of the Sydney-Newcastle natural gas 
pipeline was finally determined in December 1977 by a working group 
comprised of representatives from State agencies and the applicant 
companies (Energy Authority of New South Wales, 1977).
At the second Inquiry it was clear that AGL had adjusted to the 
new environmentalism. The study of environmental impact, along the 
route chosen by them, was significantly better than the EIS conducted 
for the first Inquiry. AGL ensured a better EIS by hiring respected 
Australian field naturalists and scientists to carry out the study. 
Among these was the well known naturalist Harry Butler who in 1968 
formulated the 'Conservation Ethic' for the West Australian Natural Gas 
Pty Limited. At present (1981) the pipeline from Sydney to Newcastle 
is being installed and among AGL staff assigned to the project is an 
environmental engineer who is responsible for vegetation regeneration, 
erosion control and other environmental matters along the pipeline
easement.
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As to be expected, there was also objection to the ownership 
take-over of the pipeline by the Commonwealth. For the then 
Commonwealth government, ownership of the Moomba-Sydney pipeline was 
vital to its scheme for a national grid. It is ironic — although it 
accords with the theory presented in Chapter 2 — that Sir William 
Pettingell was one of the first individuals within Australia to 
acknowledge that given the disparate distribution of natural gas in the 
country, the 'logical development would be interconnection to the 
potential grid system' (Pettingell and Hokin, 1971:329). But, clearly, 
the concept of government intervention to effect equitable national 
distribution of resources is incompatible with the role of the private 
sector within the tenet of a capitalist economy. The AGL could only 
work towards the reversal of these decisions which it saw as being 
inimical to its survival as a private enterprise utility. It 
immediately began proceedings to take back ownership of the pipeline 
from the Commonwealth and to increase its control over future decisions 
about the allocation and ownership of natural gas.
Although the Commonwealth still owns and operates the Moomba- 
Sydney trunk, in recent years the company has acted to regain control 
in several other ways. For example, in 1979 it purchased 10.01 per 
cent of the shares held by Santos Limited in the Moomba gas fields 
thus raising its total ownership of Moomba gas to 15 per cent, the 
maximum allowed by South Australian law (the South Australian Gas 
Company's Act, 1979). Also in 1979, AGL merged with The North Shore 
Gas Company Limited, its main competitor in Sydney and also bought 
the Newcastle Gas Company Limited which was the major gas company 
serving that city. In addition, dormant plans for pipeline laterals
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to Wagga Wagga and Newcastle were activated and construction began 
on them in 1980 along with another to Canberra.
Gradually, through extending its ownership and increasing the 
community dependency on its gas pipeline system, the AGL has secured 
greater control, than it had in 1973, over political events which could 
affect the organization. Its behaviour over the past two years has, 
however, been greatly facilitated by the rapidly escalating world market 
prices for fuel oil and a changing energy equation locally (compare 
electricity and home gas prices, Figure 6.6). Added to this is a 
global condition of mounting uncertainty about future patterns of flow 
of resources. Also, the coming to power of a Commonwealth Liberal 
Party-Country Party government has produced benefits for the company.
The abolition of the Petroleum and Minerals Authority in 1975 and 
the Liberal Party's commitment to a free market economy have made all 
these actions possible. AGL's dream of owning a cross-continental 
pipeline grid from Western Australia to Sydney may yet be realized.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis demonstrates how a law sanctioned the relationship 
of cooperation between the State politicians and the AGL. The 
Pipelines Act, 1967 served to minimize the occasions for conflict 
between land owners and the firm, to outline the nature of State 
agencies' support for the project, and to reduce uncertainty for the 
firm through the attachment of statutory time limits on the actions 
which led to the granting of a licence to construct a pipeline. 
However, the analysis also indicates that within a changing social 
context it may be impossible to legislate against all potential
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conflicts between developers of environmental resources and interest 
groups within the community. The conflict over AGL's plan to use 
national park lands demonstrated this. The inadequate attention paid 
to environmental concerns in the T'i'pe'l'ines Act was one reason for the 
emergence of opposition to the location of the project. (Another 
reason was the secrecy which surrounded the project: see Chapter 7.)
The analysis also shows how environmental laws are used to mediate (and 
to legitimize) the relationship between the state and the firm 
(Thompson, 1975; Clark, 1980).
The process of environmental incorporation through which a 
business organization like the AGL adopts policies and assigns personnel 
to achieve environmentally responsible actions specifies the role of 
conflict in bringing about changes in environmental attitudes and 
actions in society. In addition, since the degree of environmental 
incorporation by a firm is strongly related to company size and 
profitability (Henry, 1974; Goodwin, 1977), the reluctance of the 
AGL to relocate the pipeline outside the Blue Mountains National Park 
may therefore have been partly due to its weak economic situation at 
the time. This conclusion underscores the important role which economic 
forces play in achieving environmentally responsible actions in society.
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CHAPTER 7
THE COMMUNITY: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTORS AND THEIR ROLE
IN THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
Chapters 5 and 6 show that the cooperative relationship between 
the state and the private sector is an important feature of the 
capitalist mode of production. This relationship, together with the 
mutual dependency on natural resources (land, minerals, energy and so 
on), has undermined the boldest attempts at state planning in most of 
the urbanized Western world (Offe, 1975a; Dear and Scott, 1981;
Roweis, 1981). As will be shown in this chapter, land use planning 
since World War II in New South Wales, in particular in the Sydney 
Region, exemplifies the unwillingness (inability?) of the state to 
restrain the rate of exploitation of natural resources under the force 
of private sector pressures for development. Through the adverse 
effects on the allocation of resources and on the healthy and aesthetic 
enjoyment of a locale, resource development can give rise to counter­
forces demanding that concern be shown for the improvement of the 
general level of environmental quality. The operation of a force and 
counter-force will be demonstrated through the protest over the location 
of the gas pipeline within the Blue Mountains National Park.
The reasons why the pipeline project gave rise to an issue or 
stake for the environmentalists can be properly understood only in terms 
of the historical context in which the conflict occurred. Such a 
perspective allows the identification of key factors which triggered the 
community response to the planned action. It is necessary therefore to 
focus on the history of planning open space in the Sydney Region to 
identify the links between that process and the environmental protest
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over the pipeline.
Attention can be drawn to the doubts raised by Enzensberger 
(1974) and Harvey (1977) that environmental interest groups can bring 
about improvements in the general level of environmental quality and 
achieve a more equitable distribution of resources. Although these 
doubts are shared by this author and others like Devall (1980) and 
Mitchell (1980), this argument need not be pursued here. Suffice it 
to say that while Castells (1978)is right in arguing that urban and 
ecological (or environmental) problems are particular expressions of 
the contradictions between productive forces and relations of 
production in capitalism, the 'ecological stake' (Castells, 1978:5) 
as articulated thus far, does not appear to be able to harmonize the 
goals of equity and the aesthetic enjoyment of life (see Ley, 1980).
However, even Enzensberger (1974:10), one of the environmentalists' 
severest critics, acknowledges that 'the limited nature of their 
initiatives should not conceal the fact that there lies within them 
the seed for a possible mass movement'. Therefore this chapter focuses 
on the initiatives taken by environmentalists in the pipeline case and 
the potential of their actions to bring about social change (here, in 
areas of environmental management and the provision and maintenance of 
open space). Hence, the following discussion evaluates the actions 
taken by a small group of environmentalists in the context of land use 
planning conflicts in the Sydney Region. The factors (forces and 
tools) influencing the group's success will also be identified to 
highlight what may be considered as prerequisites for fruitful 
environmental protests.
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FACTORS UNDERLYING THE EMERGENCE OF A COMMUNITY 
STAKE IN THE PIPELINE PROJECT
It was difficult for AGL to understand why there was opposition 
to its plan to locate an underground pipeline within national parks in 
general, and the Blue Mountains National Park in particular. The 
protest appeared unnecessary when viewed in terms of the small area of 
33 ha of the 282 km2 Blue Mountains National Park that would be taken 
up by the easements (Butters, 1973a). So, while AGL acknowledged that 
the State government's decision to hold a public Inquiry into the 
pipeline proposal was in response to 'an apparent groundswell of public 
opinion against our proposed centre route' (Butters, 1973b:3), it 
condemned the action and it also condemned the community protest 
because they could only work against the 'finely balanced' economics 
of the project (Butters, 1973b:2). Undoubtedly, this response 
reflected AGL's frustration over the apparent breakdown in the special 
cooperative relationship with the state which it enjoyed throughout 
the early planning stage of the pipeline project. From the firm's 
position, an environmental inquiry would only create additional costs 
which it could ill afford to internalize, especially under the 
conditions of over-supply and intense competition which prevailed in 
the energy supply industry during the early 1970s. Clearly, then,
AGL's view of the means of resolving the conflict was related to the 
position it occupied within the social structure and, more specifically, 
its need to have suitable conditions for the accumulation of capital.
It is with these structural relationships, and especially their 
consequences for the preservation of environmental amenity such as 
national parks, that this section is concerned. The analysis broadly
outlines the social conditions in New South Wales that gave rise to the
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concern for the diminution of recreational open space, shows the link 
between this problem and the protest against the pipeline route, and 
identifies the physical and historical factors which gave significance 
to the Blue Mountains National Park as the locational focus of the 
environmental protest.
The struggle for open space in New South Wales
As argued in Chapter 3, the need for open space and therefore 
the assessment, or perception, of a diminution in the quantity, quality 
or access to this resource arises fundamentally from the urban 
population. Castells (1976) argues that environmental demands (for 
pollution control, parks and other amenities) are part of the 
consumption needs of the urban system which are necessary for the 
reproduction of the urban labour force. Indeed, the supply of open 
space has been a major issue throughout the history of the environmental 
movement in New South Wales (Turner, 1979). Further, the environmental 
movement is essentially urban based. Some verification for this argument 
is provided by the distribution of submissions to the 1973 environmental 
Inquiry shown in Figure 7.1. Hence, the reference to New South Wales 
in the title of this section does not imply that the pressures for open 
space have emerged uniformly throughout the State, but rather to 
situate these demands within a broad political system empowered to make 
authoritative decisions about the use of resources which impact on the 
availability of open space.
The struggle for open space must be seen as a response to the 
process by which areas are alienated from public use and it is therefore 
necessary to identify the features of land use planning in New South
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Wales, specifically in the Sydney region, that underlie the conflicts 
over open space.
The rapid, uncontrolled post World War II urban growth within 
and on the fringes of the Sydney metropolitan area created urban sprawl 
accompanied by the loss of convenience and recreational amenity due 
to the inability of State agencies to carry out rational planning under 
pressure from land developers. Stretton (1970), Sandercock (1977) and 
Spearritt (1978) lay the blame on the failure of planners and politicians 
to implement planning schemes and achieve egalitarian social goals 
when confronted with the pervasiveness of the growth ideology and the 
sheer difficulty of devising methods to cope with the complexities of a 
large and rapidly expanding metropolis. In all fairness, the Sydney 
urban planners perhaps did their best under the most unfavourable of 
planning conditions. For example, it was impossible to foresee that 
the city's population would exceed the 1980 projection of 2.3 million 
by the early 1960s. As a result, residential and other urban construction 
consumed considerable areas of land previously reserved for open space 
under the much lauded Cümberland County Council master plan of 1948.
But, as Sandercock (1977:179-212) maintains, perhaps the major 
impediment to the successful implementation of the Cumberland County 
Council's plan was that it impinged on the interests of local 
governments and private property owners whose political power militated 
against support for the plan. This lack of political support placed the 
Cumberland County Council in the situation of responding to private 
development proposals rather than directing city growth and change.
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Impediments to the push for open space
The history of the Cumberland County Council (the Council) has 
been outlined by Harrison (1972) and Sandercock (1977) but a brief 
summary points up the political power relationships which led to the 
demise of its master plan.
The Council was established in 1945 under the influence of 
Labor's J.J. Cahill, then Minister for Local Government and later 
Premier of New South Wales, who saved the Council from extinction in 
1951. Cahill's death in 1959 signalled the demise of the Council, 
which quickly lost political support and by 1963 was replaced by the 
State Planning Authority of New South Wales.
The Cumberland County Council was primarily responsible for the 
preparation of a statutory land use plan for the County of Cumberland,
oan area of 4,533 km around Sydney. The area comprised 39 local councils 
(Sandercock, 1977:179). According to Harrison (1972:68), among the 
most important feature of the Council's plan were:
1. The encircling green belt which defined the limits
of the continuous suburban spread by a general prohibition 
against building on sites less than 5 acres [2.02 ha] in 
area. A major concern of the council was the proliferation 
of premature subdivisions and the widespread scatter of 
housing around the rural-urban fringe.
2. The general prohibition of new buildings on the lands 
designated for open space and county roads. Some $16 
million was spent on the acquisition of these lands over 
the period 1951-68 but the areas of open space were much 
reduced from those proposed in the 1948 plan. Many local 
councils resented being saddled with the responsibility 
for these open spaces and their loss as rateable lands.
3. The zoning of land for manufacturing industry in the 
middle and outer suburbs as well as the confirmation of 
the existing predominantly industrialised localities in 
the inner areas. This was a conscious attempt to reserve 
new areas for industrial growth in suitable locations 
with regard to the needs of industry and the future
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residential distribution of factory workers. Suburban 
dispersal of manufacturing plants would have occurred 
in any event, but would certainly have been hampered 
by the lack of suitable available sites. Many local 
councils resisted these zoning proposals and the size 
and location of the areas that were held for factories 
were not always ideal.
The green belt included a lot of publicly-owned open space — national 
parks and other reserves — but most of it was privately-owned rural 
land. It was never intended that the privately-owned land would be 
acquired for open space, but would remain in private ownership although 
building on sites of less than 2 ha was prohibited, i.e. it would never 
become 'urban1. In general, the green belt was no more than 3 or 5 km 
wide.
The Council's plan was submitted to the Minister for Local 
Government in 1948 but did not receive legislative approval until 1951 
- due to opposition from local councils which resented the authority given 
to the Council over certain land use decisions within their jurisdictions. 
In addition, the attitude of other State agencies ranged from 
indifference to hostility, and consequently the Council was denied the 
sort of cooperation which was vital to the successful implementation of 
its objectives. Harrison (1972:70) has summarized the power position 
of the Council:
The County Council never became part of 'the ring' of 
departments and authorities where the workings of the 
apparatus of government, whether in conflict or in 
co-operation, are dealt with by unwritten understandings 
and personal or official relationships acquired over 
time. Its staff was not recruited from the public 
service and remained outside it; in this and all other 
respects it was 'a loner'. What strength it had stemmed 
from its role as custodian of the important elements of 
the statutory county plan, the provisions of which the 
Minister had the power, if he chose, to suspend and, in 
the last resort, change.
Added to these problems was the contradiction of planning for the
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Containment of urban sprawl and preservation of open space in a post­
war period of economic boom and rapid population growth. Thus, while 
it might have been possible to achieve some success in improving the 
urban environment at the fringes of the metropolis, 'there was no 
restraint on the build-up of employment in central and inner areas, 
which accounted for 37 per cent and 18 per cent respectively of 
metropolitan employment in 1966' (Sandercock, 1977:182).
Development pressures to rezone green belt land acquired by the
Council began to build up as soon as 1953. By 1959, under the
administration of Labor's Minister for Local Government, P.D. Hills, the
green belt was virtually eliminated. Thus began the downfall of the
Council whose demise Harrison (1972:76) felt was most probably due to:
the fact that it was not susceptible to the kind of 
direction that a Minister or a government seeks to 
wield. Its meetings were open and most of its 
documents were available to the public. It publicised 
its aims and intentions and, when the occasion demanded, 
its disagreement with the Minister. All the Minister 
could do to influence the Council was to suspend or 
amend its plan by overt public action; he could not 
direct the Council to do anything.
The Council's assertiveness was undoubtedly due to the widespread 
community approval of its objectives and of its strategy to maximize 
public information and minimize political control. However Harrison 
(1972:76) finds that support for the green belt concept was neither 
organized nor specific, while those who sought changes in the plan had 
at least plausible arguments, not so much against the green belt idea, 
but against its retention in particular areas. Political opposition 
mounted, and by 1962 the abolition of the Council was foreshadowed in 
the Premier's election policy speech. In 1963 the Council was replaced 
by the State Planning Authority.
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The SPA: less direct state involvement in planning
In 1964 the Minister for Local Government, Mr P.D. Hills,
announced that the new State Planning Authority (SPA) would
co-ordinate plans for use and development of land 
including Crown land owned by statutory bodies 
representing the crown; co-ordinate public and 
private land uses with the provision of utility 
services, transport facilities and other requirements 
for urban and non-urban land development (quoted in 
Harrison, 1972:80).
The function of the new planning agency was broader than its predecessor. 
Moreover its co-ordinating role spanned the entire State. Thus, by 
extending its area of responsibility the Minister intended to avoid 
the SPA's involvement in detailed local planning, a response to the 
pressures of developers exerted through local councils. The SPA 
differed from the Council in another important way. Whereas the latter 
was made up of a ten member body comprising one member from the Sydney 
City Council and nine others elected from the local councils, the 
membership of the SPA was altered to include two full time members as 
chairman and deputy chairman and ten part-time members, five of whom 
represented local governments and four were from State agencies (the 
Department of Local Government, the Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board, 
the Department of Transport and the Department of Main Roads). The 
tenth member was chosen from a professional association within New 
South Wales. (Sir William Pettingell, general manager of AGL from 
1952 to 1974, was a part-time member of the SPA in his capacity as a 
Commissioner of the City of Sydney from 1967 to 1969.) Each member 
was appointed for seven years.
The increased scope of responsibility and changed membership 
structure was intended to obviate what the Minister for Lands saw as
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the 'principal defect of the Cumberland County Council' — its 
involvement in detailed local planning (quoted in Harrison, 1972:80).
As a result, the SPA's major contribution to city planning — the 
Sydney Region Outline Rian—  was a statement of 'broad proposals' for 
the adoption of 'principles' (Figure 5.3) and strategies to achieve some 
very general objectives. These were identified as:
(1) The development of Sydney should be inter-related with that 
of the State as a whole.
(2) Sydney should remain Australia's greatest city, commercial centre 
and port.
(3) Sydney-Newcastle-Wollongong should be regarded as a closely 
related urban complex.
(4) Ample, well located industrial land should be available.
(5) High quality in urban design and landscape should be established.
(6) Comprehensive replanning of the metropolitan city centre is 
needed.
(7) A much greater level of investment in communications and public 
utilities is needed, coupled with the best use of existing 
facilities.
(8) A wider and more balanced distribution of commercial activity 
should be established so that over-concentration of employment 
in the metropolitan centre can be avoided.
(9) Flexibility is necessary.
(10) Long-term growth must be allowed for.
The provision of open space for aesthetic or recreational
enjoyment was not given priority in the plan and the green belt concept
was discarded because it was 'less flexible than is desirable where
there is uncertainty, as in the case of Sydney, about the scale and rate
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of growth (SPA, 1968:15).
The Outline Plccn included the main strategy for development of 
the Sydney Region for the three decades to 2000. Of relevance to this 
study is the way it sought to manage the use of space and the influence 
it might have had on AGL's locational decisions and the overall economic 
feasibility of the pipeline project. But such an influence would have 
been mainly in terms of the general prediction about, not prescription 
for, burgeoning growth. Indeed, some indication of the relationship 
between the Outline Plan and AGL's decisions are provided in the company's 
1968 Annual Report. The cover (Figure 7.2) carries a photograph with 
the caption: 'Officers planning the Company's distribution network in
terms of the Sydney Region Outline Plan 1970-2000 A.D.'. However, there 
is no evidence to suggest that the location of the main Moomba-Sydney 
trunk pipeline would have influenced or been influenced by the urban 
expansion areas proposed in the Outline Plan.
A basic principle of the Outline Plan was to encourage closer 
physical and economic relationships, along a north-south axis, between 
Sydney and Newcastle by developing intervening urban areas, especially 
Gosford and Wyong. A second urban axis ran east-west across the 
Blue Mountains (Figure 5.3). The plan was also developed around the 
goal of maintaining Sydney's position as the premier commercial and 
industrial centre and port facility within Australia, to which end it 
was assumed (SPA, 1968:10) that the State government would:
(a) encourage strong industrial growth, fundamental 
to Sydney's expansion;
(b) ensure every effort is made to provide the 
infrastructure of energy, water and sewerage 
systems and communications upon which successful 
economic growth will depend;
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(c) encourage the development of Sydney in a form which 
will minimize the costs of providing this infra­
structure, consistent with the promotion of strong 
economic growth;
(d) generally take all possible steps to secure full 
employment.
According to the Outline Plan, additional open space and 
recreational requirements until 2000 would be of the order of 10-14,000 
ha, a total which would 'need to be concentrated in the most favoured 
recreation areas, mainly near the cost' (SPA, 1968:53). A major short­
coming of the plan, however, was its identification of objectives 
without clearly addressing the range of possible social and physical 
environmental effects; a clear example of this was the planning for a 
greatly increased population along a coastal zone which was also 
recognized in the Outline Plan as important to meet the recreational 
needs of the people of the region (SPA, 1968:53). But the concept of 
population decentralization portrayed in the Outline Plan seems to have 
been in contrast to that being projected by the Commonwealth (Labor) 
government which was in power at the time of the pipeline controversy. 
The Commonwealth aimed to promote decentralization of population 
through the development of viable inland urban centres. Nevertheless, 
it must be pointed out that the Commonwealth, acting as if it did not 
expect the inland growth centres to make much difference to the 
pressures on existing metropolitan centres, provided support for the 
Macarthur (Campbelltown) decentralization area (Figure 5.2), for 
example.
It was the pressure for development of land within the metropolitan 
area that led to the erosion of the green belt under the Labor government 
during the 1950s and 1960s (Harrison, 1966; Winston, 1966; Rutherford,
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Burdekin and McGregor, 1971). These pressures also led to the 
replacement (under the succeeding Liberal government) of the green 
belt idea with 'a different urban concept which is more readily 
adaptable to the particular circumstances of the Sydney Region'
(SPA, 1968:15). This points to the inability of both political 
parties, and in fact the state in general, to implement firm policies 
which could direct economic development away from natural areas of 
recreational or ecological importance. Impotence of the state to 
direct the location of land use activities explains the need felt by 
certain individuals within the community for protest action. How an 
open space protest movement evolved over the years can be demonstrated 
by the struggle to designate a national park within the Blue Mountains. 
The environmental protest against the gas pipeline was in many ways 
simply the continuance of a resistance, which emerged as early as 
1932, to the intrusion of development activities into the area.
The Blue Mountains: land use conflicts and the struggle for a
Blue Mountains National Park
The same post-war development pressures that caused the 
diminution of open space reserves in Sydney and the westward spread of 
suburbanization on the Cumberland Plain, had spill-over effects in 
the Blue Mountains as a result of the heightened awareness by Sydney 
residents of the recreational values of the mountain landscape. 
Conflicting with this growing awareness of the recreational significance 
of the Blue Mountains was the push to exploit the area for a wide range 
of other resources (e.g. timber and coal) for the nearby metropolis and 
for overseas markets. Figure 7.3 was prepared by the Sydney based
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11 Network of eroding fire tra ils 
over whole of forested areas.
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Hill overlooking Grose Valley.
17 New expressway up escarpment.
‘ 18 Re-build ing of Bell Road with 4 
lanes.
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ral quality of the "backd rop  to 
Sydney."
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Bents Basin.
21 330 k.v. powerline proposed by 
N.S.W. E lectricity Commission 
across area promised by N S.W. 
M inister fo r Lands as future 
National Park.
Figure 7.3: Development activities occurring in the Blue Mountains 
Region during the pipeline controversy.
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environmental organization Total Environment Centre and lists what its 
director, Milo Dunphy terms 'nefarious activities' proposed or in 
progress during 1972. Mapping the juxtaposition of activities was a 
powerful means of pointing to the 'web of issues' (Enloe, 1975:40-3) 
surrounding the natural gas pipeline development. It is the total'ity 
of development activities that gave the pipeline location salience in 
the view of the environmentalists. The existence of such a 'web' 
supports the dictum that issues rarely exist in a vacuum and, moreover, 
it demonstrated the holistic or cumulative approach adopted by most 
environmentalists when assessing a project's impacts on society. It is 
this approach to the assessment of environmental impact that fundamentally 
separates environmentalists from developers, like AGL, which generally 
evaluate their projects in terms of the incremental impacts on the 
environment. It helps to explain why AGL could not understand how the 
pipeline centre route became such a 'delectable morsel' (Butters,
1973b:3) for the environmentalists of that time.
In his review of the evolution of land use pressures in the 
Blue Mountains, Hull (1975) referred to the process as one of 'landscape 
devolution' from the 'ideal to real'. He outlined the major conflicts 
which accompanied the process and the role of individuals and activist 
groups in protecting the 'ideal' elements of that landscape. (Appendix 2 
includes photographs of scenes from the Blue Mountains.) The pipeline 
controversy was part of a process of struggle for open space reserves 
in New South Wales which began in earnest after the turn of the present 
century. Turner (1979) documents the process of action and reaction 
in the history of national park designation in New South Wales. Turner 
highlights the role which a few zealous individuals played in the process
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from the identification of sites to their dedication as national parks. 
The most outstanding of these individuals was Myles J. Dunphy whose 
contribution to the Australian national parks movement Turner equates 
with that of John Muir in the United States conservation movement.
Between 1922 and 1932 Dunphy formulated a plan for a Blue 
Mountains National Park. In June 1932 he submitted his proposal to 
the Surveyor General of New South Wales and the Blue Mountains Shire 
Council for consideration. On 24 August 1934 he published a 
justification of his plan in a four page supplement in the Katoorrba 
Daily. The proposal was for a large national park of 4,700 km2 
(Figure 7.4) encompassing all the then unalienated Crown lands of the 
greater Blue Mountains region. Dunphy explained that he sought public 
approval and support of his scheme because it was 'right to think of 
the future' of the 'premier scenic areas and playground of Australia 
[which was] fast being subjugated and denuded by various private 
interests, lawful and otherwise', and which if left unchecked could 
convert the area into badlands (Katoorriba Daily, 24 August 1934).
Dunphy was convinced that the Blue Mountains scenery would be best 
preserved by being strictly left alone and that Sydneysiders would 
benefit from the proximity of a wilderness area which, in his view, 
was an indispensible necessity of modern existence.
The most overt resistance to Dunphy's scheme came from the State 
Forestry Commission which moved to have most of the Crown lands declared 
State forest reserve (Hull, 1976). Against this pressure Dunphy stepped 
up his own lobbying efforts and in 1955 he began to petition the State 
parliament directly for action on his proposal. In 1958 the Blue 
Mountains National Park was officially declared although on a smaller
> h r s o o * J B o i R W A  
M '  DURAMBAVG Y
a.blul' M ntains national park
v  i\W ’ ^ ' P R I M I T I V E - A R E A S :
H p "  *  A X '  J  URAT1RIR M'"  / J c  * |  Proposed b y
S c a l e  o f  M i le s .  \  / )  c J f e  ( V d f i o n a f  S h a r k s
l~ r i  ' 1 J e \  P r i m i t i v e  A r e a s
| |  C o u n c i l .
r m  y^y y  % %
j g o  J y  f i r s t  b r o u d h t  u n d e r
-  f  ' U & Y  ' N O R T H E R N ^ , -  f  ' / n o t i c e  o f A u E h o r i J . e s
v - - \  ~ k . “
«■ s ” S i r ' \  t  ; /  /
• N /  p  },FORlST- /  /  's‘ t r - r ?  / '
f f . . .  / , «  p , . ^ H  (
/  X  v L ,  . v -  L r  0  ;
y ,  x O x t x J .
A  X i  t r  X “ "  '  x \
U  ! /  M’ VW orJ J*  \ y  / H N T R A  L  n T l T t f  .
f  ‘ W  ^ -^ C n  f
. . .  / X tisy i r p  '  t
° ® v - 7 /  XiUf  ^ V\y: - ' j \ ____________[ v  X] ■ - 1 -  /  j .  A
r - i  ’ C  I r r V “ .  r s *  « ~ s H  . v -j » i  w h s  i  o  n  s t ' ^ K l k . . .
^ s . ß d M . . . . . . . . .  »I .. .  u r 4 r £ . .  / ^ /  \  /
\ /  • N / y  l .M O U N T A JN Sr A  / I  A b V R  | N F 11 ^  T '  N \
/  \  (  ' ' * # ■ .  i 3 _  • ' /  $  : £ L  l  £ \ X ^  J  V  Br‘" ? ' X
X  \ y f i  7 / i f  i j M  » f f f  \  . J r *  vy^inor h ?
jPm w M  a iX
.  / ) }" r y t ^ ! $ g r  y&J\(y\A/y««jk v ^y/s i
\  y , y X ^ i  s | n G . : s *  xppRoposKD )
' JX k A ^ r  4 W *  1  /  7  j / " AT& ! n  pa A R K  Ah >  /Li-aÄfriXXr? X ~ 4 - v /
> . . » ■
B o u n d a r i e s  o f  D i v i s i o n s  ~ L r -  O t h e r  a r e a s  w o r th y  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  . ; l ] ' | ' p -  X n  j X ^ /
R a i l w a y s : f u t u r e  e x p a n s i o n  o f  s e t t l e m e n t  a r e a s  f  ' ^ < ^ M i ,T*G0« i
R o ^ d s  : r . r . —  i n  C e n t r a l  D i v i s i o n  f i a s  b e e n  c o n s i d e r e d . ( ^ ) b o w r a l
S t a t e  F o r e s t s  i n  D i v i s i o n s  i  A l i e n a t e d  a r e a s  w i t h i n  t h e  D i v i s i o n s  a r c  / ,  •
F o r e s t  R e s e r v e s  d o .  d o  =; '• v j  h e a v i l y  o u t l i n e d .  A n u m b e r  o f  a l i e n a t e d  O Q y l e s  $  D u n p h y
L— •■•■I ,  , ,  ,  , , Hm S cc Mour.lauiTrJll.CluV NSW
s m a l l  p o r t i o n s  a r c  n o t  s h o w n  . Vice f r a  S y J n ^  » u ,h  W^iiun,
M e  cl fuel MJr  June 195? Bale of Hus Mjp Oct I9i3
Figure 7.4: Areas proposed for national parks within the Blue
Mountains by the National Parks and Primitive Areas 
Council in 1932.
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scale (1,100 km2) than was advocated.
Dunphy's fervour reflected his own interest in the outdoors and 
an appreciation of the natural, to which his membership in the National 
Park and Primitive Areas Council, the Mountain Trails Club of New South Wales 
and the Sydney Bush Walkers Association attested and which his profession 
as an architect and land surveyor undoubtedly enhanced. Dunphy is now 
widely regarded as 'the father of wilderness and national park activism in 
N.S.W.' (Ovington, 1980:48) and his remarkable efforts are a legend in the 
history of the conservation movement in Australia. The efforts of 
Dunphy's son, Milo Dunphy (Director of the Total Environment Centre and 
Vice-Chairman, Environmental Board, New South Wales Chapter of the Royal 
Australian Institute of Architects), in the protest against the location 
of the natural gas pipeline within the Blue Mountains National Park 
provide one link, at the level of the actors, in the continuing battle 
for the preservation of the wilderness character of certain areas of 
the Blue Mountains. The specific role played by the junior Dunphy in 
the pipeline controversy is identified more fully in the following 
section which focuses on the group of actors who successfully protested 
against the location of the gas pipeline within the Blue Mountains 
National Park. The reason for trying to do this lies in the need to 
know more definite answers to questions which arise from the theory 
about why particular individuals and groups participate in environmental 
protest activities, and how they get their way.
PROTEST OVER THE PIPELINE: THE ACTORS AND THEIR STRATEGY
Answers about how and why individuals and groups became involved 
in the pipeline controversy can provide support for either liberal or
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Marxist theories which posit differing degrees of access to the 
political decision-making system by individuals and groups. At one 
extreme of the theoretical continuum lies pluralist theory which 
maintains that state politicians and the state bureaucracy are very 
responsive to the demands of citizens who therefore enjoy easy access 
to, and influence over, the political decision-making system (Dahl, 
1961:164-5). At the other extreme are Marxist theories which 
emphasize the role of a ruling class in dominating resource use 
decisions. It is this ruling class domination that creates the need 
for individuals and groups to become politically active in advancing 
their own interests.
A range of strategies may be used by individuals and groups to 
gain a desired response from state decision-makers. Kimber and 
Richardson (1974:212) argue that the success or failure of community 
campaigns for environmental protection depends on advance intelligence, 
liaison with administrators, rational argument and the merits of the 
case, relationships with legislators, and relationships with the mass 
media, resources and sanctions. The list suggests the need for a strong 
correlation between successful protests and skilful participants 
(Kasperson and Breitbart, 1974; Olives, 1976; Pickvance, 1976).
Further, it has been repeatedly argued that environmental actors are 
essentially drawn from the middle socio-economic class (Milbrath, 1965; 
Buttel and Flin, 1974, 1978; Ley and Mercer, 1980; Ley, 1980; Cotgrove 
and Duff, 1980, 1981) — a fact which seems to be a prerequisite for 
successful protest. Middle class environmentalists appear to have the 
necessary confidence, skills, tools and the inclination to engage in 
costly political action against powerful interests in society.
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Research carried out in Britain by Cotgrove and Duff (1980,
1981) suggests that middle class individuals are the very kinds of 
people that can, and must, be relied upon to modify the dominance of 
the growth ideology and to foster greater appreciation of the importance 
of the natural environment to human well-being.
Cotgrove and Duff make two important points which contribute
to the understanding of contemporary environmental activism and these
can be evaluated with the evidence from the pipeline case. First,
they show that both environmentalists (i.e. in the sense of individuals
committed through membership in groups which actively promote policies
which seek a shift in priorities of industrial society from high growth,
high energy consuming and environmentally damaging ways of life) and
the public generally show an awareness of environmental issues. But
Cotgrove and Duff (1980:340) find
that what differentiates environmentalists is a 
complex of beliefs about the nature of industrial 
society, about both the effectiveness and 
desirability of many of its core institutions and 
values. Their world-view differs markedly from the 
dominant view. It constitutes an alternative 
paradigm, with different beliefs about nature and 
man's relation with his environment, about how the 
economy can best be organized, about politics and 
about the nature of society.
The beliefs which Cotgrove and Duff found to constitute this alternative 
paradigm are set out in Table 7.1. Second, there is the issue of who 
engages in environmental activism. Cotgrove and Duff (1980:340-1) note 
that
environmentalists are drawn predominantly from a 
specific fraction of the middle class whose interests 
and values diverge markedly from other groups in 
industrial societies. Firstly, environmentalism is 
an expression of the interests of those whose class 
position in the non-productive sector locates them 
at the periphery of the institutions and processes
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TABLE 7.1: COMPETING SOCIAL PARADIGMS
Dominant social 
paradigm
Alternative environmental 
paradigm
CORE VALUES Material (economic 
growth)
Natural environment 
valued as resource 
Domination over nature
Non-material (self- 
actualization) 
Natural environment 
intrinsically valued 
Harmony with nature
ECONOMY Market forces 
Risk and reward 
Rewards for achievement 
Differentials 
Individual self-help
Public interest 
Safety
Incomes related to need 
Egalitarian
Collective/social provision
POLITY Authoritative structures 
(experts influential)
Hierarchical 
Law and order
Participative structures 
(citizen/worker 
involvement) 
Non-hierarchical 
Liberation
SOCIETY Centralized
Large-scale
Associational
Ordered
Decentralized
Small-scale
Communal
Flexible
NATURE Ample reserves
Nature hostile/neutral
Environment controllable
Earth's resources limited
Nature benign
Nature delicately balanced
KNOWLEDGE Confidence in science and 
technology 
Rationality of means 
Separation of fact/value, 
thought/feeling
Limits to science
Rationality of ends 
Integration of fact/value 
thought/feeling
Source: Cotgrove and Duff (1980:341).
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of industrial capitalist societies. Hence, their 
concern to win greater participation and influence 
and thus to strengthen the political role of their 
members.
Significantly their sample of environmentalists revealed a high 
proportion of individuals (doctors, social workers, teachers) occupying 
roles in what Cotgrove and Duff term the 'non-productive sector'
(Table 7.2). Cotgrove and Duff (1980:344) conclude, on the basis of
TABLE 7.2 OCCUPATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND 
NON-ENVIRONMENTALISTS
Environmentalists 
per cent
Non-environmentalists 
per cent
Commerce and industry
- professional and supervisory
- clerical
14.3
5.6
13.6
12.2
Self-employed 9.6 4.8
Service, welfare, creative 38.4 12.2
Manual 5.4 28.2
Retired 9.1 7.8
Housewife 8.0 18.0
Unemployed 1.6 1.7
Student 8.0 1.4
100.0 99.9
N = 427 N = 294
Source: Cotgrove and Duff (1980:342).
these findings, that any attempt 'to assimilate the ideology of this 
particular fraction of the middle class to that of either the 
bourgeoisie or the proletariat flies in the face of evidence'. In view 
of their generally high levels of education, professional skills, 
interest in politics and concern to win greater participation and
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influence over social decision-making, committed environmentalists would 
be expected to be aware of and to employ strategy in protest actions 
which demonstrate good knowledge and understanding of the bases of 
political power and likewise the means of gaining such power for their 
environmental goals.
The question of who became involved in the pipeline environmental 
controversy adds an important dimension to the very significant question 
as to the amount of control which environmentalists can gain over 
political decisions and, necessarily, the potential of environmentalists 
to bring about a shift in the dominant social paradigm which has 
supported environmentally destructive processes. Equally important is 
the identification of what constituted a successful protest strategy in 
the pipeline case.
Focusing on the environmentalists in the pipeline case
Turner's (1979:312) research presents a picture of members of
environmental pressure groups in New South Wales as
middle class urban dwellers with an uncharacteristically 
strong interest in both environmental quality and outdoor 
recreation opportunities. They have the education and 
self esteem to feel willing and able to present their 
well-articulated views to influential decision makers.
The same can be said for the individuals who played central roles in the
pipeline protest.
The core group of environmentalists which caused the location 
of the pipeline to become a political issue were Hugh Bannister, Nicole 
Bannister, Renate Hermann, Roger Lyle and Richard Wood. At 29, Hugh 
Bannister was the oldest of the group which, with the exception of 
Nicole Bannister, has grown up in Sydney suburbs and graduated from
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Sydney universities. At the time of the pipeline controversy Wood, 
like Bannister, was a doctoral student in engineering at the University 
of New South Wales.
In discussions with the author, Hugh Bannister emphasized 
that although they were all from middle class backgrounds, they were 
not affluent, and that the concern for environmental protection arose 
more from their education and status as students or recent graduates. 
Further, their involvement took place at a time in their lives and at 
a time in history when they could afford to act without being burdened 
by considerations of the consequences of such actions on their future. 
Individuals who provided support either in information gathering, 
publicity efforts or in the electoral campaign were Dave Kelly,
Phillip Sutton, Michael Symons and others who are identified in the 
following discussion.
The strategy used to raise the issue
The effectiveness of the strategy used by the very small core 
group of environmentalists reflected knowledge of local politics and 
dedication to having the pipeline relocated from within the Blue 
Mountains National Park. Notwithstanding this, at the root of their 
success was the existence of strong community support (a large social 
base in Castell's (1976) terminology) for the provision of open space 
and the protection of national parks. The extent of this support is, 
perhaps, best reflected in the green bans movement which gained strength 
in the very early 1970s.
While recognizing the relationship which the successful protest 
had to the presence of a large social base, the mobilization of community
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support depended on the commitment to action of an organized group 
of individuals, and their strategy did play a decisive role in 
determining whether or not the requisite support was effectively 
mobilized to bring about the desired political response.
The sequence followed by the environmentalists was to gather 
the information necessary to assess the environmental impact of the 
pipeline proposal; form the Wilderness Protection Committee; set up 
a public information programme; and seek parliamentary representation 
through the Hawkesbury by-election. The resort to political action was 
in contrast to the historical pattern of patient participation through 
public education which Turner (1979) claims has characterized the New 
South Wales national parks movement.
Information gathering
By 1972 a cohesive network of active environmental groups 
existed within Sydney and the Blue Mountains area. They were well 
known to the mass media and to State agencies which had observed their 
participation in previous environmental protests. Conversely, the 
environmentalists were also aware as to who sympathized with their 
views in these institutions and this made the process of information 
gathering considerably easier. For example, the first time that the 
environmentalists were made aware of the plans for the pipeline 
location was in September 1972 when Milo Dunphy received an anonymous 
telephone call giving a description of the proposed route for the 
pipeline. Dunphy immediately acted on this information by writing a 
letter to the Sydney Morning Herald, expressing concern over the 
proliferation of development activities established or planned in the
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Blue Mountains. The information was then passed on to a group of 
Sydney bushwalkers suggesting that it should contact Max Hatherly 
at the University of New South Wales who was thought to have more 
information. When contacted Hatherly said that he did not want his 
name to be linked with the release of the information at that time for 
fear that his good relationship with the NPWS would be damaged. 
Hatherly was opposed to the use of the National Park and favoured the 
construction of the pipeline within the services corridor proposed in 
the Outline Plan. (The concept of a multi-service corridor received 
wide support in the submissions to the 1973 Inquiry but there were 
technical reasons why the idea was not implemented: chief among these
was the safety hazard resulting from having services like roads, gas 
pipelines and electricity powerlines in close proximity within a 
common easement.) Thereafter the bushwalkers stepped up their own 
investigations by contacting certain State agencies assumed to be 
involved, by conducting field surveys and by developing arguments 
against the pipeline centre route.
Responses of the State agencies. The WPC's records indicate 
that it contacted the Departments of Lands, Local Government (Gas and 
Electricity Section), Development and Decentralisation, Mines and 
Energy and the NPWS. The Department of Lands' response was that it 
had very little to do with the route of the pipeline since its only 
responsibility was to supply information about the land through which 
the pipeline would pass. The spokesman for the Department of Local 
Government said that his agency would become fully involved once the 
pipeline project was finalized. He suggested that AGL's consultants, 
Williams Brothers Engineer-CMPS, be contacted for information.
Similarly, Mr Harding of the Department of Development and Decentralisation
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responded from the perspective of his department's narrow area of 
responsibility. Harding ventured an opinion that a detailed survey 
of the needs of country industries for natural gas had indicated that 
there was no great need for it. When asked if the Department of 
Development and Decentralisation would consider a southern route 
through Goulburn, a desirable action for decentralization, Harding 
explained that such a decision could be made only after interdepartmental 
discussions. Mr Harding, however, indicated that Mr Boddam-Whetham, 
then Executive Officer to the Energy Advisory Committee, Department of 
Mines, would be able to provide more information on the project.
Mr Boddam-Whetham was able to say more than any of the other 
informants because the Department of Mines had worked most closely 
with AGL from the project planning stage. Boddam-Whetham supplied the 
following information:
(a) the pipeline construction was not definite because of the 
unknown reserves in the gas fields;
(b) the pipeline route was already settled as far as Bathurst, 
leaving only the Bathurst-Sydney portion to be finalized;
(c) five possible routes had been listed and the southern route via 
Goulburn was one of them;
(d) surveying, construction and operation of the pipeline was covered
by the Pipelines Act, 1967: he outlined the Act and pointed out
that it is possible for anyone to make written submissions to the 
Minister for Mines, and that all government departments and the 
SPCC can lodge submissions for consideration, adding that after 
considering the submissions the Minister is empowered to alter
the initial route for which a permit was granted;
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(e) the Department of Mines depended on the SPCC for advice on 
environmental matters.
Roger Lyle, reporting on his discussion on 3 October 1972 with
Mr Armstrong, Acting Assistant Director of the NPWS, wrote:
Being a public servant he was not able to commit 
himself on matters of policy, but it was quite 
obvious from the tone of the conversation that 
NPWS was unhappy with the fact that a pipeline 
was proposed through a National Park. He said that 
the preliminary survey was being carried out by 
William Brothers-CMPS with a permit from NPWS.
He seemed reasonably familiar with the Wollangambie 
Area, having been to the drill site on Shay ridge 
and appreciated the primitiveness of the region.
Whether or not the individuals contacted were withholding 
information from the bushwalkers is unclear. The responses received 
point to the existence of definite limits to the autonomy of agencies 
within the state bureaucracy. In this case the responsibility of 
certain agencies was specified in the P'i'pel'ines Act, 1967. It is this 
management by specific rule which narrows the ambit of an agency's 
authority and thus its inclination and ability to provide information 
to individuals from within the community. The summary of comments 
(Table 7.3) submitted by State agencies to the 1973 Inquiry demonstrates 
the narrow view taken in evaluating the impact of the pipeline project.
The environmentalists also sought the support of politicians at 
the State and Commonwealth levels of government. And, as is to be 
expected, they received the cooperation of certain Labour parliamentarians 
including Mr Connor who in turn sought technical information about the 
pipeline routeing from them.
Results of field surveys. Three separate field investigations 
were conducted by the bushwalkers. Between 30 September and 1 October 1972
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Hugh Bannister, Nicole Bannister, Renate Hermann and Richard Wood 
walked through the Wollangambie wilderness area of the Blue Mountains 
National Park, hoping to trace the route of the proposed pipeline from 
Bald Hill to Mt Irvine (Figure 7.1). They also intended to assess the 
difficulty of the terrain for pipeline construction and the effects 
that construction would have on the area. The report of the field 
investigation dated 2 October 1972 and signed by Hugh Bannister noted 
that
It was generally felt that the route presented no 
particular engineering difficulties for the pipeline. 
Grades were generally easy. The ridges were wide 
and soil covered for most of the trip although 
towards Mt Wilson they became somewhat narrow and 
rockier.
The area was prolific with wildflowers, especially 
waratahs. There was no evidence of recent 
devastating bushfires for most of the trip.
However, towards Mt Wilson the condition of the 
bush deteriorated. The track to Mt Wilson showed 
numerous signs of recent fires.
Although the ridge followed was fairly gentle, the 
general terrain is very rugged. Views are impressive 
from several vantage points. It is clear that the 
pipeline and the work involved in its construction 
will alter the character of the area. The route 
will be clearly visible from several vantage points 
and will greatly disturb some areas where the 
ridges are narrow and rocky. The ridge to be 
followed by the pipeline is also clearly visible from 
Dufaur Lookout and Mt Wilson.
Another field survey on 30 September 1972 was conducted by 
Roger Lyle, Mike Richter, Dave Kelly, Don Bradfield and Chris McGowan. 
They limited their task to the identification of the pipeline route by 
locating survey markers at the Mt Irvine end of the Blue Mountains 
National Park. A third trip to the area was made on 8 October 1972. 
The party consisting of Wood, Lyle and Hermann aimed to find out more 
about the pipeline route and to canvass residents' attitudes towards
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the pipeline in the Mount Irvine and Bilpin areas.
The field report prepared by Hermann and Wood is important for 
demonstrating the range of responses which were recorded and the extent 
to which the responses reflected the individualism that underlies 
action or inaction in environmental controversies. The following 
summarizes their observations.
(1) The fruit stall/milk bar owners at Bilpin did not know about 
the proposal. [They, perhaps, were not directly affected by the 
pipeline route.]
(2) Individuals coccupying a house opposite a school in an area which 
the investigators felt sure would be affected were not worried 
about the pipeline because it did not affect their orchards.
The pipeline did cross their property, however, in an area of 
unused bushland.
(3) One respondent said the pipeline could cut across his apple 
orchard but that a powerline had already gone through the property 
and for that easement he had obtained $A10. He was more concerned 
about the general increase in development of the area within his 
Shire since rates were so high that people were being forced to 
subdivide and sell their land in small blocks.
(4) At another property the party was told that the surveyors had 
granted her request that the pipeline avoid an area of softwood 
on one side of the property: that she was satisfied that it would 
not do significant damage to the natural bushland, and that she 
felt that development and bushfires were the real dangers to
Mt Irvine.
(5) Hermann and Wood recorded that 'some residents of Bilpin were 
opposed to the scheme' but no reasons were noted.
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O'Riordan's (1976:252) observations provide a fitting commentary
on the activities of the bushwalkers and the responses they received
from Blue Mountains residents:
There will always be some who will simply not be aware 
of the problem, either because it does not appear to 
involve them or because it is low on their political 
agenda. Some people will resign themselves to the 
matter because they are political fatalists, or at 
least they like to use this as an excuse for doing 
nothing. Others will recognise the stress but 
resolve it by psychological adaptation or behavioural 
adjustment. A small group will seek to do something 
about it, either through traditional forms of political 
protest, such as letter writing, petition signing and 
the like, or by forming or joining a pressure group.
But beyond this, mere recognition of the diversity of responses 
is the fact of a divergence of attitudes between the environmentalists 
and the property owners. Viewed as a group, the property owners' 
motivations can be seen to have been provided by interests compared to 
the environmentalists who acted on principles. This distinction was 
first made by Allison (1975:110-12) who explained that interests 'are 
privately oriented wants, those not logically dependent on public 
benefits', while principles 'are public oriented wants, which cannot 
be made coherent without reference to an indefinite number of people'.
This distinction between interests and principles is not greatly 
different from that made by Cotgrove and Duff (1980) between adherents 
to the 'dominant social paradigm' and the 'alternative social paradigm' 
(Table 7.1). Data from the submissions to the environmental Inquiry 
which provide some support for this conclusion are presented in Table 7.4.
Finding an alternative pipeline route. Bannister and Wood 
evaluated the alternatives to the pipeline crossing the Blue Mountains, 
taking into account cost, environmental impact and effects on population
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decentralization. Alternative modes of transporting natural gas to 
Sydney were also considered and rejected either because they were too 
expensive or inefficient in terms of resource consumption. They 
concluded that the southern route via Goulburn would be less disruptive 
of natural ecosystems since easements could be located mostly across 
land already in agricultural use. Moreover, Bannister and Wood reasoned 
that the southern route would be more suitable for pipeline construction 
because of the relative absence of rugged terrain. The longer southern 
route would be more expensive to construct, but in their view, the 
additional cost could be balanced by the proximity to the Melbourne gas 
pipeline system which would reduce the cost in the event of linking it 
to a national grid. A southern route would also provide easy connection 
with Canberra and Wagga Wagga. The environmentalists were aware that 
the Moomba-Sydney gas pipeline was significant to the regional and 
urban development objectives of the Commonwealth, and they concurred 
that the pipeline should be located to serve long-term planning 
objectives rather than short-term goals. Based upon these findings the 
bushwalkers formulated a counter-proposal for the location of the main 
pipeline and laterals. (The spatial arrangement that they proposed was 
strongly reflected in the recommendations of the Inquiry: see Figure P.l).
Thus having identified a base of support for their protest and armed with 
a well reasoned objection and an alternative proposal, the bushwalkers 
decided to launch their campaign against the centre route.
Formation of the Wilderness Protection Committee
Once the small group of bushwalkers were convinced that a strong 
case could be made for altering AGL's proposed route for the pipeline 
they created the Wilderness Protection Committee (WPC) in October 1972.
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The specific purpose of the Committee was the preparation of information
on the pipeline route for use in challenging the location through the
Wollangambie wilderness area. The general aims were:
To ensure that projects which would damage National 
Parks, State Parks and proposed parks and reserves 
are subjected to full public scrutiny before any 
interference with the natural features of the area 
are permitted.
And the WPC would seek to achieve this aim:
1. By advocating the strengthening of the position of 
the NPWS with the possible aim of making that agency 
a statutory body.
2. By advocating the release of information to the 
public on proposed projects in National parks and 
reserves.
3. By seeking clarification and strengthening of the 
status of wilderness areas within National Parks 
and in areas proposed for inclusion in national 
parks.
The public information programme
Information about the natural gas pipeline and its impacts, as 
assessed by the WPC, was summarized in a pamphlet: 'Natural Gas for
Sydney: What Price Progress' (Appendix 3). Several hundred copies
were distributed to the news media, conservation groups, politicians 
at all levels of government, government agencies and the AGL. Pamphlets 
were sent to 'public personalities' like poet and conservationist 
Judith Wright, union leader Jack .Mundey and the Director of the 
Australian Museum, F.H. Talbot. Meanwhile, the inter-industry dispute 
between AGL and BHP over the purchase of Japanese manufactured steel 
pipe was being given much coverage by the news media and this provided 
another avenue through which the environmental concerns were brought to
the attention of the community. The environmental concerns were aired
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much more easily and more prominently than might have been the case had 
they not existed alongside the hotly debated steel pipe supply issue.
The responses to the WPC's initial efforts to gain media cooperation 
are shown in Table 7.5. They suggest that, initially, at least, the 
environmental impact of the pipeline was perceived to be either a 
non-issue or not sufficiently important for immediate attention. Despite 
the hesitancy displayed by the news media, coverage of the opposition to 
the pipeline crossing the Blue Mountains was achieved relatively easily. 
Three factors accounted for the successful access to the media. First, 
and perhaps most important, was that the environmentalists knew which 
individuals within the various media organizations were sympathetic to 
environmental concerns or those who, for other reasons would be willing 
to give public airing to the conflict over the pipeline location. The 
second factor may be described as the mood of environmentalism which 
prevailed in Australia in the early 1970s (discussed in Chapter 3).
The proliferation of environmental conflicts in Australia in general 
and New South Wales in particular during that time contributed to the 
news-worthiness of the environmentalists' objections to the pipeline 
project. Yet another factor was the pre-existing controversy between 
AGL and BHP. Together these factors point to the powerful role which 
the media can play in influencing which concerns gain widespread 
publicity and thus attain the status of an issue (Walmsley, 1980).
The case also demonstrates how influential individuals and organizations 
can be instrumental in setting the agenda of public information (Sellers 
and Jones, 1973; Sandbach, 1980).
On 15 October 1972 the Sunday Telegraph carried a story with 
the caption: 'Plans for pipeline attacked'. It featured a photograph
of Lyle, Wood and Richter in the bush and included a statement by Milo
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Dunphy drawing attention to the many projects being considered for the 
Blue Mountains which in their view threatened to destroy the wilderness 
character of the area. This article marked the first time that the 
environmentalists' views were exposed to the community at large and 
it paved the way for the appearance of a number of articles in other 
daily newspapers on the environmental issues surrounding the pipeline 
project. The Australian Financial Review, beginning on 8 November, ran 
a series of three articles by P.P. McGuinness on the need for a national 
fuel policy. Such a policy McGuinness said would need to take into 
account the number of issues surrounding the pipeline project and the 
need for a national pipeline grid. The Daily Mirror, 10 November, quoted 
Dunphy as saying that the proposed route for the AGL's gas pipeline was 
a 'disgraceful parody of planning' and that 'no single project in New 
South Wales had ever endangered so many national parks'. On 21 November 
the Sydney Morning Herald announced that the WPC's two committee 
members 'claim the pipeline could be one of the most important 
conservation issues to arise for some time' and ran items from a text 
submitted by Bannister and Wood in which the pair emphasized the 
precedent the action would have for future developments within national 
parks.
Once the environmental concerns had been given satisfactory 
exposure by the media, the WPC embarked on its next publicity effort.
It announced a public information meeting to be held at Springwood, near 
the Blue Mountains, on 8 December 1972. The meeting was organized by 
a coalition of environmental groups from Sydney and the Blue Mountains. 
This was the second meeting held within two months to protest
development activities in the area.
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The Hawkesbury by-election: the perspective of the environmentalists
Once Bannister had committed himself to running for the seat in 
State parliament, he suspended his doctoral scholarship for four months 
to devote himself to the task of campaigning. Aided by Michael Symons, 
the WPC outlined a procedure for its media campaign. The first step 
was to announce his candidature, comprising a photograph of the candidate, 
the reasons for standing, his own plans for the electorate, and an 
identification of key supporters. The second step was the preparation 
of statements for weekly press releases. Each statement revealed new 
information and perspectives on and solutions for problems in the 
electorate. The information was sent to news editors of all television 
and radio stations, to all newspapers in Sydney and to the Parliament 
House Press Gallery. The third step was the preparation of special 
releases for selected media.
In its first press release the WPC said that its reason for 
supporting Bannister in the by-election was 'to draw attention to the 
environmental problems of the Hawkesbury electorate'. The WPC further 
stated that through its representative 'the balance of power in the 
New South Wales parliament will ensure that the views of an independent 
environmental candidate will be heard' (WPC manuscript, section A). The 
issues which formed subjects for separate press releases were summarized 
in the brochure 'Save the Hawkesbury: Vote Bannister' (Appendix 3).
Bannister's concerns were, however, over matters which affected 
not only the local electorate but were regional in scope and which, 
therefore would require the adoption of major policy initiatives by the 
State politicians to effect changes which could be felt at the district
level. Revision of the Outline Plan to include a programme for 
population decentralization, the rerouteing of the Moomba-Sydney gas
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pipeline to avoid national parks, the need for revised zoning laws, 
improved public transport facilities, control of the uses of the 
Hawkesbury River and the strengthening of environmental policies to 
incorporate provisions for public participation in decision making were 
problems which the WPC felt to be in need of State action (Appendix 3).
But these were some of the very big problems which, given the context 
of Australian interstate relations and divisions of State and 
Commonwealth powers, any State would have found difficult to accommodate. 
The WPC's concern over Sydney's 'mad-growth' was encapsulated in its 
campaign slogan 'Sydney is Coming' (Appendix 3). The implication was 
that there was something frightening — not good — about the Sydney 
urban environment. And, such a spatial form should be avoided. This 
was an indictment of the incumbent government's inability to direct the 
process of urbanization in a manner which minimized adverse impacts on 
the lives of residents of the region.
Premier Askin responded to this attack by entering a 'conservation' 
candidate in the Hawkesbury by-election, by setting up environmental 
inquiries into the pipeline project and into the pollution of the 
Hawkesbury River and by demonstrating that his government was 
environmentally responsible in that it had assumed a leadership role in 
the enactment of environmental legislation in Australia. Askin also 
found it necessary to resort to the use of the socialist scare tactic; 
he warned that 'The people of Hawkesbury would have to do more than just 
vote in the State by-election' for 'with a sycophant Labor Government 
in New South Wales, we could be headed for a socialist dictatorship at 
Canberra' (Haukesbury Observer, February 1973).
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The Liberals also emphasized the working class origins of 
their candidate, Kevin Rozzoli, who they said was a real Hawkesbury 
man and a fourth generation Australian who had lived and worked in the 
Hawkesbury district all of his 33 years. Rozzoli was als'o a member of 
the Hawkesbury District Conservation Society which in sum made him the 
ideal candidate to pit against the middle class, academic outsider 
Bannister.
The conservationists admitted the validity of Rozzoli1s interest 
in environmental conservation but they charged that 1 inquiries without 
action are useless'. It was also clear to them that they had achieved, 
for the environment, the status of an issue and could then devote some 
effort to reaping maximum benefits from the environmental Inquiry into 
the pipeline proposal.
In deciding on the scope of the submission to the gas pipeline 
Inquiry the WPC reasoned that, in terms of strategy, it would not have 
been wise to address the range of problems associated with the pipeline 
development but that it would be more profitable to stick to the 
strongest arguments against the pipeline in reference to their 
particular area of emphasis — the impact on national parks. Moreover, 
the WPC intended to stress its concern about the creation of a precedent 
rather than the scale of environmental disruption that would result 
from locating the pipeline within the Blue Mountains National Park.
Also, since the economics of the project was a major consideration 
in the choice of route, its testimony-would need to reflect an awareness 
of this. This was a task which engineers Bannister and Wood were 
capable of handling as was demonstrated in their well thought out 
submission to the Inquiry in which they addressed the cost of construction
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in terms of varying combinations of pipeline sizes and routeing 
arrangements.
The failure of the WPC's bid for parliamentary representation 
and the victory of the Liberal Party's contestant must have later 
caused the Premier to regret having called the Inquiry which gave the 
environmentalists their victory. The Premier's action was clearly a 
response to the support which the environmentalists enjoyed in Sydney.
But the Hawkesbury district was of a different political complexion. 
However, the election defeat was not a significant loss to the WPC 
for, as Wood later explained, political power gain was not the 
motivation for their actions. Rather, the aim was to push conservation 
issues to the foreground on the political agenda.
The outcome of the protest against destruction of the 
wilderness character of the Blue Mountains National Park was seen by 
the environmentalists as a victory which could set a precedent for 
the preservation of the pristine properties of national parks in 
general and the Blue Mountains National Park in particular. The 
environmentalists praised Commissioner Coffey for his conduct of the 
hearings and for the recommendations he made after the Inquiry. But 
the outcome represented only a small victory for the general goal of 
improved people-environment relations.
The decision by the Premier to accept the Commissioner's 
recommendation that the gas pipeline follow a route south of the Blue 
Mountains did not have any impact on the larger problems of uncontrolled 
urban sprawl or the need for population decentralization from Sydney 
which the environmentalists said were not confronted by the Outline 
Flan. However, as the first section of the chapter attempted to show,
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these were major matters which arose from the relationship between the 
forces that direct the rate of consumption of resources and the 
political system which has the authority to set policies for regulating 
the use and allocation of resources including open space. Clearly, the 
stake which the environmentalists claimed in the protection of national 
parks was not large enough to have a noticeable impact on these 
relationships, nor was the threat to the Liberal Party in the Hawkesbury 
by-election strong enough to alter the political balance of power in 
the State parliament.
CONCLUSIONS
The successful strategy employed by the WPC, especially its 
use of the Hawkesbury by-election, more than anything else reflected 
its appreciation of the way the political system operated. However, 
perhaps the most important conclusion to arise from the case —  beginning 
with the WPC's awareness of the i-ssueness of the pipeline location to 
its participation in the by-election — was the necessity for the 
conjunction of events. The status of the wilderness areas, and 
regional/national parks within easy access to Sydney, the mood of 
environmentalism which gave rise to community activism in Australia in 
the early 1970s, the expressly sympathetic attitude of the reformist 
Commonwealth (Labor) government towards environmental protection, the 
slim majority held by the Liberals in the State parliament, and the 
Hawkesbury by-election were all important events in the mosaic (or 
totality) which shaped the outcome of the environmental protest.
Together these events or factors impose an historical specificity on
the pipeline conflict.
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But, fundamentally, the protest took place only because certain 
individuals were motivated and equipped to act. The Bannisters,
Dunphy, Lyle, Hatherly, Hermann, Wood and others were the agents 
responsible for producing a range of effects which must have imprinted 
on the environmental consciousness of individuals within AGL, the state 
and the rest of the community. The victories which the protest 
achieved may be divided into environmental effects and political effects 
after Olives (1967) who used the term 'effect' with reference to 
objectives successfully realized.
The environmental effects were:
(1) the re-assertion of the importance of national parks and the 
identification of a non-permissible use —  i.e. for pipeline 
easements.
(2) the ascription of meaning to the concept of wilderness in the 
Australian cultural context. (Although the term 'wilderness' 
had been used in reference to the Wollangambie area, because this 
was not an official designation the significance of the term was 
not authoritatively established. What the Inquiry did was, for 
the first time in the history of the Australian conservation 
movement, to raise the question of the meaning of wilderness.)
(3) the recognition of the need for environmental impact evaluations 
to include an assessment of the impacts of development projects 
on archaeological sites and the requirement to preserve those 
sites considered to be valuable relicts of the Aboriginal 
culture. (This was, in fact, a serendipitous outcome of the 
environmental Inquiry. It arose from the concerns expressed 
chiefly by the National Parks and Wildlife Service which is 
responsible for the preservation of archaeological sites in New
South Wales.)
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(4) the sensitizing of the population of the State, and of the nation 
in general, to the efficacy of protest action in gaining a 
reaction (desired or otherwise) from politial decision-makers.
(5) the sensitizing of AGL to the need to include environmental
impact considerations in future development planning. (There 
was evidence of this effect in later development projects 
undertaken by AGL: (a) the EIS which was prepared for the 1975
Inquiry into the Sydney-Newcastle lateral gas pipeline was 
vastly improved over that prepared for the Moomba-Sydney trunk 
pipeline; (b) the firm retained the Australian naturalist Harry 
Butler as an environmental consultant during the planning and 
construction of the Sydney-Newcastle lateral and it at present 
employs an 'environmental engineer' who is responsible for the 
restoration of soil and vegetation along their pipeline easements.)
The main political effects are, first, the impacts of the 
protest on those new agencies within the State bureaucracy responsible 
for various aspects of environmental management, specifically the SPCC 
and the NPWS. For both these agencies, the benefits should have been 
improved status within the bureaucracy, a clearer definition of their 
areas of responsibility, and increased respectability amongst the 
environmentalists. Most certainly, the specific ways in which these 
agencies contributed to the outcome of the environmental protest 
arose not only from their own assessment of the contribution they ought 
to make to environmental protection in the State, but from the support 
they felt existed within the community. Hence, the assertion of 
authority was due to their sensitivity to the mood of idealism, or 
frustration, which existed throughout Australia at the time. It was
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part of the same mood which had brought the Whitlam Labor Government 
to power in late 1972. Consequently, much of the outcome of the 
environmental controversy over the pipeline location is related to 
the time during which it took place. The other political effect of 
the pipeline controversy was its contribution to making environmental 
protection an important issue for inclusion in the political agenda.
The changes in the State and the Commonwealth governments 
since 1972 and the altered socio-economic conditions in Australia and 
the world have produced a mood of uncertainty about the future which 
is in marked contrast to the optimism which characterized the society 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Questions arise therefore as to 
how effective a WPC protest would be today, and whether a similar 
project would now give rise to the same responses. The environmental 
lessons learned by society in the recent past have probably eliminated 
the potential for the kind of conflict experienced in the pipeline 
case. However, unresolved conflicts such as the damming of the rivers 
of southwest Tasmania may call for new strategies on the part of all
those involved.
311
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT: FORCING CHANGE
IN THE SPHERE OF POWER
The chosen study illustrates how a decision by the New South 
Wales government to grant AGL's request to locate a natural gas 
pipeline within national parks caused controversy over what, for 
environmentalists, was an illegitimate transfer of a resource from 
public to private use. This thesis aimed to understand why the 
controversy arose and how the demands of competing interests were 
accommodated by the government.
The study was conducted within a set theoretical framework
in agreement with Rein (1976:255) that while reality can challenge the
value frameworks it cannot yield a value perspective. The search for
causality which underlies my commitment to this work is well summed
up in a statement by Dearlove (1973:2 36) :
Only if research is based upon a keen appreciation 
of the reality of local politics and political 
decision-making can reforms be suggested which will 
make government sensitive and responsive to the 
needs and demands of all citizens — and no amount of 
efficiency can make up for that.
This is a most important observation which is especially relevant at 
present when nearly all of the major Western democracies seem bent on 
achieving efficiency despite the great cost to some members of society.
The analysis of the pipeline case sought to demonstrate that 
environmental conflict is fundamentally related to the social 
distribution of power which is inequitable in terms of access to
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resources and influence over decisions for their use. The main 
theoretical position adopted was that the motivation for actions by 
participants in environmental controversies is related to a complex 
interplay of a-spatial forces operating in the local, national and 
international economy rather than to decisions which can be understood 
at the level of the individual alone. Nor can motivations for actions 
be explained purely in terms of the influence of the physical attributes 
of a site. These arguments were empirically demonstrated in the 
analysis carried out in the thesis.
The following discussion of the results of the analysis is 
divided into four parts. The first includes conclusions relating to 
the theoretical arguments of the thesis, while the second contains 
conclusions on the environmental pressure group activities. In the 
third part the policy implications of environmental conflicts are 
discussed and in the fourth part some implications of the findings for 
geographical theory are outlined.
Conclusions relating to the theoretical arguments
The context within which AGL operated was influenced by global 
patterns of inputs into the production of energy and by materials 
transport technology. However, the decision by the firm to construct 
the pipeline was more directly related to the changed energy situation 
within Australia and its own untenable position in the local energy 
market. The dominance of local and national influences in this case 
should be related to the very local nature of the firm. The switch 
from imported naphtha to natural gas meant that the source of AGL's 
main raw material input to production and the market for the output
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would be based entirely within the country.
The link which AGL had with the rest of the society was provided 
by its role as the major supplier of energy required by domestic and 
industrial consumers. The natural gas was also needed by the New South 
Wales government for use as an instrument of interstate competition.
Its role as the main supplier of a basic commodity in New South Wales 
defines the status of the firm within the society.
The identification of causes for the state's actions will 
perhaps always be the most difficult part of an analysis of 
environmental controversy. For it is here that there is greatest need 
to understand the nature of the state which, as Lukes (1977) points out, 
involves an inquiry into counterfactuals.
From the evaluation of theories of the state undertaken in 
Chapter 2 it was concluded that the prime responsibility of the state 
in capitalist society is to facilitate the reproduction of capitalist 
relations of production. Three types of functions underpin this role: 
economic, political and ideological. The constraints which each of 
these exerts on the behaviour of the state appear to depend on the 
particular circumstances surrounding each controversy. In the pipeline 
case the view of the state as the agent or 'associate' (Johnston, 
1980:440) of capitalism is supported. The New South Wales government 
acted in association with AGL to find a source of natural gas (Chapter 5) 
and to map a route for the pipeline from South Australia to Sydney 
through the Blue Mountains National Park (Chapter 7). The importance 
of political considerations was, however, well demonstrated in the 
government's response to the protest by the environmentalists. The
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act of ordering an Inquiry was the means through which environmental 
interests were accommodated by the state. The ability to take such 
action — as it turned out, at quite substantial costs to the firm — 
illustrates a certain amount of state autonomy from the firm (and 
from capital in general). This autonomy, or state power, must be 
directly related back to the role of the state in society which entails 
the resolution of conflicts of interest.
State power is distributed amongst the various institutions 
(or agencies) through which it performs its functions. The case study 
identified various agencies to which state power is entrusted. It 
was emphasized, however, that this power is always backed by law: 
state agencies do not normally act outside the ambit of these laws.
In fact it was shown in Chapter 6 that, even when laws existed which 
gave state agencies the authority to impose environmental standards on 
industrial activities, the responsibility may not be asserted until 
sufficient community pressure builds up for their implementation. It 
appears, therefore, that for environmental laws to be effective the 
community must be mobilized. This is a conclusion also reached by 
Storper et at. (1981). The evidence also suggests that inaction is 
one strategy used by various state apparatuses (Dearlove, 1973) to 
resist demands that impinge upon actions of groups which have state 
support. Inaction is also practised by business enterprises (Crenson, 
1971) where to grant community requests would reduce the efficiency 
of capital. Strategies of inaction provide a mechanism through which 
established patterns of behaviour are maintained or reproduced.
They are also one means by which power is exerted.
With respect to local governments, motivation for action in
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environmental controversies is influenced by the unique political and 
economic conditions of each constituency. However, as shown in the 
pipeline case, where the ultimate decision was made by the central 
government the influence which local governments can have on the 
outcome of decisions concerning who gets a share of resources is 
related to their economic power rather than the status of their 
political representative in the central government. This point is well 
demonstrated in the case of Wagga Wagga (Chapter 5). The weak economic 
status of local governments relative to the central government generally 
accounts for their subservient role in policy decisions.
The motivations for community protest action are usually 
plainly articulated by the participants in controversies. In the 
pipeline case one stimulus for community action was objection to the 
location of the development within national parks and wilderness areas. 
Another reason was indignation at the failure of government to 
communicate information about the project to the members of the 
community and to seek out their views prior to making a decision.
Public participation in the overall locational decision was forced by 
the environmentalists. The evidence suggests, then, that pressure 
groups act to stand in the way of the cooperation of the state and 
capital. A generalization from this observation would be that protest 
groups exert pressures for change in existing relationships in society.
At this point the question can be answered as to how the 
roles of the state, the firm and the community determine their 
relative influence in resource use decision-making. As shown throughout 
the thesis the different roles, and attendant power, determined the
relationship and the nature of the interaction between the three groups
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of participants in the environmental conflict. Their roles also 
determined the extent of knowledge (Qr advance intelligence) each 
group had about the project. The details of the pipeline project 
had to be prised out of the initiator (AGL) and the facilitator (the 
state) by the environmentalists who later used their grasp of the 
political process in advancing their own interest. In the case of 
the pipeline controversy knowledge was power.
Conclusions on environmental pressure group activities
Apart from underscoring the critical role of local pressure 
groups in forcing changes in society, the results of the analysis of 
the actions of the environmental activitists lead to several other 
significant conclusions about the nature and potential of protest 
politics. These conclusions, it is believed, provide cues for future 
policy for minimizing environmental conflict.
First, support is provided by Castells' (1976) and Olives'
(1976) argument that the success of social movements (of which
environmental protests are definitely a subset) depends on good
organization and a strong base of support for the issue (or the
stake) being debated. The widespread expression of concern over
environmental protection in Australia in general, and the Sydney Region
in particular, during the early 1970s meant that these two criteria
were easily met in the pipeline case. It is therefore important for
environmentalists to heed Olives' (1976:178) dictum that:
Given the 'presence of organization-type of action 
and social base3 it appears that it is the size 
of the stake which is decisive . . .  in determining 
whether urban or political effects are obtained 
or not.
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Also decisive, as demonstrated in the case study, is strategic planning
and accurate and relevant information. For environmentalists this
means, as Pickvance (1976:218) asserts, that:
the survival and success of such movements depends 
on the resources they are able to obtain free or 
through social exchange, from organizations in the 
community, from higher levels of hierarchies, and 
from the personal networks and multiple position of 
their members.
A second conclusion, identical to one reached by Storper et at. 
(1981), is that the environmentalists' success, like industry's, partly 
depends on pre-existing legal requirements and procedures. It is 
possible to see how the pipeline protest could have failed had the laws 
requiring the assessment of environmental impacts of development actions 
and the maintenance of national parks not been previously adopted.
While the first and second of these conclusions are connected 
to the politics of environmental protest, the third is more closely 
related to the nature of the protest and, as such, has implications 
for theory. It can fairly be said that the environmentalists' 
critique was mainly directed at the spatial effects (erosion of open 
space) caused by ongoing a-spatial processes. And while environmental­
ists in general have been severely, though not unnecessarily, criticized 
(e.g. by Enzensberger, 1974; Harvey, 1977) for laying emphasis only on 
effects, their successes have set important precedents (environmental 
impact assessment regulations, for example) for the future use and 
management of space. The theoretical implication of the environmental­
ists' focus is, therefore, that spatial patterns are important for 
identifying problem areas in society, even if they cannot provide any 
answers as to why the patterns occur in the first place. Knowledge of 
the relative importance and distribution of phenomena in space should
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then be seen as a basic starting point — but only that — for 
geographical inquiry.
The fourth and last of these conclusions is that the preservation 
of national parks and archaeological sites along the initial pipeline 
route was made possible only because of the existence of a particular 
set of circumstances which provided the opportunity for community 
action. Furthermore, the pipeline case corroborates a conclusion which 
Dearlove (1973:230) drew from his study of the politics of policy in 
local government in Britain. Dearlove's conclusion is that community 
forces 'are only likely to be decisive in determining the development 
of public policy where government is weak and operating in a hostile 
environment'. If indeed this is the norm, then there may be serious 
limitations to the reliance on protest as a motor for change in the 
conditions that create conflict. What therefore are the policy 
implications of this and the other conclusions made from the environmental 
controversy in the case studied?
Environmental conflicts: policy implications
Changes in the conditions that produce environmental conflict 
can only come about by altering the power relations within the structure 
of society. One possible scenario for an alternative future arises out 
of the argument that policy changes take place during periods of 
weakness or crisis in government. The scenario is this. With the 
continued proliferation of conflicts in society governments will be so 
weakened as to be compelled to adopt the sort of policies that reflect 
the demands of environmentalists. Another scenario, and one that
environmentalists everywhere have been pressing for, is the incorporation
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of standards for good environmental management into the decision-making 
process for resource development activities. Naturally this begs the 
question of what the standards are for good environmental management.
The answer, most definitely, lies in the beliefs and values of 
environmentalists. And, to go by Cotgrove and Duff's (1980, 1981) 
findings in Britain, as well as those implied but not systematically 
investigated in this study, the beliefs and values of environmentalists 
embrace an 'alternative' social paradigm (Table 7.1) which, if actuated, 
might lead to a new political economy (O'Riordan, 1980). The 
requirement for environmental impact assessment (EIA), which is being 
imposed to varying degrees in several countries throughout the world, 
is one means by which this alternative paradigm is already being 
partially implemented.
If standards and procedures are well thought out and systematically 
and universally applied, EIA regulations will lead to greater incorporation 
of environmental considerations into the planning and implementation of 
resource development projects. Of equal importance is the fact that the 
process can cause a decrease in the number of environmental conflicts.
This connection, between the adequate assessment of impacts and 
conflicts, has obviously been recognized in the United States, the 
European Economic Community and by the OECD.
In the United States regulations for EIA were established in the 
National Environmental Policy Act (n e p a), 1969. nepa was designed 
(Section 2)
to encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between 
man and his environment; to promote efforts which will 
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and 
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; 
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems 
and natural resources important to the Nation.
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Chapman (1981:191) observes that over the years, the process of 
refinement of NEPA's rules has served to define more clearly the kinds 
of situations in which EIA should be carried out. According to 
Chapman (1981:191) the experiences reflect the primacy of two sets 
of criteria 'one relating to the characteristics of the development, 
the other to the nature of the area in which it is to be located'. 
There is obviously great scope for geographers to contribute to an 
understanding of at least the second of these criteria.
But the whole EIA process is encumbered by many problems that 
are quite difficult to solve (Chapman, 1981). Within the European 
Economic Community, for example, O'Riordan (1981:forthcoming) observes 
that the problem
is not that EAs [environmental assessments] are not 
done, it is that they are not prepared to any set 
guideline, the planning authorities are generally 
not competent to understand them and that developers 
are not required to prepare them at set stages of. 
site selection and the canvassing of alternative 
approaches to achieving a given objective.
O'Riordan (1981:forthcoming) is concerned that the injustice
and politically motivated 'hit and miss ad hocery' surrounding when,
where and by whom EIAs are prepared be eliminated. He illustrates his
reasons for worrying with a most remarkable story:
In south west England two mining proposals lie little 
more than 50 miles apart, one in Devon and adjacent to 
Dartmoor National Park, the other in Cornwall and not 
adjacent to a designated landscape area. In the Devon 
case the company involved is very much aware of the 
power of the Dartmoor Preservation Association, the 
sensitivity of the site in question and the need to 
show willing at a forthcoming public inquiry. But in 
Cornwall, the company knew that the local planning 
authority was more interested in the job creation 
prospects of the proposal than its environmental impact 
and it received planning permission within a few months 
of submitting its application which contained less than 
two pages of what could be remotely construed as an EA.
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The Devon company has already spent two years and 
well over £250,000 on its EA.
However, there is much hope (Chapman, 1981; O'Riordan, 1981) that 
through the investigation and recommendations of the Commission of 
the European Communities some of these problems will be eliminated.
The importance of the EIA process and its role in national 
and international affairs is also recognized by the OECD countries."*"
A meeting of Ministers of Environment held in 1979 resulted in the 
adoption of a 'Declaration of Anticipatory Environmental Policies'
(OECD, 1980:9-10) by OECD members and Yugoslavia. The issues contained 
in the document reflect the potential of environmentalism to bring 
about significant changes in the relationship between people and 
nature and amongst nation states. The countries declared that:
(1) They will strive to ensure that environmental 
considerations are incorporated at an early stage of 
any decision in all economic and social sectors likely 
to have significant environmental consequences.
(2) They will seek more effective institutional, 
economic and other means to integrate environmental 
policy with policies in other sectors and in so doing, 
will attach priority to land-use planning to the 
chemicals, energy and other sectors having a major 
impact on the environment.
(3) They will, where appropriate and possible, employ 
economic and fiscal instruments, in combination as 
need be with regulatory instruments, to induce public 
and private enterprises and individuals to anticipate 
the environmental consequences of their actions and 
take them into account in their decisions.
(4) They will encourage the design, development and 
use of processes, products and urban form that conserve 
resources and energy, and that protect and enhance the 
environment.
These include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and 
the United States.
322
(5) They will, in proposing laws and making regulations, 
seek to.avoid unduly complex or conflicting requirements 
and unnecessary delays in decisions affecting the 
environment.
(6) They will endeavour, to the extent practicable, to 
develop systems to account for changes in environmental 
quality and related resource stocks.
(7) They will encourage public participation, where 
possible in the preparation of decisions with significant 
environmental consequences, inter alia, by providing as 
appropriate information on the risks, costs and benefits 
associated with the decisions.
(8) They will support the promotion of environmental 
objectives and awareness in the field of education.
(9) They will strengthen their co-operation in the OECD 
in order to encourage arrangements between interested 
parties on international environmental problems, and to 
seek harmonization of national environmental policies.
(10) They will continue to co-operate to the greatest 
extent possible, both bilaterally and through appropriate 
international organizations, with all countries, in 
particular developing countries in order to assist in 
preventing environmental deterioration.
Although there is usually a gulf between declarations of 
intention (such as the above) and actions, it can only be hoped that 
efforts will be made towards achieving the stated goals. And, whereas 
the responsibility for policies must ultimately be that of governments, 
environmentalists will have to play a leading part in seeing that the 
necessary actions are taken. Consequently, in addition to the usual 
strategies of overt protest, lobbying and education, environmentalists 
should seek (as did the WPC) representation in state parliaments. In 
this way they will be better able to initiate debate, change 
institutions and influence the adoption of policies reflecting their
ideology.
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Implications for geographical theory
Although the study strongly supports the structural approach 
outlined in Chapter 1, it has also served to show how the theory falls 
short of being comprehensive. It has been demonstrated that the main 
strength of the form of structuralism adopted here was the emphasis on 
determinate relationships between broad social groupings such as the 
state, the private sector and the community. It was also argued that 
it is these relationships which set constraints on the choices for 
action made by individuals and groups. But as illustrated by the 
case study, 'what is done within these constraints reflects the 
particular orientation of peoples, times and places' (Johnston, 1980:441). 
Hence, while the understanding of structural constraints certainly enables 
a degree of prediction about the general motion of capitalist society, 
its ability to account for either the incidence or the outcome of 
events like environmental conflicts is itself constrained by a lack 
of knowledge of the reactions and actions of individuals and groups.
For instance, while it was possible to explain the relationship between 
the main participating groups in the pipeline controversy, the reactions 
and actions of the environmentalists and the Whitlam Government to the 
proposal to locate the pipeline within national parks could not be 
explained on the basis of the theory. This result (admittedly here 
limited to one case) points to the need for a theory which explicates 
causality in structural terms but which also admits a conception of 
social change based on human action.
Indeed, if it is true that men and women make their own history, 
even if not in the circumstances of their own choosing (Marx, 1969:398) 
then to ignore one or the other of these claims would present problems
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for geographical theory. But the articulation of the contradictory 
unity between structure and action (Giddens, 1979) remains a major 
challenge for the social sciences.
Thus far, geographers have tended to emphasize either one or
the other aspect of the Marxian maxim. Those who have limited their
aims to illustrating how social structure determines human behaviour
have earned the criticism that there is
a certain "circularity" in the "structuralist way of 
thinking" and its inclination to overdeterminism — 
its inclination to see the features of existing 
capitalist systems as part of an overall structure 
which, in the last instance, only reproduce the very 
same structure — prevented structuralism from 
identifying those forces within the advanced capitalist 
core countries which could potentially be interpreted 
as possible alternatives to capitalist development 
(Szelenyi, 1981:7).
Some more specific criticisms of the application of the 
structural approach in geographical analysis have been raised by Wood 
(1980). Interestingly, the problems which he identifies all seem to 
be related to the fact of the dichotomization of social structure and 
actions of human agents. Wood (1980) finds, in Massey and Meegan's 
(1979) empirical application of structural analysis, three principal 
weaknesses. They are: (i) that it throws no light on the alternative
responses of interests other than those whose actions are examined;
(ii) that it lacks the ability to anticipate behaviours and (iii) that 
there is a failure to clarify the social and economic significance of 
the problems identified.
These faults seem to spring from the fact that structuralist 
theory is about the actions (Dawe, 1979) of large groupings or classes
and organizations in society. Such a focus naturally results in a lack
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of understanding of the meaning —  intentionality and consciousness 
(Buttimer, 1974:29) — of human actions.
But the weaknesses of structuralism are the strengths of 
humanistic geography. According to Buttimer's (1974) view the 
humanistic geographer seeks to understand social facts by gaining 
awareness of the values that underlie the selection and definition 
of problems. She places importance on values because they reflect 
patterns of thinking about the world. Values, Buttimer (1974) 
maintains, can have profound effects on what is actually implemented 
in social policy. Then, it is through values that the social 
significance of actions can be assessed. Caws (1967:54) provides 
grounds for this stance. He proffers the view that values 'refer not 
to what is or was the case, but to what will or may be the case.
They, are therefore, always prospective or future referential'.
Herein lies the strength of the humanistic project. For without a 
reasonable comprehension of the beliefs and values that propel 
environmentalism, for example, it is impossible to evaluate the 
potential of the movement to bring about changes in society. Thus 
only by being told (e.g. by Cotgrove and Duff, 1980, 1981) that 
environmentalists adhere to an alternative social paradigm can a 
different future be anticipated. Even then, the prospect that one set 
of beliefs and values will predominate must be judged against the 
strength of competing paradigms. Hence the need for knowledge of 
alternative responses to social conditions.
Obviously, either structuralism or humanism has distinctive 
evaluative emphases and each is applicable at a particular level of 
abstraction. The former (the large-scale view) is useful for
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understanding processes operating at the level of society as a whole 
while the latter (the small-scale view) is limited to the study of 
processes at the level of the individual. The task which remains is 
for human geographers to bring both views together in a meaningful way. 
There are four options. The first is to link the two views through 
synthesis. The second is to develop an entirely new theoretical 
approach which takes account of both views. The third would require 
the formulation of a theory which brings the large-scale view down to 
the level of the other, and the last option is for geographers to see 
the task as an impossibility and therefore unnecessary.
The first option should be seen as a pragmatic short-term 
strategy. Indeed, it is one which is already being pursued (cf. Sayer, 
1979; Gregory, 1981; Forbes and Thrift, 1981). Efforts in this 
direction ought to lead, in the long term, to an entirely new theory 
of social structure and human action (option two). It is hoped that, 
by responding to this kind of a challenge, the claim that geographers 
'experience malaise rather than threat to our values, indifference 
rather than belligerence over issues' (Buttimer, 1974:27) will soon be 
pass£.
Finally, what is also needed is a lot more empirical testing 
of the various theoretical positions. Only by so doing will we gain the 
insights needed for our theories to more closely approximate real world 
situations. It is hoped that the analysis of the pipeline case carried 
out in this thesis will be seen as a modest contribution to this end.
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APPENDIX 1
The 'Wang Conservation Ethic' is reproduced below. It was 
prepared in 1968 for the construction of the Dongara to Perth and 
Pinjarra gas pipeline and was also applied in the construction of 
the Moomba-Sydney pipeline. Its author, Mr. W.H. Butler, has explained 
(pers. comm., 20 October 1981) that it has been expanded and developed 
immensely since 1968, and that today it is the background document for 
the construction of most pipelines of any magnitude in Australia.
Wang Conservation Ethic
Butler regarded conservation in four basic concepts, these being 
preservation, utilization, restoration and beautification. With these 
concepts in mind, the following programme was applied to the pipeline 
construction.
1. PRESERVATION
(a) Easement
Minimal easement was taken for the practical laying of the 
pipeline and its auxiliaries. In essence, this meant over 
vacant and agricultural land, 18 m, over metropolitan land,
15 m, and over highly developed specialized land, 12 m as 
easements. In some specialized cases, involving gardens and 
existing buildings, the easement was hand-dug to strictly 
the width of the pipe. This latter situation was minimal.
(b) Right-of-Way Clearing
In the preliminary clearing, the right-of-way was only levelled 
to top soil level, with surface vegetation cover removed, 
leaving the woody root stock of native plants in situ. This 
had a dual purpose of preventing erosion and bogging of equipment, 
plus fast regeneration from existing root stock.
(c) Aesthetic Value
Where the public had visual access to the right-of-way, certain 
key trees were left intact by moving construction machinery 
around them rather than remove them.
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(d) Fire Control
Fire control in terms of brush clearance, fire guards during 
pipe welding and spark arresters on all heavy equipment was 
observed at all times.
(e) Weed Control
The prevention of weed development along the right-of-way was 
implemented by the quarantine and cleaning of heavy moving 
equipment and the total restriction of soil movement along 
the right-of-way. The retention of root stock helped to 
suppress stray weed seed establishment.
(f) National Areas
Public features such as the Swan River Crossing, National Parks 
and similar places were considered in terms of total preservation. 
In the case of the Swan River Crossing it was obvious that the 
river would have to be crossed and two possibilities existed.
One was to bridge the river, which was impractical, the other 
was to trench the river bed and lay the pipe below existing 
river levels. This latter was carried out, but erosion factors 
in the disturbed bank areas led to considerable problems and 
eventually a restoration programme using a structure with a 
positive failure time of approximately 5 years was built.
Behind this were planted trees of which it is estimated that 
within 5 years of planting time will have sufficient root mass 
to recreate the original river bank profile. In the case of 
National Parks, Fauna Reserves and other Crown owned land vested 
for a particular reason, specific care was taken to ensure that the 
original purpose of the vestment was honoured and that at no time 
would the pipeline laying run contrary to the original purpose or 
be unavailable for restoration in terms of original purpose.
2. UTILIZATION
(a) Area
It was quite obvious that although the surface right-of-way 
was granted that the utilization was an area of ground between 
0.9 and 1.2 m below surface level. Once this utilization had 
taken place, there was no further use for the right-of-way as 
such, excepting for the retention of an access track for 
maintenance purposes. The access track is approximately vehicle 
width. From both conservation and engineering viewpoints to lay 
the pipe and refill as quickly as possible was most practical.
(b) Permanent Firebreaks
In certain instances in Crown and Shire land, the local authority 
has chosen to use the right-of-way as a fire break. Assuming 
advance information was given that this was intended during 
construction, a much cleaner cut was made to ensure minimal 
regrowth in the area. In such cases all trash material was 
disposed of by burning.
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(c) Public Use of Right-of-Way
South of Eneabba where the main road had not been constructed 
the general public made use of the right-of-way as an access 
track to Eneabba. This contravened our agreement with the Lands 
Department to regenerate the area, as a mechanical erosion on 
the right-of-way being used by public, prevented regeneration. 
The anomaly was discussed with the Lands Department and 
permission was given the company to restrict public access 
across public land for the purpose of regeneration of the 
right-of-way to meet our contractural obligations.
(d) Aesthetic Values
(i) The compressor stations are controlled by radio which 
necessitates the use of radio receiver masts. These are placed 
on high situations and aesthetically tend to be slightly less 
than pleasing. The design and painting of these masts is 
governed by Civil Aviation and other Commonwealth and State 
Statutes. In these cases WANG could only build the most 
aesthetic structure that is possible under the Statutory 
rulings.
(ii) All construction and domestic litter was cleaned up by 
subcontractors, this being written into their contracts. A 
WANG team under the Conservation Consultant did final litter 
checks and established litter bins at points of public use.
3. RESTORATION
(a) Soil
Soil was backfilled over the trench in such a way that top soil 
was replaced in its correct position in the soil horizon to 
emphasize and expedite maximum regrowth. This was accomplished 
by prior engineering planning using a machine type which 
allowed soil separation in the initial trench digging. Refill 
was carried out by bulldozer which was able to refill the 
separated sub-soil before capping with the separation top-soil.
(b) Brush Replacement
All vegetative cover removed during construction and access work 
to the right-of-way was windrowed and following soil replacement 
was spread over the 12 m right-of-way. This material includes 
tree stumps as well as the lighter material. Their presence 
prohibits vehicle movement on the 12 m side and acts as seed, 
soil and water traps, it inhibits wind erosion, promotes root 
stock regrowth by preventing vehicular traffic and provides 
micro-habitat for the re-establishment of ground fauna. During 
the critical summer months for regeneration it reduces glare 
and reduces surface evaporation. This is an essential part of 
the conservation programme for the pipeline.
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(c) Maintenance
All maintenance is carried out from the 6 m side of the pipeline. 
It should be explained that the 18 m right-of-way was divided 
into 6 m and 12 m side by the pipe. The 12 m side was used 
for mechanical access and all machinery operated on this side.
The 6 m side was used for soil and spoil disposal during 
construction and as the maintenance access track after laying.
(d) Critical Flora Areas
In certain critical areas which were specifically contracted, 
native plans of the same frequency and density as were cleared 
over the right-of-way during construction were replanted. In 
order to determine this, prior studies taking plant densities and 
frequencies were made by the Conservation Consultant. The species 
concerned were especially grown in a plant nursery and from there 
were planted out following construction during the early rainy 
season over the restored area. To date there has been an 85 per 
cent survival rate of such replanted material. Approximately 
25,000 plants were put out in this way.
4. BEAUTIFICATION
(a) Aesthetic Structures
All areas in the public eye have been beautified by shielding 
with attractive shrubs and trees.
(b) Weed Control
Weed control on these areas has been implemented by the use of 
subsurface plastic shields or selected weedicides.
(c) Road Crossings
All major road crossings of the pipeline have been angled in such 
a way that the travelling public is unable to look directly 
down the pipeline. This minimizes the visual effect of the 
immediate post-construction stage and reduces the aesthetic 
impact on the public until such times as regrowth takes place.
SUMMARY
It is the prime objective of the Conservationist to have the 
right-of-way contain an identical biotic complex to the immediately adjacent 
surroundings. Obviously specific attention must be paid to micro-habitats, 
such as the Swan River Bank, but in general these problems did not arise.
The biotic complex consist of inter-relationship of animals, plants, soil 
and climate within the framework of time. The construction of the pipeline 
directly affects animals, plants and soil and Wang's conservation programme 
is specifically designed to keep this interference to an absolute minimum, 
within the practical necessities of laying the line, to restore the 
original condition as soon as is practical and to ensure that, whatever time
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lag takes place between these two objectives, that the aesthetic 
appearance is not one which will cause adverse public comment. The 
major factor which appears to be overlooked by the uninformed would-be 
conservationist, is that of time. In Western Australia it is significant 
that no critical comment was levelled at the conservation or construction 
of the West Australian Natural Gas Pipeline.
General Summary of Engineering Principles with 
Conservation Values and Vice Versa
1. Root Stock Retention
(a) By setting, clearing bulldozer blades 2 inches above ground 
surface and only removing vegetative material plus any big 
trees and stumps, there is an immediate regrowth of vegetation 
from the predominantly root stock based Australia flora.
(b) There is no disturbance of soil components and therefore there 
is less opportunity for exotics to establish themselves in an 
undisturbed soil.
(c) The root stock retention enables vehicles and the machinery 
to move over sandy soils (as in Western Australia) without 
breaking the surface and becoming bogged and it is significant 
that no time was lost during construction for this reason.
(d) There is little fire risk during welding or other operations, 
because the root stock is subsurface and therefore relatively 
non-flammable.
2. Soil Erosion Control
Contouring right-of-way and access tracks is practical commonsense, 
preventing washout of pipeline, making easier access, and inhibiting 
wind and water erosion.
3. Pipe Coating
Pipe treatment was an extruded plastic sheet which excludes root 
penetration of the pipeline. This obviates the necessity (when 
different types of shielding are used) to have low or surface rooted 
vegetation above the pipeline.
4. Soil Separation
Soil separation is inherent within the type of machinery used and a 
refill putting soil back into proper horizons is also inherent.
All that is required is initial planning and logistics to ensure that 
these aspects are fully carried out.
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5. Surface Material
Respreading of surface material is an essential. In Western 
Australia a condition of easement is restoration of the area and 
by respreading of vegetation. This is speeded up for many reasons 
(described in the previous section).
6. Prior Studies
An essential of this whole conservation programme is a prior 
examination by a competent Field Biologist who is aware of the 
total needs of conservation in its widest sense. This in turn 
leads to the establishment of a nursery or the utilization of an 
existing nursery to grow the necessary native species for replanting 
selected areas. It is quite useless to leave this aspect until the 
pipeline construction is completed, it must be done prior to the 
beginning of construction.
7. River Crossings
River crossings which I put in the category of public places, are 
like national monuments, they are essential areas which may not 
be disturbed. There is a temporary disturbance while construction 
takes place and then a structure of wood with a built in obsolescence 
factor due to local conditions, e.g. termites and dry-rot, is erected 
to hold a profile bank in place while the replanted vegetation is 
establishing the necessary root structure. In Western Australia, 
the estimated obsolescence time of the Swan River crossing is 5 years, 
when it is expected that the root structure of the replaced vegetation 
will totally restore the river bank to its preconstruction profile.
8. Communic ation
At all times the compatibility between engineering practice and a 
conservation desirability is borne in mind and a working rapport 
between engineers and conservation advisers is an absolute essential 
to ensure the maximum benefit for both sides of the operation.
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APPENDIX 2
Scenes from the Blue Mountains National Park.
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APPENDIX 3
Election campaign brochures prepared by the WPC for the 
Hawkesbury district by-election.
HUGH BAN N I S T E R  S EEKS:
•  REVISION OF S Y D N E Y  D E V E L O P M E N T  PLAN
At present Sydney must accommodate a thousand more 
people every week. The guidelines for development in the 
Sydney Region Outline Plan are based on the growth-mad 
assumption of 5Vx million by the year 2000, by which time the 
growth rate will have doubled. The plan should be revised to 
cater for a smaller population in Sydney and should emphasize 
decentralisation. A new international airport should not be 
included in this plan.
•  RE-ROUTI NG OF GAS PIPELINE
Sound national reasons demand construction of the pipeline 
through Goulburn. The Askin Government agreed to hold a 
last-minute public inquiry in a bid to defuse Hugh Bannister's 
election campaign. But no inquiry is needed to show that a 
pipeline should not pass through national parks or the Blue 
Mountains.
•  REVIS ED Z ONI NGS
Vague "non-urban" zoning of much of the electorate leaves 
residents uncertain of their future. Most of the electorate 
should be zoned "rural" and rates kept correspondingly low. 
The introduction of Scenic Preserves, an idea used effectively 
elsewhere to control development, would maintain the 
character of the area.
•  IMP ROVED PUBLIC T R A N S P O R T
The shameful deterioration of the Richmond railway service 
must be corrected.
•  C O N T R O L  OF RIVER
Mining and pollution must be stopped from irreparably 
damaging the Hawkesbury River. Also, proper zoning will 
allow the river to be enjoyed by everyone, not just a privileged 
few.
•  S T R O N G  E N V I R O N M E N T A L  POLICIES
The present environmental legislation should be strengthened. 
The N.S.W. Department of Environment needs staff. Public 
participation in decision-making is essential.
P.O. Box 23, 
Windsor, N.S. W. 2756 
Telephone: Kurrajong 76-1261
Dear Elector,
You and your friends have chosen to live in the Hawkesbury 
district for many different reasons. Perhaps you relish the crisp air o f  
the mountains or the quiet beauty o f  the river. Farming may be your 
choice, or perhaps you prefer the life in charming towns like 
Richmond and Windsor.
But the choice is disappearing. The city is sprawling into the 
Hawkesbury. Already speculators have moved in. You will not only 
have to change your way o f life, but will also have to pay for 
Sydney’s expansion with skyrocketing rates, overcrowded schools 
and hospitals, pollution and traffic congestion. It has been like this 
elsewhere in Sydney, and the Askin Government plans the same for 
you.
It need not be this way. We could, in fact, slow down Sydney 's 
growth by calling for fewer migrants and by co-operating with the 
Commonwealth in diverting Sydney’s growth to towns like Albury. 
By doing this, we could improve the life for existing residents and 
not waste our money on needless expansion. We could choose a way 
o f  life which suited us, rather than having the decision made by 
some politician or planner sitting in a Sydney office.
The Australian preferential voting system allows you to use your 
first preference vote to register a protest against the destruction o f  
your environment. You can then use your second preference to vote 
for the major party which you support.
I f  you want to discuss these issues, I  would like to meet you and 
your friends or talk to your society or group. A donation and some 
help on polling day would also assist our campaign enormously. I f  
you wish you can contact me at the above address.
Australians have fought and worked hard to build a way o f  life 
for themselves and their children. Yet we cannot enjoy it i f  our 
surroundings are continually deteriorating. So isn’t environment 
what politics is all about?
Authorised for the Wilderness Protection Committee by Donations payable to :— The Wilderness Protection Committee.
Councillor A. Kemp, Tizzana Road, Ebenezer.
Printed by the New South Wales University Press,
Govett Street, Randwick.
VoteM  
Bannister
T H E  A S K I N  G O V E R N M E N T  T A L K S  A B O U T  T H E  
E N V I R O N M E N T  A N D  C A R R I E S  O U T  I N V E S T I G A T I O N S ,  BUT 
W H A T  H A S  IT D O N E  F O R  H A W K E S B U R Y ?
A L R E A D Y  IN T H E  E L E C T O R A T E :
•  R A T E S  A R E  R I S I N G
Sydney's unbridled growth has caused land speculation in the 
electorate followed by rising rates. Some residents are forced 
to abandon the rural way of life.
•  N A T U R A L  G A S  P I P E L I N E  P L A N N E D
The proposed pipeline and its Newcastle branch will scar areas 
in the south and east of the electorate as well as nearby 
national parks, everybody's heritage. Unwillingness to establish 
powerline corridors has meant that lines festoon the 
countryside.
•  P O W E R  B O A T S  M O N O P O L I S E  R I V E R
Each summer weekend thousands of waterskiers dominate the 
Hawkesbury River, once a restful recreational facility, creating 
a hazard for those seeking more peaceful enjoyment. Serious 
erosion has resulted and residents suffer from noise and 
congestion.
•  B E L L B I R D  HI LL H A S  BEEN C L E A R E D
Clearing has destroyed the charm of Bellbird Hill, near 
Kurrajong Heights. This is only one example of extensive 
irresponsible development of the escarpment.
•  R I V E R S  A R E  P O L L U T E D
The Nepean-Hawkesbury River system is already polluted by 
sewage and industrial waste. A new waste dump close to the 
river at Castlereagh will take waste from all Sydney.
•  G R A V E L  M I N I N G  IS D E V A S T A T I N G  R I V E R S
The beauty of local rivers has been destroyed by large-scale 
gravel mining. The State Planning Authority over-ruled Colo 
Shire Council to permit mining of the lower Grose. Heavy 
trucks are damaging roads and are hazardous to residents and 
visitors.
•  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  A I R P O R T  T H R E A T E N E D
A new airport of this size would shatter the peace of the 
Hawkesbury Valley.
F O R  T H E  Y E A R  2 0 0 0 :
T H E  A S K I N  G O V E R N M E N T  P L A N S  T O  H A V E  T H E  
P R E S E N T  P E A C E F U L  C O M M U N I T Y  C R O W D E D  O U T  BY A 
T E E M I N G  P O P U L A T I O N  O F  H A L F  A M I L L I O N ,  
T O G E T H E R  W I T H  F A C T O R I E S ,  F L A T S ,  P O L L U T I O N  A N D  
C O N G E S T I O N .
HUGH BANNISTER RSc. BI. (HONS.) 
..THE ENVIRONMENT CANDIDATE
A 29-year-old engineer and conservationist is 
standing as a candidate in the Hawkesbury 
by-election to be held on February 1 7.
The candidate, Hugh Bannister, will give N.S.W. 
voters, for the first time, a chance to show they care 
for the environment. He wants the environment to 
get your number one vote.
Hugh Bannister is a 
first-class environment 
c a n d i d a t e  because, 
professionally, he devotes 
himself to solving the 
problem of transport chaos 
and, on weekends, he 
bushwalks in the natural areas 
around Sydney.
After attending a Hornsby 
school, Hugh Bjannister 
graduated in both Science 
and Mechanical Engineering 
(with honours) at the 
University of N.S.W.
He worked for fojir years 
in Australia and Europe as a 
mechanical engineer. But he 
began to feel that too many 
engineers did not appreciate 
the beauty of their
surroundings. He decided to 
return to new studies.
He has been back at the 
university for the last two 
years working towards a 
doctorate. He is, incidentally, 
president of the Society for 
Environmental Action there. 
His particular research 
interest is the routing and 
scheduling of buses and trains 
to provide the best possible 
service. “1 use a mathematical 
method called optimisation,” 
he explains, “a branch of 
Operations Research directed 
at getting the best results 
with your resources.”
He is an advocate, for 
instance, of the minibus taxi 
-  a small radio-directed bus
Hugh & Nicole Bannister explore a natural area of the electorate on one 
of their weekend outings.
Historic buildings add to the 
character of the area.
which provides a 
door-to-door service on 
request. It is technically 
feasible. “Adelaide is to try 
out minibus taxis,” he says. 
“Perhaps the relatively 
uncluttered roads in the 
Hawkesbury electorate may 
be the place to experiment in 
Sydney.”
About six months ago 
Hugh Bannister and his wife, 
Nicole, helped to form a new 
bushwalking group. The club 
planned to investigate the 
Wollangambe Wilderness in 
the Blue Mountains National 
Park and other untouched 
areas.
But in October last year 
the walkers discovered that 
the wilderness area was 
crossed by survey pegs for the
natural gas pipeline from 
South Australia. They formed 
a task-force called the 
W ilderness Protection 
Committee and elected Hugh 
Bannister chairman.
While campaigning against 
the pipeline route they met 
local people who complained 
about one environmental 
outrage after another. The 
Committee decided to 
sponsor a candidate in the 
Hawkesbury by-election so 
that residents could voice 
their disapproval of things 
like the pipeline (which is 
proposed to run through the 
electorate), the rising rates 
due to Sydney’s expansion 
and the noise caused by 
water-skiers.
The Wilderness Protection 
Committee selected Hugh as 
the ideal candidate and has 
called on all people 
concerned with the 
environment to support him. 
“We must take the 
offensive,” he says.
Do not underestimate the 
power of the number one 
vote you give Hugh Bannister. 
His Committee has already 
made the environment a hot 
issue in this by-election. 
Following the announcement 
that a conservationist would 
stand the Askin Government 
proposed two last-minute 
inquiries — one into the gas 
pipeline and one for the 
whole Hawkesbury Valley.
“But inquiries without 
action are useless,” says 
Hugh. “An independent in 
parliament will ensure that 
election promises are 
fulfilled.”
PLANNING IN PUBLIC, NOT IN SECRET.
Rational planning fo r the fu tu re  is no t possible i f  the pub lic  is de liberate ly 
kep t in a state o f ignorance. B itte r experience has shown tha t large 
corpora tions and governm ent departm ents, w o rk in g  in secret, arouse hostile 
opposition  when the ir schemes threaten to  carve up the remaining natural 
areas o f the state.
On the o the r hand, an in fo rm ed co m m u n ity  cou ld  lighten the load o f many 
a pu b lic  servant.
Th is co-operation can begin now. The Blue M ounta ins should be covered by 
an overall p lanning scheme prepared w ith  fu ll pub lic  review. As a f irs t step, the 
environm enta l im pact s tudy o f the A G L  p ipe line p ro jec t should be made 
available fo r  pu b lic  scru tiny before the fina l decision on the route is made. 
The shameful secrecy now surrounding the  details o f th is  pro ject arouses 
jus tifiab le  suspicion tha t the Blue M ountains is being sold fo r  a song.
WHAT YOU CAN DO, NOW!
WRITE to  you r local S tate and Federal Parliam entary Members.
Insist tha t an a lternative route be used to  save the Blue 
M ounta ins fro m  despoliation.
VISIT yo u r local council i f  you  live in an area d ire c tly  affected by
the p ipeline. Demand th a t the State P o llu tion  C ontro l 
Commission review the p ro jec t.
SUPPORT the N ational Parks & W ild life  Service in its stand against the 
pro ject w ith  letters and telegrams.
VI EW the W ollangambe Wilderness fro m  Du Faur's Rocks and other
vantage po in ts  at M ount W ilson.
JOIN and support you r local environm enta l o r conservation
society.
Donations and Enquiries to: 
WILDERNESS PROTECTION COMMITTEE, 
P.O. BOX N204,
GROSVENOR STREET,
SYDNEY, NSW 2000
M a jo r S ponsors :
M r G .B . M assingham , B ilp in .
N.S.W . F e d e ra tio n  o f B u sh w a lk in g  C lubs.
wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww
§; 8 JC
i. O
Natural Gas 
for Sydney
What Price 
Progress!
A u th o r is e d  b y : R. L y le , 26  W h ite  S tre e t, B a lgow lah .
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The Facts...
GOOD GAS, BAD PIPELINE.
The Sydney-Newcastle-Wollongong region is the only large industrial area in 
Australia not yet supplied with natural gas. The East-Australian Pipeline 
Corporation, which is wholly owned by the Australian Gas Light Company 
(AGL), plans to correct this deficiency by piping gas from Moomba in South 
Australia to Sydney, a distance of 780 miles.
Natural gas is a clean-burning fuel which can be used in many ways as a 
replacement for coal and petroleum products, and although most of the air 
pollution in urban areas is caused by motor vehicles, any improvement, 
however small, must be welcomed.
AGL aims to dramatically expand its sales of gas to industry by reducing 
the price by as much as 50%. It is unlikely that domestic and commercial users 
will also benefit from a significant price reduction. Small consumers will be 
subsidising AGL's frantic scramble for industrial users.
When it comes to the route of the pipeline, AGL seems to be operating 
under the impression that national parks and natural environments are always 
the most expendable.
Pipeliners prefer parks. Rights of way are easier to obtain from 
governments than from protesting private landowners. AGL intends to lay its 
pipe across the proposed Sturt National Park in north-western NSW. When the 
pipe reaches the Blue Mountains the proposed route will take it swathing 
through the Wollangambe Wilderness of the Blue Mountains National Park and 
then through the picturesque gardens and orchards of Mount Irvine, Bilpin and 
Grose Vale.
Branchlines through the Hawkesbury and lllawarra areas threaten other 
proposed parks.
DESTRUCTION IN THE MOUNTAINS.
Many of the areas affected by 
Wollangambe Wilderness, with its m 
gorges, offers a unique wilderness e>
The main Moomba-Sydney 
buried to a depth of 3 feet except 
gorge on an arched bridge. To 
easement will need to be cleared o 
will need to be blasted to obtai 
machinery will require much large:
Regular aerial surveillance will 
for maintenance purposes.
AGL has publicly claimed that t 
the pipeline "is scarcely visible, evi 
years". It is true that buried pipe i 
agricultural areas. However, the con: 
that effective restoration will 
Wollangambe area.
In the sandstone country of the 
will always be visible and unavoid 
clear streams into rivers of mud 
route will thwart the painful recove1
the pipeline are relatively unspoiled. The 
tze of jagged rocky ridges and deep narrow 
perience to all those who seek it. 
aline will be 34 inches in diameter and 
where it crosses the scenic Wollangambe 
construct the pipeline, an 80 foot wide 
all vegetation. In rugged areas, the terrain 
n a relatively uniform route and heavy 
areas for manoeuvring.
necessary and permanent access retained
te area can be restored so that the route of 
m on the right of way, after two or three 
nes do little permanent damage to open 
i^truction engineers have privately admitted 
impossible in the rough parts of the
Blue Mountains the scar of the easement 
ible erosion of the steep terrain will turn 
Inevitable future pipelines along the same 
I y process.
We Must 
Act NoW!
HOW MUCH IS A WILDERNESS WORTH?
Despite AGL claims to the contrary, it is not possible for this scheme to 
proceed without seriously affecting the wilderness nature of the Wollangambe 
area and other sections of the Blue Mountains, The fact that such a scheme, 
which is contrary to the aims of a system of national parks, is being considered 
at all highlights the extraordinary lack of authority of the National Parksand 
Wildlife Service.
Sir William Pettingell, the General Manager of AGL, neatly summed up his 
attitude when he publicly stated that "Personally, I would like to have my 
pipeline out in the wilds away from everyone". Such a policy would swiftly 
erode the wilderness, recreational and scenic value of the Blue Mountains — 
surely one of the State's most precious assets.
This project, the first of its kind, will be a precedent facilitating attacks on 
every national park in NSW. For this reason alone the proposal must not 
become a reality.
ALTERNATIVES EXIST.
No reasonable person will deny the need for natural gas, and studies show 
that a pipeline is by far the most economic method of transportation. 
Suggestions to use existing transport corridors across the Blue Mountains have 
been rejected with simplistic explanations by AGL. Some of these are 
definitely worthy of serious study.
Also, the route passing through the Goulburn area, which was AGL's 
original proposal, is almost entirely through open country and would do little 
damage. AGL has refused to reveal the additional costs involved in this 
alternative but $8 million has been unofficially stated (compared with the 
total project cost of $250 million). This is a cost to AGL but the investment at 
this stage may result in a saving for the community when the planned trunk 
between Sydney and Melbourne is built. The Goulburn route would also 
encourage decentralisation to the Sydney-Melbourne corridor.
PUBLIC IN THE DARK.
It is only by good fortune that the public became aware of the proposed 
route as early as it did. The first official disclosure of the Bathurst-Sydney 
section was made in the newspapers of November 10, 1972, but surveying of 
this section was well underway by September. While surveying and 
right-of-way negotiations were continuing apace, both AGL and the NSW 
Government denied that the route was anything more than a proposal. Yet, no 
surveys have been carried out on AGL's other alternatives.
A final decision is expected early in 1973 with construction to commence 
at a number of points by Easter. Secrecy has pruned the period of public 
discussion to a matter of weeks.
HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF.
The fact that important decisions will be made during parliamentary recess 
is reminiscent of the Clutha controversy.
Ironically, the person responsible for deciding the fate of the Blue 
Mountains is none other than Wal Fife, the Minister for Mines and Power. Mr. 
Fife has been an enthusiastic supporter of AGL in parliament and cannot be 
exepcted to evaluate the project's environmental impact study impartially. His 
decisions on Myall Lakes, Colong and Clutha demonstrate his bias.
The brand new Department of the Environment and the supposedly 
powerful State Pollution Control Commission have left the National Parks and 
Wildlife Service to fight this proposal alone. Nothing has changed with the 
coming of environmental legislation.
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